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LABOR LAW
I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND REPRESENTATIONAL ACTIVITY
A.*National Labor Relations Board's Authority To Award Attorney's Fees
Limited: Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRBI
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA")
provides that the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") will,
upon finding that a respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices,
issue an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist such
unlawful activities. 2 Further, the NLRA authorizes the Board "to take
such affirmative action including the reinstatement of employees, with
or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the Act."' Included
among the NLRA's policies is encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining.' Toward that end, the Board's authority to
award attorney's fees where the respondent engaged in frivolous liti-
gation remained intact for twenty-five years in the District of Columbia
Circuit.' The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB overturned its precedent,
deferring instead to the traditional American rule that mandates that
each side assume its own litigation expenses, absent a statute clearly
indicating Congress's intention to permit an exception. 6 By withhold-
ing the Board's authority to award attorney's fees, the court erodes the
Board's ability to deter employers from litigating a frivolous claim and
thus uses the Board as a tool to achieve unlawful ends./ Thus, the
court's decision eviscerates the Board's ability to encourage the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and thus to effectuate the
policy goals of the NLRA. 8
In 1973, in Food Store Employees Union Local No. 347 v. NLRB, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
* By Benjamin Wattenmaker, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
118 F.3d 795, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2833 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
2 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1959).
5 Id.
4 Id, § 151.
5 See Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 807, 155 L.R.R.M, (BNA) 2833, 2843 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
6 Id. at 800, 806, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2838, 2843.
7 See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Attorney's Fees, the NLRB, and the Equal Access to Justice Act: From
Bad to Worse, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 11-13 (1984).
See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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held that the Board, which found the employer guilty of unfair labor
practices, should have included attorney's fees and litigation expenses
in its award of damages to the union because the employer had en-
gaged in a deliberate, sustained pattern of illegal anti-union conduct
and had acted in bad faith. 9 The defendant employer, Heck's Inc.
("Heck's"), discouraged its employees' unionization efforts by engag-
ing in various anti-union practices prohibited by the NLRA.'° Upon
finding Heck's guilty, the Board ordered the employer to bargain in
good faith and refrain from interfering with its employees' rights as
guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA, but omitted from its order the
reimbursement of litigation expenses." The union subsequently ap-
pealed the Board's decision to the district court."
The court first noted that the charging party in NLRB proceedings
is not required to participate and, thus, to incur litigation expenses
when pursuing a complaint." The court reasoned, however, that em-
ployers should be deterred from litigating to delay union recognition
and to avoid collective bargaining.' 4 Further, the court determined that
the Board can only fulfill its legislative purpose of achieving industrial
peace through collective bargaining when its docket is uncluttered by
frivolous litigation." To this end, the court reasoned that an award of
litigation expenses would provide the necessary deterrent."' The court
thus held that the Board has the power to award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party as a part of the damages allowed under the NLRA.' 7
In 1975, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the
United States Supreme Court held that only Congress, and not the
9 476 F.2d 546, 547-48, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2955, 2956 (D.C. Cir. 1973), reu'd on other grounds,
417 U.S. 1, 8 n.9, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2209, 2211 n.9 (1974). While Food Store Employees was
pending before the Supreme Court, however, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Board
in Tiidee Products, Inc. & International Union of Electrica4 Radio Co' Machine Workers, 194 N.L.R.B.
1234, 1236 (1972), reasoning that it was bound by the earlier decision in Food Store Employees.
See International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 352, 86
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2093, 2096 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Thus, although Tiidee Products is the only lasting
precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, the reasoning upon which it rests is articulated
only in Food Store Employees. See Food Store Employees, 476 F.2d at 547-48, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
2956; see also Unbelievable, 118 F.3d at 801 n.2, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2838 n.2.
I° See Food Store Employees, 476 F.2d at 548, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2956. Specifically, Heck's
had threatened its employees, ascertained the level of union support by publicly polling its
employees and refused to bargain despite a majority of votes in favor of the union. See id.
" See id.
12 See id.
L See id. at 550, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2958.
14 See id,
16 See Food Store Employees, 476 F.2d at 550, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2958.
16 See id. at 550-51, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2958.
17
 See id.
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courts, may create exceptions to the American rule that attorney's fees
are not recoverable by the victorious party.' 8 In Alyeska, petitioners
sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits
granting rights-of-way to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. ("Alyeska") for
construction of an oil pipeline, arguing in part that such a permit
would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 ("Act").' 8 Although the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
enjoined pipeline construction on the basis of the Act, Congress sub-
sequently amended the Act to allow the Secretary of the Interior to
grant the requested permits to Alyeska." Respondents then sought to
recover attorney's fees resulting from the prolonged litigation over the
now-moot issue. 2 '
The Court first reasoned that authority to determine whether to
subvert the American rule rests solely with Congress. 22 The Court
observed that Congress traditionally assumed responsibility, through
fee statutes, for determining whether a victorious party is entitled to
an award of attorney's fees." Thus, the Court observed, Congress
reserved this right for itself, permitting fee-shifting only in specific and
explicit provisions under selected statutes." Although courts construed
the fee statutes to permit exceptions to the American rule in a very
small class of cases, the Court observed that none were germane to this
case."
Finally, the Court addressed the petitioners' argument that a
plaintiff bringing an action under a statute that promotes the "private
attorney general" concept ought to receive compensation for attor-
ney's fees." The Court acknowledged that such a statute may permit
13 421 U.S. 240,270-72,10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (I3NA) 826 (1975). All BNA sources present
only highly excerpted versions of this case. For the sake of consistency, I will not include parallel
cites for all subsequent notes related to this case.
15
 See id. at 242-43.
" See id. at 244.
21 See id. at 245.
22 See id. at 247-50,
23 See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247-50. The Court pointed to both the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, which mandated that federal courts follow the practices of the states in which they were
located, and an 1853 Act intended to standardize state practices of fees recoverable from losing
parties. See id. at 248,251. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held consistently since 1796 that the
judiciary could not create a general rule, independent of any statute, allowing awards of attorney's
fees, See id. (citing Aracambel v. Wiseman, 5 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796)).
24 See id: at 260.
25 See id. at 257-59. Fur instance, a court may assess attorney's fees for the willful disobedience
of a court order or when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for
oppressive reasons. See id.
26
 See id. at 263-64.
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the shifting of counsel fees." The Court, however, cautioned that the
private attorney general concept in a statute, by itself, is not a grant of
authority to the judiciary to shift attorney's fees. 28 The Court reasoned
that courts would encounter difficulty in discriminating between im-
portant and unimportant statutes, allowing fee-shifting only in connec-
tion with the former, without legislative guidance. 29 Thus, in Alyeska,
the Court held that courts may not shift attorney's fees in the absence
of an explicit instruction from Congress."
In 1982, in Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Local 11Z United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, the United States Supreme Court
held that courts may not award the attorney's fees incurred by an
injured plaintiff during Board proceedings as "damages' under section
303 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 3 ' In 1972,
Summit Valley Industries, Inc., ("Summit Valley") a manufacturer of
prefabricated modular homes, opened a plant in the Butte, Montana
area. 32 Summit Valley staffed the plant with unskilled workers repre-
sented by the Teamsters Union, rather than skilled carpenters repre-
sented by Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners
("Local 112")." Local 112 incorrectly believed that Summit Valley's
action violated a valid work-preservation agreement between it and
local contractor associations, when in fact the company was not a
signatory to the agreement. 34 Nevertheless, Local 112 ordered a work
stoppage and picketed the company. 35 Summit Valley prevailed in ac-
tions with the Board against Local 112, alleging illegal picketing, and
unfair labor practices." Summit Valley then filed the present action
under section 303 of the LMRA, seeking damages resulting from Local
112's illegal activities, including $13,604.33 in attorney's-fees. 37
27 See id.
2g
 See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263-64.
" See id. Further, the Court. observed that courts would also be required to determine
whether awards should be discretionary or mandatory and whether awards should be afforded
to any prevailing party or only to the prevailing plaintiff. See id. at 264.
3° See id. at 270-71.
31 456 U.S. 717, 727, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2445 (1982); see also 29 U.S.C. § 187(b)
(1959).
"See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 719, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2441.
33 See id.
34 See id., 110	 (BNA) at 2442.
35 See id.
36 See id.
31 See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 721-22, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2442. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
states that:
it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to engage
in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in
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The Court first determined that neither the express language nor
the legislative history of section 303 of the LMRA suggests that Con-
gress intended to permit an exception to the American rule. 38 Further,
the Court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of the term "damages"
would suffice to protect employers from the adverse effects of a union's
illegal activities, thus satisfying the legislative purpose of the LMRA. 39
The Court reasoned that considerations that support the American
rule—such as the deterrent effect fee-shifting may have upon poor
litigants with meritorious claims—outweigh the need to provide full
compensation. 1 °
Finally, the Court reasoned that if recovery of attorney's fees were
required to compensate fully each successful plaintiff, then each plain-
tiff who resorts to litigation to enjoin a defendant from engaging in
illegal conduct would be entitled to recover the cost of the action in
any subsequent action involving the same conduct. 4 ' The Court deter-
mined that an endless stream of litigation would result if successful
litigants could recover their attorney's fees in later actions; immediately
upon entry of judgment, the plaintiff could start another action to
recover his attorney's fees incurred in obtaining the previous judg-
ment." Thus, in Summit Valley, the Court affirmed the supremacy of
the American rule in actions brought under the LMRA."
During the Survey year, in Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the NLRB could not require an employer to reimburse litigation costs
because the NLRA lacks clear language indicating congressional intent
to override the American rule.' 14 In 1988, Unbelievable, Inc. ("Unbe-
lievable") purchased the Frontier Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas ("Fron-
tier")."" The hotel's employees included members of two unions: the
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal
in the course of his employment to . . work on any goods, articles, materials, or
to perform any services ... where the object thereof is forcing or requiring any
employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization
or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor
organization or in another trade, unless such employer is failing to conform to an
order or certification of the Board ... •
29 U.S.C. § 158(h),
38 See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 721, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2443.
38 See id. at 724, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2444.
40 See id. at 725, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2444.
" See id.
42 See id. at 725-26, 110 L.R,R,M. (BNA) at 2444.
43 See Summit Valley, 456 U.S. at 726, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2444-45.
44 118 F.3d at 806, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2843.
45 See id. at 796, 155 L.RR.M. (BNA) at 2834.
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the International Union
of Operating Engineers." In May 1990, Unbelievable resolved to nego-
tiate new contracts with both unions. 47 Unbelievable submitted pro-
posed contracts to the two unions with a letter indicating that it would
implement the terms of the contract unilaterally if the unions' attor-
neys did not contact Unbelievable's attorney to arrange negotiations
by a fixed date."
Unbelievable negotiated with both unions but failed to reach an
agreement with either party, leading to its unilateral implementation
of most of the terms in its proposed contract. 43 Although Unbelievable
agreed to certain alterations in contracts with both parties—such as
keeping the health insurance plan—the company remained intransi-
gent during the negotiations.5° Unbelievable indicated that its manage-
ment wanted a strike so it could replace the existing employees and
eliminate union representation in the workforce. 5' The unions filed a
complaint with the Board alleging unfair labor practices.52
In concluding that Unbelievable violated sections 8(a) (1), (3) and
(5) of the NLRA, the administrative law judge ("AL I) found that the
company had not bargained in good faith. 53 The NLRB adopted the
AU 's findings and legal conclusions and ordered Frontier to pay the
46 See id. Labor contracts between the unions and Frontier's previous owner expired in 1987,
but Unbelievable implemented the terms of the old contract until 1989, when it imposed new
contract terms upon the two groups of unionized employees. See id.
47 See id. at 797, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2834.
42 See id., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2835. The proposed contracts would have reduced the wages
of some Teamsters from $11.92 per hour to $6.50 and would have cut the wages of most employees
represented by the Operating Engineers by five percent. See id. Both contracts would have
eliminated the pension plan, replaced the unions' health plans and imposed restrictions upon
employees' receipt of pay for vacations and holidays. See id.
42 See Unbelievable, 118 F.3d at 797, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2835.
50 See id.
5i See id. During Unbelievable's first meeting with the Operating Engineers, the company
refused to consider the union's counteroffer, which closely paralleled the standard contract used
among area hotels. See id. When the union indicated that the company's proposals were unac-
ceptable, Unbelievable's counsel responded that the company would not mind if the proposals
led to a strike. See id. Negotiations with the Teamsters followed in similar fashion. See id.
52 See id.
55 See id. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) states that:
it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization; . . . and (5) to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provi-
sions of § 159 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a). The AU stated that Unbelievable had engaged in "surface bargaining,"
intentionally seeking to reach an impasse for the purpose of implementing its terms unilaterally
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unions' bargaining expenses. 54 The Board reasoned that where a party
to negotiation engages in "aggravated misconduct" that renders the
bargaining process wasteful, shifting of negotiation fees is necessary to
ensure a return to the economic status quo ante at the bargaining
table." Further, the Board ordered Unbelievable to pay the unions'
litigation expenses to restore the charging party fully to its original
economic position. 56 The Board reasoned that its policy mandates that
a respondent who raises frivolous defenses must pay for its opponents'
litigation expenses.57
Unbelievable petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the
NLRB order, and the NLRB cross-appealed for enforcement of its
order." The court sustained the NLRB's conclusions that Unbelievable
violated the NLRA, as well as the NLRB's order commanding Unbe-
lievable to compensate the unions for their negotiation expenses. 59 The
court, however, overturned the NLRB order that Unbelievable com-
pensate the unions for their litigation expenses, reasoning that the
NLRA does not endow the NLRB with the authority to order a respon-
dent to pay the litigation expenses incurred by a charging party.°
The court first reasoned that, in the wake of the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Summit Valley, the Board could overcome the presump-
tion that the American rule controls only if the NLRA contained
express statutory authorization. 6 ' The court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court decision in Summit Valley addressed section 303 of the
LMRA, and therefore, it did not expressly overrule the District of
Columbia Circuit's opinion in Food Stare Employees, which discussed the
remedial authority of the NLRB under the NLRA. 62 Nevertheless, the
court noted that a later Supreme Court decision indicated that lower
courts must consider the application of Summit Valley for the question
of whether the NLRB retains the authority to award attorney's fees."
and subsequently forcing the unions to strike. See Unbelievable, 118 F.Sd at 797, 110 L.R.R.M.
(DNA) at 2835.
84 See Unbelievable, 118 F.3d at 798, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2836.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 796, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2834.
59 See Unbelievable, 118 F.3cl at 799, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2837.
6° See id.
61 See id. at 802, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2839.
52 See id. at 801, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2839.
95 See id. Specifically, in JP. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court vacated a judgment
of the Fourth Circuit that followed the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in Food Stare
Employees, remanding the case for reconsideration in Light of Summit Volley. See id. at 801-02, 110
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit next
dispensed with petitioner's arguments that Summit Valley was distin-
guishable because section 10(c) of the NLRA, unlike section 303 of
the LMRA, contains no limitation on the Board's broad authority to
effectuate the policies of the NLRA." Next, the court observed that
congressional silence on the matter of attorney's fees has been inter-
preted as a sign that the legislature did not intend an exception to the
American rule in a particular statute. 65 The court further reasoned that
the requirement of express statutory language to overcome the Ameri-
can rule applies a fortiori to the NLRA because the statute does not
require the charging party's participation in the litigation. 66
The court found that neither the statutory text nor the legislative
history of the NLRA provides the clear command of statutory authority
necessary to rebut the presumption that the American rule controls. 67
The court then addressed the Board's argument that it should defer
to the Board's interpretation of its own authority under section 10(c)
of the statute. 68 The court noted that it should defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own statutory power only if "that interpretation is
rational and consistent with the statute." 69 The court reasoned that it
is not rational to interpret silence in section 10(c) on the issue of
fee-shifting as support for the remedy when the Supreme Court has
stated that an exception to the American rule is permitted only when
supported by a clear legislative statement. 7°
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2838-39; see also J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982), vacating
668 F.2d 767 (1982).
"See Unbelievable, 118 F.3d at 802, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2839. The court stated that it
found nothing in the rationale of Summit Valley to indicate that the holding did not apply to a
statute granting power to an administrative agency. See id. The court also cited numerous cases
in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed adherence to the American rule to support its ruling
that the presumption against fee-shifting applies to the NLRA. See id.
65 See id. at 802-03, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2839-40. Since Summit Valley, Congress has
expressly authorized fee-shifting in numerous statutes, and the Supreme Court has interpreted
congressional silence as a sign that the legislature did not sanction a shift in the burden of fees.
See id.
66 See id. The court concluded that it would be anomalous for the Supreme Court to hold
that a statute requiring an individual to bring an action at his or her own expense cannot be
read to authorize an award of attorney's fees without a clear statement of congressional intent,
but that a statute allowing a federal agency to pursue a claim on behalf of an individual will be
read to permit reimbursing the party's legal fees should the party choose to intervene. See id. at
803-04, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2840-41.
67 See id .
68 See td. at 804, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2840-41.
69 See Unbelievable, 118 F.3d at 804, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2841 (citing NLRB v. Food &
Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3281 (1987)).
70 See id.
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Finally, the court reasoned that the NLRA's broad grant of author-
ity to the NLRB to take appropriate action to effectuate the policies of
the Act does not include the power to shift attorney's fees because
fee-shifting is not closely related to the NLRB's statutory mission or to
its primary area of expertise." The court observed that awarding attor-
ney's fees moves the Board away from its expertise in labor relations
and toward "a discretionary power entrusted to a court only when
specifically legislated."72 Moreover, the court noted that the Board
justified awarding attorney's fees as a deterrent to frivolous litigation;
this purpose does not further the Board's statutory mission of prevent-
ing unfair labor practices because it is not an unfair labor practice to
present a frivolous defense." Finally, to award attorney's fees as a
means of discouraging frivolous litigation is essentially punitive and is
beyond the scope of the Board's power. 14 Thus, in Unbelievable, the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the NLRB may not award attor-
ney's fees without a clear statutory command that permits an exception
to the American rule."
In dissent, Judge Wald contended that Food Store Employees, not
Alyeska and Summit Valley, remained the controlling precedent in the
District of Columbia Circuit regarding the power of the NLRB to award
litigation costs." Judge Wald maintained that, under Food Store Employ-
ees, the NLRB is permitted to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party
to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. 77 Thus, Judge Wald contended
that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should
affirm the NLRB's award of attorney's fees in Unbelievable."
The dissent first argued that Summit Valley did not overrule Food
Store Employees, as the majority held, because it did not address the
NLRB's authority under the NLRA to award litigation expenses. 79 The
71 See id. at 804-05, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2841. The court recognized that the Board's
remedial power is not limited to the one action enumerated in the statute (reinstatement with
or without back pay), but reasoned that it ought to be related to the Board's primary area of
expertise and to its statutory purpose. See id.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 805, 110 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2841.
. 74 See Unbelievable, 118 F.Sd at 805, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2842.
75 See id, at 806, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2843.
76 See id. at 807, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2843 (Wald, J., dissenting).
77 See id. at 807, 810, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2844, 2846 (Wald, J., dissenting).
78 See id, at 807, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2844 (Wald, J., dissenting).
79 See Unbelievable, 118 F.Sd at 808, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2844 (Wald, J„ dissenting). Judge
Wald observed that Summit Valley considered the awarding of attorney's fees under section 303
of the LMRA, which contains a far different remedial scheme than that proposed in the NLRA.
See id. (Wald, J., dissenting). Section 303 contains a damages clause that entitles an employer
who has been injured "in his business or property" by a union's unfair labor practice to "recover
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dissent argued that Summit Valley rests upon factors that are peculiar
to section 303 of the LMRA—a fact recognized by the Sixth, Seventh
and Ninth Circuits—and, therefore, should not apply to the NLRA."
The dissent also criticized the majority's contention that the NLRB's
remedial authority under the NLRA does not include the power to
award attorney's fees. 81 Judge Wald observed that section 10(c) is
drafted quite broadly, designed to include "all reasonable remedies
consistent with the Act's purposes" and opined that reimbursing an
injured party for economic harm effected during litigation is within
the scope of the NLRA's intention to prevent unfair labor practices."
Thus, the dissent would have affirmed the NLRB's decision to permit
an award of attorney's fees as a deterrent to frivolous litigation."
The court's rejection of the Board's decision in Unbelievable will
frustrate the Board's ability to promote the process and procedure of
collective bargaining, one of the chief policy goals of the NLRA." By
denying the Board's ability to award attorney's fees, the court prevents
the Board from seriously deterring employers who use frivolous litiga-
tion as a tool against unions." Thus, employers will be able to delay
the processes of the Board itself to postpone union recognition, avoid
bargaining with unions and weaken their economic position by pur-
posefully presenting frivolous defenses to union allegations of anti-la-
bor conduct."
The court's decision in Unbelievable ignores congressional intent
to grant the Board wide discretion in fashioning remedies." In the
Board's 1995 decision to permit the award of attorney's fees, Chairman
Gould and members Browning and Truesdale observed that the legis-
lative history of the NLRA indicated an intention to broaden, rather
than limit, the remedial authority of the Board." Specifically, Congress
... the cost of the suit" in addition to the actual damages sustained. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court's holding in Summit Valley found that the term "damages" in this section did
not include attorney's fees. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
8° See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
81 See id. at 810, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2845-46 (Wald, J., dissenting).
82 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting). Moreover, she noted that an award of attorney's fees is "no
different" from an award of compensation for the costs of bad faith negotiation, which the
majority had approved. See id.
83 See id. at 812, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2848 (Wald, J., dissenting).
84 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1959); see also Unbelievable, 118 F.Sd at 796, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
2843.
85 See Lieberwitz, supra note 7, at 11-13.
86 See Unbelievable, 118 F.3d at 808-09, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2846 (Wald, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 810, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2845-46 (Wald, J., dissenting).
88 See Unbelievable, Inc. v. Professional, Clerical. & Miscellaneous Employees, Local 995, 318
N.L.R.B. 857, 862-63, 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065, 1072-73 (1995).
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adopted broad language regarding the scope of the Board's remedial
actions in the 1935 Act from Senate Bill 1958, which provided that the
Board may issue orders "to take such affirmative action, including
restitution, as will effectuate the policies of the act. "59 In selecting this
general language, Congress omitted the mention of such specific reme-
dies in the original proposal, Senate Bill 2926, such as "to take affir-
mative action, or to pay damages, or to reinstate employees, or to
perform other acts to achieve substantial justice?" The Senate Labor
Committee reported that it selected the general term "restitution"
because "an effort to substitute express language such as reinstate-
ment, back pay, etc., necessarily results in narrowing the definition of
restitution, which may include many other forms of action." 91
Historically, the Board has had a recurring problem of formulat-
ing effective remedies. 92 Where an employer refuses to bargain in good
faith, for instance, the usual remedy is an order to bargain in good
faith.93 A defendant may delay the issuance of the order and its even-
tual enforcement, however, by choosing to take advantage of its appel-
late options." The absence of the power to shift attorney's fees leaves
the Board without a substantial deterrent against parties who frivo-
lously litigate, delaying the issuing and enforcing of an order." During
the delay, the effects of the unfair labor practice may thwart the union's
efforts to recruit members or may encourage active union members to
decertify the union because its bargaining has proven ineffective." If
the Board lacks the independent and flexible authority to fashion
creative remedies necessary to carry out the national labor policy,
including the power to shift attorney's fees, then an employer may
achieve the goals of its unlawful conduct by promoting a frivolous
defense and thereby exploiting the delay inherent in the Board's
litigation sys tem.°
In conclusion, in Unbelievable, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed twenty-five years of circuit
89
	(citing S. 2926, 73d Cong. (1935), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA,
at 6-7 (1935); S. 1958, 74th Cong., reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or THE NLRA, at 1302
(1935).
96 Id.
91 Id. (comparing S. 2926, 73d Cong. and S. 1958, 74th Cong., reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NLRA, at 1360 (1935)).
92 See Lieberwitz, supra note 7, at 12.
22 See id.
94
 See id. at 13.
" See id.
96
 See id.
97 See Lichcrwitz, supra note 7, at 13.
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precedent in ruling that the Board does not retain the remedial
authority under the NLRA to award attorney's fees to the prevailing
party when its opponent has engaged in frivolous litigation." The court
extended the holding of Summit Valley—which limited exceptions to
the American rule to cases where Congress has expressly granted
statutory authority to courts to award attorney's fees—to the NLRA. 99
The court's ruling will erode further the power of the Board to protect
unions from unlawful actions by unscrupulous employers and to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.'"
B.* City's Actions Must Have "Real Effect" To Be Preempted by
NLRA: Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland'
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") to
guarantee employees the right to organize for the purpose of collective
bargaining and to promote peaceful industrial relations. 2
 Sections 7
and 8 of the NLRA encompass a multitude of labor relation activities. 5
Congress carefully regulated these activities to prohibit certain forms
of economic pressure from being forced on disputing parties.' In
addition, to help forge a balance of power between management and
labor, Congress intentionally left other activities unregulated and avail-
able for parties to use. 5 When local governments act within the labor
arena, however, their conduct may interfere with Congress's integrated
scheme of regulation. 6 Courts have held that those local government
actions that have a "real effect" on the disputing parties' federal rights
are subject to preemption.? In Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oak-
land, the Ninth Circuit addressed uncertainty as to whether the City of
Oakland's participation in a boycott constituted municipal regulation
subject to NLRA preemption applying this standard. 8
98 See 118 F.Sd at 806, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2843.
" See id, at 801-02, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2839.
188 See id. at 806, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2843.
* By Thomas Beetharn, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
95 F.34 1906, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2257 (9th Cir. 1996).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). This Act is commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.
3 See id. §§ 157-58.
1 See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 146, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2881, 2886 (1976).
5 See id.
6 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2838,
2842 (1959).
7 See Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d 1406, 1413, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2257, 2261 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 114, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2513, 2518 (1994)).
8 Id. at 1909, 1420, 153 L.R.R.M. (ANA) at 2258, 2267,
March 1998	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 579
In 1959, in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, the
United States Supreme Court held that federal law preempts state law
that purports to regulate activities that the NLRA protects, prohibits
or arguably protects or prohibits.' Garman involved a labor dispute in
which the employer refused union demands to employ only workers
who were union members." The unions picketed the employer's place
of business and exerted pressure on customers and suppliers in order
to persuade them to stop dealing with the employer." In response, the
employer initiated a representation proceeding before the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")." The NLRB's Regional Director,
however, "declined jurisdiction presumably because the amount of
interstate commerce involved" was not within the scope of the NLRB's
jurisdiction.' 3 The employer simultaneously filed suit in California Su-
perior Court for the County of San Diego claiming that the union's
actions constituted unfair labor practice." The superior court enjoined
the unions from picketing and from applying other pressures to force
an agreement." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the California Supreme Court on the issue of
damages." The state court, determining that it had jurisdiction to
award damages for injuries caused by the unions' activities, awarded
damages in favor of the employer, holding that the unions' activities
constituted a tort based on state law.' 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that state
jurisdiction must yield to the NLRB where an activity is arguably within
the scope of the NLRA, regardless of whether the NLRB assumes
jurisdiction." The Court reasoned that allowing states to control activi-
ties that are potentially subject to federal regulation could conflict with
Congress's integrated scheme of regulation." Thus, the Court con-
cluded that to avoid state government interference with national pol-
icy, states must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB if the
activity involved is arguably covered by the NLRA. 2°
9 359 U.S. at 244, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2841.
'° See id. at 237, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2838.
1 1 See id., 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2838-39.
12 See id. at 238, 43 L.R.R,M. (BNA) at 2839.
1 ° Id.
14 See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237, 238, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2838, 2839.
15 See id. at 237, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2839.
16 See id. at 238-39, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) al 2839.
17 See id. at 239, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2839,
18 See id. at 245, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2842.
19 See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2842.
2° See id. at 245, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2842.
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In 1976, in Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the United
States Supreme Court held that states cannot regulate self-help activi-
ties that the NLRA leaves unrestricted, such as workers' collective
refusal to work overtime. 2' In Machinists, union members refused to
work overtime during negotiations for renewal of an expired collective
bargaining agreement with their employer. 22 The employer filed a
complaint with the NLRB and the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission ("Commission"), charging that the refusal to work over-
time constituted an unfair labor practice. 23 The NLRB dismissed the
charge because the conduct did not appear to be in violation of the
NLRA. 24
 The Commission, however, concluded that the activity was in
violation of state law and entered a cease-and-desist order. 25 The Su-
preme Court reversed, reasoning that Congress intended for some
activities to remain unrestricted." These activities, the Court reasoned,
include the economic weapons (such as refusing to work overtime
during negotiations) that Congress left available to the disputing par-
ties. 27 The Court reasoned that these activities should be subject only
to the free play of economic forces." The Court stated that Congress's
decision to prohibit certain forms of economic pressure, while leaving
others unregulated, represented a congressionally intended balance of
power between management and labor. 29 Thus, the Court held that
certain self-help activities, such as refusing to work overtime, are eco-
nomic weapons that are integral to national labor law and accordingly,
Congress intended such activities to be free from regulation."
In 1986, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, the
United States Supreme Court held that federal law preempts a city
from imposing a condition on franchise renewal that intrudes on the
21 427 U.S. 132, 133, 136, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2881, 2881, 2882 (1976). Sclf-help activities are
economic weapons used by parties in a labor dispute to apply pressure on other parties in the
dispute. See id. at 144, 146, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2885, 2886.
22 See id. at 134, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2881-82.
" See id. at 135, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2882.
24
 See id.
25 See id. at 136, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2882. The Wisconsin statute provides, in part: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert with others . • . to engage
in any concerted effort to interfere with production except by leaving the premises in an orderly
manner for the purpose of going on strike." Id. at 136 11.1, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2882 n.1 (citing
Wis. STAT. § 111.06(2) (1974) ).
26
 See Machinists, 927 U.S. at 136, 141, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2882, 2884.
27 See id. at 141, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2884.
26 See id. at 144, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2885.
" See id. at 146, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2886.
30 See id. at 133, 136, 92 L.R.R.M. (DNA) at 2881, 2882.
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collective bargaining process." In Golden State Transit, taxicab drivers
went on strike while their employer awaited City Council approval of
its franchise renewal application." The City Council conditioned re-
newal on the parties settling their labor dispute by a certain date." The
franchise expired, however, because the dispute was not settled by the
designated date." The employer filed suit alleging that the NLRA
preempted the City's conditional requirement for franchise renewal."
The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the employer,
reasoning that Congress intended to leave parties free to apply eco-
nomic pressure as part of the collective bargaining process. 36 The
Court reasoned that the City thwarted the process by imposing a
durational limit on the economic self-help weapon (enduring a strike)
available to the employer." The Court concluded that the City Coun-
cil's settlement condition frustrated Congress's decision to allow par-
ties to use self-help economic weapons." Therefore, the Court held
that the NLRA preempts such municipal restrictions."
In 1993, in Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated
Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc. ("Boston Har-
bor"), the United States Supreme Court held that when a state partici-
pates in the free market as a proprietor, the NLRA does not preempt
the state's actions because they are not regulation within the meaning
of the Garmon and Machinists doctrines." In Boston Harbor, the Massa-
chusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA"), an independent gov-
ernment agency, was responsible for the pollution clean-up of Boston
Harbor.' [ The MWRA incorporated a pre-hire collective bargaining
agreement into their bid solicitation for contractors' work on the
project. 42 An organization representing non-union construction indus-
try employers brought suit against the MWRA, alleging that the NLRA
31 475 U.S. 608, 619, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3233, 3238 (1986).
32 See id. at 610, 121 L.RR.M. (BNA) at 3234.
33 See id. at 611, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3234-35.
94
 See id., 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3235.
33 See id.
5° See Golden State Transit, 475 U.S. at 615, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3236.
37 See id.
33 See id. at 615-16, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3236-37.
32
 See id.
40 507 U.S. 218, 229-30, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2649, 2654 (1093).
41 See id. at 221, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2650. Following a lawsuit arising out of MWRA's
failure to prevent the pollution of Boston Harbor, in alleged violation of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ordered
the MWRA to clean-up the Harbor. See id.
42 1d. at 221-22, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2651. Bid Specification 13.1 provided, in pan: "Each
successful bidder and any and all levels of subcontractors, as a condition of being awarded a
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preempted the bid specification because it amounted to government
regulation.'" The organization sought to enjoin enforcement of the bid
specification." Applying the Machinists principle, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the bid specification
was preempted because the MWRA was regulating activities that Con-
gress intended to leave unrestricted. 45 The Supreme Court reversed,
however, stating that although the NLRA prevents a state from regu-
lating conduct either subject to NLRB jurisdiction (Gannon), or that
Congress intended to leave unrestricted (Machinists), a state does not
regulate simply by acting within one of these protected areas. 46 The
Court recognized that states are typically more powerful than private
parties because they can regulate private conduct. 47 The Court ob-
served, however, that this distinction is far less significant when a state
participates as a private consumer, absent an interest in governance.°
Thus, the Court held that when a state acts solely as a market partici-
pant with no interest in governing, its actions do not constitute regu-
lation.49
During the Survey year, in Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of
Oakland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that a city may refuse to patronize an employer during a labor dispute
and may even suggest its residents do likewise via legislatively approved
resolutions.50 The court stated that where municipal government ac-
tion does not constitute a regulation, it will not infer preemption. 5 '
The court further stated that such government action must have a "real
effect" on labor relations to constitute a regulation subject to NLRA
preemption. 52 The court reasoned that a city's actions are not regula-
tory where they do not interfere with the self-help economic weapons
that Congress intended to leave available to parties involved in a labor
dispute." The court concluded that the NLRA does not preempt a city
contract or subcontract, will agree to abide by the provisions of the Boston Harbor Wastewater
Treatment Facilities Project Labor Agreement . . ." Id, at 222, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2651
(citation omitted).
45 See id. at 223, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2651.
"See id.
45 See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 224, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2651-52.
46 See id. at 226-27, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2653.
47 See id. at 229, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2654.
48 See id.
46 See id at 229-30, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2654.
50 95 F.3d at 1409, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258.
51 See id. at 1413, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261.
52 See id.
55 See id. at 1418, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2265.
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from expressing its opinion by way of resolution, participating in a
boycott as an ordinary consumer or urging its residents do likewise,
because these actions have less than a "real effect" and thus, are not
regulation . 54
The dispute in Alameda Newspapers arose after Alameda Newspa-
pers, Inc. ("ANI") purchased the Oakland Tribune. 55 ANI subsequently
terminated the Tribune's contracts with several unions, relocated its
printing operation out of Oakland and dismissed more than 400 of the
Tribune's 600 employees. 56 In response, the unions launched a boycott
of the Tribune newspaper and other ANI publications." The unions
asked the Oakland City Council ("Council") to support the boycott. 58
The Council replied by passing a written resolution replacing the
Tribune as the city paper, endorsing the boycott and urging residents
of Oakland to follow suit. 59 In addition, the Council passed a separate
voice resolution directing city officials to discontinue all official adver-
tising in the Tribune and cancel the city's subscriptions to that newspa-
per. 60 The Council's directive resulted in a total loss to ANI of thirteen
subscriptions and approximately $40,000 per year in gross advertising
revenue. 6 '
ANI filed an action in United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California alleging that the two resolutions were pre-
empted by the NLRA under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. 62 The district court found in favor of ANI, holding that
the resolutions were regulatory and, thus, subject to preemption.° The
54 See id. at 1409, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258.
55 See 95 F.3d at 1409, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258.
56 See id. at 1410, 153 L.R.R.M. (DNA) at 2258.
57 See id. The unions included the Northern California Newspaper Guild, Local 52, Newspa-
per Guild and other unions comprising the Conference of Newspaper Unions. See id. at 1410
n.1, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258 n.1.
55 See id. at 1410, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258.
59 See id„ 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258-59. The resolution provided, in part:
RESOLVED: That the City of Oakland open up the process to select the official
newspaper of the City; and, be it FURTHER RESOLVED: That the Oakland City
Council endorse the boycott of the Oakland Tribune and other Alameda Newspa-
per Group publications; and, he it FURTHER RESOLVED: That the City Council
urges all citizens of Oakland to stop purchasing and advertising in the Oakland
Tribune and Alameda Newspaper Group publications until the labor dispute is
successfully concluded.
Id„ 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2959 (citation omitted).
69 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1410, 153 L.R.R.M. (DNA) at 2259.
61 See
62
 See id. at 1411, 153 L.R.R.M. (DNA) at 2259. The Supremacy Clause states, in part: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ..
shall be the supreme Law of the Land ...." U.S. CONST. an. VI, cl. 2.
63 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1411, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2259. The district court
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Newspaper Guild, one of the unions participating in the boycott, sub-
sequently filed the appeal.€4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
emphasizing that it was reluctant to infer preemption.° The court
stated that congressional intent is the ultimate touchstone of preemp-
tion analysis and looked first to congressional intent to guide its analy-
sis.° The court reasoned that a basic assumption of preemption analy-
sis is that Congress did not intend to displace state law.° Thus, absent
a clear congressional expression of intent to preempt, the court stated
that it would not infer preemption.68
In holding that the NLRA did not preempt the Council's resolu-
tions, the court stated that a prerequisite to preemption under either
the Garman or Machinists preemption principles is a finding that the
action in question constituted a regulation, i.e., it must have a "real
effect" on federal rights. 69 The court then focused its analysis on the
City's resolutions to determine whether they had such an effect. 7° The
court first examined the written resolution that announced the City's
support of the boycott and urged that city residents do likewise. 7 ' The
court observed that the resolution had no binding effect and was only
a declaration of principle or conscience. 72 The court reasoned that the
City has a fundamental right as a sovereign government both to en-
dorse the boycott and communicate with its citizens to do the same."
concluded that the resolutions were an attempt by the City to interfere in the free play of
economic forces and, therefore, they were preempted by the NLRA under the Machinists doc-
trine. See id. The district court permanently enjoined the City from endorsing the boycott,
canceling any subscriptions, replacing the Tribune as the newspaper of record for the City or
purchasing any print media advertising space or subscriptions for the City in a publication other
than the Tribune because of the dispute. See id. The district court also ordered the City to reinstate
any subscriptions that were canceled because of the dispute. See id., 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2260.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1413, 153 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2261. As a preliminary matter, the court denied
ANI's claim that it should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because the Guild met the
NLRA's Article III actual injury standing requirement. See id. at 1412, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
2260. The court reasoned that the threat of particularized injury from the district court's order
was sufficient to satisfy the requirement. See id.
66 See id. at 1413, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261.
67 See id.
68 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1413, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261.
69 See id.
" See id at 1414, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261.
71
 See id.
72 See id. The court distinguished its decision from General Electric Co. v. Callahan, 294 F.2d
60 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 369 U.S. 832, which it incorrectly described as a Fifth Circuit
case. See id.
75
 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1414, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261. The court noted
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The court further reasoned that because the resolution was purely
advisory in nature, it did not curtail ANI's right to freely use all of its
economic weapons:74
In addition, the court concluded that the second part of the
written resolution, in which the City encouraged its citizens to support
the boycott, was not regulatory." The court reasoned that if the City's
announcement of support for the boycott did not constitute regulation
even though it implicitly urged residents to act, then explicitly urging
residents to act in support of the boycott could likewise be non-regu-
latory." The written resolution, the court concluded, was thus merely
a non-binding expressive declaration of principle that had no "real
effect" on ANI's federal rights."
The court next examined the oral resolution." The court held
that the oral resolution did not constitute regulation because its eco-
nomic impact on the newspaper was not different from that of an
ordinary customer and, thus, it had no "real effect" on ANI: 79 The court
reasoned that the City of Oakland was merely an ordinary customer of
the newspaper who did not wield any significant economic power over
the Tribune through its actions.5t Because neither the City's thirteen
subscriptions, nor its advertising dollars had a large economic impact
on the paper, the court reasoned that the City's conduct was more like
a symbolic gesture than a regulatory action. 51 The court concluded that
the City's actions did not coerce either party, nor did they curtail the
economic self-help weapons available to the parties or otherwise inter-
fere with the bargaining process.s2
that local governments have a long tradition of issuing such pronouncements, which are akin to
political speech. See id., 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261-62. The court reasoned that the principles
of federalism and democracy must allow local governments to express their opinions on matters
of interest to the local community. See id. at 1415, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2262-63. The court
explained that preempting the City from making such pronouncements would be an extraordi-
nary intrusion into the rights of local governments. See id., 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2262.
74 See id, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2263.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Alameda Neuupapers, 95 F.Sd at 1415, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2262.
"See id. at 1415-16, 1417, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2263, 2264. The court differentiated
situations in which a city is not just one of many customers, but a significant patron of the
boycotted business, purchasing an unusually large quantity of a given product. See id Or, where
a city could use its powers to tax and spend, exercising the aggregate purchasing power of its
citizens and thereby acting differently than the typical consumer. See id. The court recognized
that under such circumstances, a city's actions could have a substantial impact on the bargaining
parties' negotiations, thus interfering with their federal rights under the NLRA. See id.
8° See id. at 1417, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264.
HI
 See id.
82 See id. at 1418, 153 L.R.R.M. (DNA) at 2265. The court relied on cases that held preemption
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The Ninth Circuit explained that the district court's holding
would have required the City to involuntarily patronize a boycotted
business, in effect forcing the City to cross picket lines against its
wishes." The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to limit the
freedom of workers to seek support from all customers of a boycotted
company, including municipalities.' Nor did Congress contemplate
limiting the rights of local governments to participate in boycotts
where they have no "real effect," an effect that is neither different from
that of an ordinary customer nor governmental in nature. 85 The court
reasoned that doing so would compel municipalities to act in a manner
that would violate their civic consciences." Absent a clear congres-
sional expression, the court stated that it would not preempt municipal
actions that are not regulatory. 87
In Alameda Newspapers, the Ninth Circuit never explicitly recog-
nized that city governments are fundamentally different than other
private third parties concerned with a labor dispute's outcome." Pri-
vate actors often participate in a boycott of a manufacturer based on
law was inapplicable to municipal actions that had no significant impact on the parties involved
in the labor controversy. See id. at 1419, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2266. For example, the Alameda
court relied on Image Carrier Corp. v. Beame where the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a New York City policy
permitting only union printers to bid on 'flat-form printing' business was not
preempted because . . . the City's flat-form printing needs, as distinguished from
either the City's overall printing needs or the total printing work available in and
around New York City, are not substantial enough to have 'even an indirect coercive
effect on non-union employees to abandon their [federal) right not to join a union.
Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1419, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2266 (citing Image Carrier Corp. v.
Beame, 567 F.2d 1197, 1202, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2259, 2262 (2d Cir. 1977)). In addition, the court
rejected ANI's reliance on Golden State Transit. See id. at 1420, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2266-67.
The court emphasized that in Golden State Transit, the City of Los Angeles had life or death power
over the taxi company by virtue of its authority to control the renewal of the company's franchise.
See id., 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2267. In contrast, the City of Oakland's support of the boycott in
Alameda Newspapers merely favored the workers side during the dispute as an ordinary customer
with minuscule economic effect. See id. Thus, whereas the City of Los Angeles used its governing
power to coerce, the court concluded that the City of Oakland acted without wielding any
governmental powers. See id.
85 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.Sd at 1416, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2263, 2264.
84 See id., 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2263.
85 See id.
86 See Id.
87 See id., 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264. As a final matter, the court dismissed ANI's claim that
the City had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving ANI of its rights under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution. See id. at 1421, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2268. The court held
that the First Amendment protects newspapers from retaliation by government agencies on
account of articles or views that the newspapers have published (or intend to publish), not against
retaliation because of the internal policies or business conduct of their owners. See id.
gg See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2654.
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a labor policy concern rather than a profit motive." Under these
circumstances, the private actor is attempting to "regulate" the manu-
facturer's actions through economic pressure 9 0 When a state acts as
regulator, however, it performs a role that is characteristically govern-
mental rather than private." As regulators of private conduct, a state
is more powerful than private parties. 92 The court implicitly reasoned,
however, that this distinction is less significant when a state acts as a
market participant with no interest in governing." Therefore, the court
rightly ignored the City's unique governing powers because in this
case, the City did not use them to influence the outcome; rather, it
acted as an ordinary participant."
The court's holding is consistent with Congress's intent to allow
disputing parties the ability to apply economic pressure on one an-
other. 95 The court correctly reasoned that Congress did not entirely
bar local governments from acting within the labor arena.% Rather,
Congress only barred local governments from acting forcibly to curtail
or prohibit parties from applying economic pressure." Accordingly,
when a local government acts as a market participant with no interest
in setting policy, its actions are not regulatory in nature; the munici-
pality is free to act within the labor arena without fear of preemption. 99
In contrast, when a local government uses its power in a coercive
manner, it destroys the congressionally designed balance of power and
frustrates Congress's decision to leave open parties' options to use
economic pressure." Therefore, Alameda Newspapers clarifies one type
of municipal action that is not subject to preemption.'°°
Although the holding tips the scales in labor's favor, it stops short
of altering the balance that Congress intended to create between
management and labor.'" The City's actions did not negatively impact
the parties' federal rights and, therefore, did not even amount to a
89
 See id.
9° See id.
91
 See id.
92
 See id.
93 See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2654; Alameda Newspapers, 95
F.3d at 1417, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264.
" See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F,3d al 1417, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264.
95 See id.
96 See id., 153.L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2265.
97 See id.
99 See id., 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264.
" See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1418, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2265.
100 See id. at 1409, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258.
1 ° 1 See id. at 1416 n.15, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2263 n.15.
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"thumb on the scale."" Because Congress did not explicitly prohibit
municipalities from expressions of opinion or ordinary marketplace
participation, federal law should not preempt such actions where they
do not prohibit the parties from using the self-help weapons available
to them." The court rightly pointed out that the principles of democ-
racy and federalism must militate against preemption, especially in
circumstances where a deeply felt local interest is at issue." In this
case, the City did not act to control the participants, but only to suggest
that its citizens participate in a desired manner." The court correctly
protected the City's right to express its interest in local matters where
these expressions were not regulatory in nature." Courts should not
consider expressions of opinion and/or participation in a boycott as
an ordinary customer to be actions that have a real and regulatory
effect on disputing parties. 1 °7
Moreover, although Congress sought to preserve the balance of
power between the interests of the employer and the employee, true
neutrality is not possible in the face of a strike or boycott." All con-
sumers effectively support one side or the other." Purchasing a boy-
cotted product provides economic support to the manufacturer,
whereas refusing to do so constitutes withholding. such support and
benefits the union."° The district court's injunction would have re-
quired the City to take a position that favors the employer." Therefore,
although the Ninth Circuit's holding tips the scales in favor of the
union, any action (or lack thereof) by the City would invariably have
had a similar effect on the disputing parties." 2 In this case, however,
the effect was minimal."' Thus, because the City's actions were not
regulatory, the congressionally intended balance of power remained
undisturbed."'
1 °2 See id.
1 °3 See id. at 1415, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2262-63.
1 " See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1415, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2262-63.
1" See id., 153 L.R.R,M. (BNA) at 2263.
11" See id.
1 °7 See id. at 1409, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258.
1 " See id. at 1416, 153 L.R,R.M. (BNA) at 2263.
1 °9 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d. at 1416 & n.15, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2263 & n.15.
11 ° See id.
111 See id.
112 See id. The court reserved judgment on the issue as to whether a municipality may ever
be compelled to take a position in a labor dispute by preemption where the city's withholding
or furnishing of economic support would have a "real effect" on the parties. See id.
115 See id. at 1418, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2265.
114 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1418, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2265.
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In conclusion, in Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a city
may refuse to do business with an employer during the course of a
labor boycott and may even suggest its residents do likewise."B Only
municipal actions constituting regulation are subject to NLRA preemp-
tion."6 The court stated that local government conduct must have a
"real effect" on labor relations to constitute regulation, 117 Conse-
quently, when a city's actions do not interfere with disputing parties'
ability to use self-help economic weapons, these actions will not con-
stitute regulation subject to preemption."B The court's holding is con-
sistent with congressional intent to allow parties in a labor conflict to
apply economic pressure on one another." 9 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit rightly refused to compel the City of Oakland to support the
employer in a labor dispute against its civic conscience. 120
II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A.* "Actual Deductions" Test for Determining Overtime Eligibility: Auer
v. Robbins'
Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA" or
"Act") requires employers to pay employees time and a half for hours
worked in excess of forty hours in a week. 2 Section 213(a) (1) of the
Act contains an exemption from this overtime requirement for employ-
ees who are employed in a "bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity," Under regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary of Labor ("Secretary"), one requirement for exempt status under
115 Id. at 1409, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2258,
116 See id.
117 See id. at 1413, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261.
118 See id. at 1418, 158 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2265,
119 See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141, 92 L.R.R.M. {BNA) at 2884; Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d
at 1413, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2261,
120 See Alameda Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1409, 153 L.R.R.M. (RNA) at 2258.
* By Annie Biegclsen, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 117 S.Q. 905, a Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1249 {1997),
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1995). Section 207(a)(1) states, in relevant part: "{Nlo employer
shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such
employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a
rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." Id.
29 U.S.C.§ 213(a) (1) (1995). Section 213(a)(1) states, in relevant part: "(a) The provisions
of ... section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to—(1) any employee employed in a
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity . .. (as such terms arc defined and
delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor] .)."
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§ 213(a) (1) is that the employee be paid a specified amount on a
"salary basis."'
Under 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) ("§ 541.118(a)"), employees are
paid on a salary basis if they receive a predetermined salary which is
not "subject to reduction" for variations in the quality or quantity of
their work, including disciplinary deductions of less than a week. 5 The
circuits have differed on the question of whether an employee's pay is
"subject to" deductions if there is merely a theoretical possibility of
such deductions or if actual deductions must be made. 6 The United
States Supreme Court resolved the conflict in Auer v. Robbins, holding
that employees are not entitled to overtime payment where there is
not an actual practice of making deductions and where an employer's
4 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.8(e) (1997). An employee must also satisfy a "duties
test" to be exempt from the overtime pay requirements. See, e.g., Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 906. To read
about the duties involved in the "duties test," see 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(a)-(f), 541.2(a)-(e), and
541.3 (a) - (e)
29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1997). As an exception to this no-deduction rule, the regulation
allows employers to impose penalties for infractions of safety rules of major significance without
affecting the employee's exempt status. See id. § 541.118(a) (5). In addition, deductions may be
made from an exempt employee's pay fofabsences of a day or more for personal reasons other
than sickness or accident. See id. § 541.118(a) (2) . Similarly, deductions may be made for absences
of a day or more for sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a policy
of providing compensation for loss of salary occasioned by sickness and disability. See id.
§ 541.118(a) (3). On the other hand, deductions may not be made for absences caused by jury
duty, attendance as a witness or temporary military leave. See id. § 541.118(a) (4). The employer
may, however, deduct any amounts received by an employee for performing those duties. See id.
If an employer makes an illegal deduction inadvertently or for reasons other than lack of work,
§ 541.118(a) (6) gives the employer a "window of correction" to rectify the deduction. See id.
§ 541.118(a) (6). Thus, the employee remains exempt if the employer reimburses the employee
for the deduction and promises to comply in the future. See id. The text of § 541.118(a) (6)
provides as follows:
The effect of making a deduction which is not permitted under these interpreta-
tions will depend upon the facts in the particular case. Where deductions are
generally made when there is no work available, it indicates that there was no
intention to pay the employee on a salary basis. In such a case the exemption would
not be applicable to him during the entire period when such deductions were being
made. On the other hand, where a deduction not permitted by these interpretations
is inadvertent, or is made for reasons other than lack of work, the exemption will
not be considered to have been lost if the employer reimburses the employee for
such deductions and promises to comply in the future.
Id.
6 See, e.g., Yourman v. Dinkins, 84 F.3d 655, 656, S Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 525, 526 (2d
Cir. 1996); Carpenter v. City of Denver, 82 F.3d 353, 354, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 362, 362
(10th Cir. 1996); McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999 F.2d 293, 297, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
785, '787-88 (8th Cir. 1993); Shockley v. City of Newport News, 887 F.2d 18, 20, 1 Wage & Hour
Cas. 2d (BNA) 788, 790 (4th Cir. 1993); Atlanta Prof] Firefighters Union, Local 134 v. City of
Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 805, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 169, 172 (11th Cir. 1991); Abshire v.
County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 487-88, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1417, 1420-21 (9th Cir.
1990).
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payment policy does not create a significant likelihood of such deduc-
tions.' Auer limits the number of exempt employees who may claim
they are eligible for overtime, protects employers from massive over-
time liability and clarifies the meaning of § 541.118(a). 5
In 1993, in Kinney v. District of Columbia, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that District of Columbia
("District") employees were entitled to receive overtime pay because
the District's payment policy theoretically subjected the employees to
reductions in pay for partial-day absences. 9 Plaintiffs were firefighters
who sued the District for unpaid overtime compensation." Plaintiffs
claimed that they were entitled to overtime because the District's pay
system subjected them to hourly reductions in pay for partial-day ab-
sences." The District responded that plaintiffs were exempt from the
overtime pay requirement under § 541.118(a) because the mere pos-
sibility of deductions was not enough to require the District to pay
overtime.' 2
The court concluded that the correct inquiry under § 541.118(a)
is whether an employer can theoretically dock an employee's pay, not
whether an employer actually has docked the pay." The court reasoned
that the Secretary intended to exempt salaried employees from the
overtime pay requirement precisely because they arc given discretion
in managing their time and activities." The court further reasoned that
if employers pay employees under a system that subjects them, even
theoretically, to hourly reductions in pay, then those employees lack
that discretionary characteristic of salaried, or exempt, employees."
Thus, the court held that the District employees were not exempt from
receiving overtime pay because the District's payment policy theoreti-
cally subjected those employees to reductions in pay for partial-day
absences.'
In 1993, in McDonnell v. City of Omaha, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the mere possibility of pay
deductions was not sufficient to entitle public employees to overtime
pay but that employers must make actual pay deductions to entitle
7 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
8 See id,
994 F.2d 6, 11, 1 Wage & Hour Cas, 2d (BNA) 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
"See id. at 8, 1 Wage & Hour Cas, 2d (BNA) at 697.
"
See id., 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 697-98.
12 See id. at 8-9, 10-11, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 697-98, 699.
35 See id. at 11, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 699-700.
14 See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 700.
15 See id.
"'See id,
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employees to overtime pay.' 7 Plaintiffs, assistant fire chiefs of the
Omaha Fire Division, brought suit against the City of Omaha ("City") .' 8
The City subjected plaintiffs' pay to reduction for partial-day absences
unless they could charge the time to annual or sick leave.' 8 The plain-
tiffs never actually lost pay as a result of the absences of less than a day
because they used accumulated leave to cover such absences. 20 The City
argued that the mere possibility of a pay reduction did not entitle
employees to overtime pay and that a deduction of compensatory
benefits, such as sick or annual leave time, did not amount to a salary
deduction.2 '
The court observed that under the City's policy, a salary reduction
would occur only if the plaintiffs had no available paid leave. 22
 The
court reasoned that annual, sick and compensatory leave did not
constitute salary and that therefore a reduction in these types of leave
was not a reduction in salary." The court further reasoned that
§ 541,118(a) allowed for the practice of offsetting absences with accu-
mulated leave time without affecting the employee's exempt status."
Thus, the court held that the mere possibility of pay deductions did
not entitle public employees to overtime pay and that employers must
make actual pay deductions before employees would be considered
"subject to" deductions in salary and thereby entitled to overtime pay. 28
In 1993, in Michigan Ass'n of Governmental Employees v. Michigan
Department of Corrections, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that where the employer's payment policy was am-
biguous the mere possibility of pay deductions was not sufficient to
entitle public employees to overtime pay. 28 Correction shift supervisors
brought suit against their employer, the Michigan Department of Cor-
rections ("State"), claiming that they were entitled to overtime pay. 27
The employees argued that under the employer's sick leave policy,
their pay was subject to reduction for absences of less than one day if
17 999 F.2d 293, 296, 297, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 785, 787, 788 (8th Cir. 1993).
18 See id. at 294, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 785. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment entitling them to overtime pay because the City subjected their pay to deductions for
partial-day absences. See id.
19 See id. at 295, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 786.
Y0 See id.
21 See
"See McDonnell, 999 F.2d at 297, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 788.
"See id. at 298, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 788.
24 See id. at 297, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 788.
25 See id. at 296, 297, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 787, 788.
26 992 F.2d 82, 86, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 574, 577, 578 (6th Cir. 1993).
" See id. at 83, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 575.
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employees exhausted their leave credits and compensatory time. 28 The
State claimed that the policy was meant to cover only absences of eight
hours or more and further argued that none of the plaintiffs actually
had been denied pay for absences of less than eight hours. 2"
The court reasoned that the policy's language was more important
than the presence of actual deductions. 3° First, the court explained,
focusing on the policy language was consistent with the actual language
of § 541.118 (a). 3 ' Second, the court observed, the policy would affect
employees even if no reductions had occurred yet, because employees
would rearrange their schedules and possibly sacrifice non-work activi-
ties to comply with the policy language. 82 The court acknowledged,
however, that the policy's language was ambiguous because it did not
state specifically whether employees would receive pay reductions for
absences of less than one day."
The court then examined the actual implementation of the pay
deduction policy to clarify and interpret its meaning." The court
reasoned that because the State never reduced any plaintiffs' pay for
absences of less than one day and because the plaintiffs could not point
to any contradictory policy statements or actions, the State's interpre-
tation that the policy applied only to absences of more than one day
prevailed." Thus, the court held that where the employer's payment
policy was ambiguous, the mere possibility of pay deductions did not
entitle public employees to overtime pay and the employer must make
actual pay deductions to entitle employees to overtime pay."
• During the Survey year, in Auer v. Robbins, the United States
Supreme Court held that public employees were not entitled to receive
overtime pay where there was not an "actual practice" of making pay
deductions." The Court further held that public employees were not
28 See id. at 84-85, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 576.
" See id. at 85, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 576. Section 541.118(a) (2) explains that
deductions may be made when an employee is absent from work for a day or more for personal
reasons, other than sickness or accident. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (2) (1997). The plaintiffs did
not provide evidence that they had in fact suffered pay reductions, nor did they provide support
for their belief that the policy applied to absences of less than eight hours. See Michigan Ass'n Of
Governmental Workers, 992 F.2d at 85, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 576.
3° See Michigan Ass'n of Governmental Workers, 992 F.2d at 8(1, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
at 577.
31 See id.
32
 See id.
33
 See id.
34 See id.
33 See Michigan Ass'n of Governmental Workers, 992 F.2d at 86, I Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
at 577, 578.
" See id.
"117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Flour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
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entitled to overtime pay where the employer's payment policy did not
create a significant likelihood of such deductions." The Court's deci-
sion in Auer resolves the conflict among the circuits about whether
actual deductions must occur to trigger overtime pay requirements or
whether the mere theoretical possibility of deductions is sufficient to
make employees "subject to" salary reductions, thereby entitling em-
ployees to. overtime pay."
In Auer, St. Louis police officers brought suit against members of
the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners ("Board") . 4° The plaintiffs
claimed that they were entitled to overtime pay because the Board's
Police Manual ("Manual") subjected their pay to disciplinary deduc-
tions.41
 The Manual nominally covered all department employees, both
salaried and non-salaried.42 The Board took actual deductions from
only one of the plaintiffs on one occasion."
The Board claimed that it required the ability to use the full range
of disciplinary tools, including deductions, to maintain discipline
where human lives were at stake on a daily basis." The Board also
argued that as a public sector employer, it had fewer disciplinary
alternatives to pay deductions:* The Board contended that, conse-
quently, the § 541.118(a) rule prohibiting pay deductions should not
apply to public sector employees.45 The Board further argued that the
Secretary arbitrarily and capriciously failed to consider adequately
whether § 541.118(a) should apply to public employees in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").47
The Court first addressed the Board's contention that
§ 541.118(a) should not apply to public sector employees. 48 The Court
noted that the FLSA grants the Secretary broad authority to define the
'scope of exemption from overtime pay requirements.49 The Court
further noted that the Secretary had defined the scope in promulgat-
33 See id.
39 See id.
4° See id. at 908, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1251.
41 See id. at 908, 910, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1251-52, 1253.
42 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
43 See id. at 910-11, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1253. This officer suffered a one-time
deduction for violating the residency requirement. See id.
" See id. at 909, 910, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1252, 1253.
43 See id. at 909, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1252.
4° See id.
17 See 5 U.S.C. g 706(2) (A) (1995); Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 910, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at
1253.
4°
	 Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 909, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1252.
49 See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(I) (1995); Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 909, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
at 1252.
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ing § 541.118(a)." The Court stated that because Congress did not
speak directly on this issue, the Court must sustain the Secretary's
approach in § 541.118(a), as long as that approach is reasonable. 5 '
The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approach in
§ 541.118(a), which makes no distinction between private and public
employers with regard to disciplinary deductions, was reasonable. 52
The Court reasoned that the differences between private and public
employees with respect to discipline are not so significant as to neces-
sitate a large-scale revision of § 541.118(a)'s salary basis test." The
Court concluded that public employers can use other forms of disci-
pline to enforce work rules, such as placing an officer on restricted
duty." The Court therefore upheld § 541.118(a) as applied to public
employees and employers."
The Court then addressed the conflict among the circuits about
whether the mere possibility of deductions was sufficient to entitle
otherwise exempt employees to overtime pay, or whether actual . deduc-
dons must occur to entitle those employees to overtime pay." The
Court adopted the Secretary's interpretation of § 541.118(a) as ex-
pressed in an amicus brief. 57 The Secretary argued that, for public
employees to be entitled to overtime pay, employers must have an
actual practice of making salary deductions." If employers do not have
an actual practice, they must have a clear and particularized policy
"See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 909, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at 1252.
51 See id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,, 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984)).
52 See id. The Court also addressed the Board's contention that the Secretary's failure to
consider adequately whether the disciplinary deduction rule should apply to public employers
was arbitrary and capricious. See id. The Court noted the "veritable Hood" of litigation against
public employers about overtime eligibility since 1985, when the FLSA was extended to cover
public employers. See id. See, e.g, Carpenter v. City of Denver, 82 F.Sd 353, 354, S Wage Sc Hour
Cas. 2d (DNA) 362, 362-63 (10th Cir. 1996); Atlanta Prof' 1 Firefighters Union, Local 134 v. City
of Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 805, 30 Wage & Hour Cas. (DNA) 169, 172 (1 Rh Cir. 1991). The Court
stated that given the large amount of litigation, the Secretary may need to consider formally
whether the rule should apply to public employers. See Auer, 117 S,Ct. at 910, 3 Wage & Hour
Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1253. The Court concluded, however, that the Board must petition the
Department of Labor directly in accordance with APA procedures before seeking redress in the
courts. See id. Sections 553(e), 555(e), 702 and 706 of the APA describe the procedure for petition
to the agency for rulemaking. See s U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 555(e), 702, 706 (1995).
53 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 909, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1252.
54 See id. at 910, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at 1253.
55 See id.
55 See id.
57 See id. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at 1254.
55 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas, 2d (BNA) at 1254.
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which effectively communicates to employees that they will be subject
to deductions in specific circumstances, thereby making deductions
"significantly likely."59 The Court reasoned that this interpretation of
§ 541.118(a) avoids the problem of massive overtime liability which.
would occur if a policy is vague or if it nominally applies to a large
range of employees."
Applying the Secretary's approach, the Court reasoned that the
Board's Manual did not communicate effectively that pay deductions
would apply to the plaintiffs. 61 The Court examined the policy, which
was contained in the Manual and listed fifty-eight possible rule viola-
tions and penalties, including disciplinary deductions. 62 The Court
noted that all St. Louis police department employees—salaried and
hourly—were nominally covered by the Manual. 63 The Court reasoned
that therefore, the penalties and deductions may have referred only to
the hourly employees. 64
 Further, the Court explained, because the
policy did not specify that the deductions applied solely to salaried
employees, the plaintiffs could not infer that the penalties and deduc-
tions applied to them. 65
 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the
one-time deduction from one plaintiff's pay did not establish a likeli-
hood that other salaried employees would be subject to deductions."
Finally, the Court applied the "window of correction" provision of
§ 541.118(a) (6) to the one officer's one-time deduction. 62 The Court
reasoned that under § 541.118(a) (6), if deductions are either inadver-
tent or made for reasons other than lack of work, then employers can
retain the exemption so long as they reimburse the employee and
promise to comply in the future." The Court also adopted the Secre-
tary's interpretation of § 541.118(a) (6), as outlined in his amicus brief,
" See id.
"See id. The Court reasoned that the Secretary's interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) is
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with that regulation. See id. The Court
concluded that the Secretary's interpretation easily met this deferential standard. See id. The
Court reasoned that the Secretary gave an acceptable and ordinary meaning to the phrase, "which
amount is not subject to reduction." See id.
61 See id. at 911-12, S Wage & Flour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
62 See id. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
67 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
64 See id.
66 See id. at 911-12, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
66 See id. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
67 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6) (1997); Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
at 1255.
68 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (6); Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at
1255.
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which does not require immediate payment. 69 Thus, the Court held
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to overtime pay requirements
where there was not an actual practice of making deductions and the
payment policy did not create a significant likelihood of such deduc-
tions."
Auer clearly resolves the circuit court conflict to the advantage of
employers." First, employers now will not be liable for massive amounts
of overtime liability because Auer limits the number of exempt employ-
ees who can claim overtime eligibility under § 541.118(a)." Second,
an employee now is exempt unless the policy manual affirmatively
communicates through a clear and particularized policy that otherwise
exempt employees are subject to disciplinary deductions or that such
deductions are significantly likely." Thus, employers whose policies do
not communicate affirmatively such a message need not change their
policies at all because the Court defaulted to a presumption of non-li-
ability for employers. 74 The Court refused to assign liability to an
employer whose policy on deductions could have applied either to
hourly employees, exempt employees or both, and instead allowed that
policy to stand." Thus, even if an employer's policy is vague and could
apply to either exempt or hourly employees, Auer does not require the
employer to pay overtime as long as there is not an actual practice of
making disciplinary deductions from exempt employees' pay."
Auer provides another advantage for employers because it does
not require them to pay overtime even if an illegal deduction occurs
69 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (6); Auer, 117 S.Ct..at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at
1255.
" See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at 1254.
71 See John D. Canoni, Supreme Court Revises the Salary Basis Test for Exempt Employees, 23
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 105, 109, 110, II 1 (1997). Auer arguably applies to both public and private
employers. See id. at 106. Although the decision interprets 29 C.F.R. § 541.118 in the context of
a public employer, the regulation itself applies to both private and public employers. Interview
with Thomas Kohler, Professor, Boston College Law School, in Newton, Mass. (Oct. 16, 1997).
72 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at 1254; Canoni, supra note 7l,
at 105.
" See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Ca.,. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
74 See id.; Canoni, supra note 71, at 109.
75 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at 1254.
"See id.; Canoni, supra nate 71, at 109. Employers should, however, clarify their policies to
eliminate employee confusion, unnecessary grievances and needless litigation that could arise
from that confusion. See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254. Specifically,
employers should change their policy language in handbooks and manuals that discuss discipline
and clearly articulate that disciplinary deductions do not apply to exempt employees. See Canoni,
supra note 71, at 110. One way for employers to accomplish this task is by adding a disclaimer to
their manuals, such as, "these disciplinary rules do not apply to exempt employees," "exempt
employees, except for safety rules of major significance, are not subject to reductions in pay for
398	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol, 39:365
because § 541.118(a) (6) provides a "window of correction."" As Auer
made clear, if deductions are either inadvertent or made for reasons
other than lack of work, then employers can retain the exemption so
long as they reimburse the employee and promise to comply in the
future." Furthermore, Auer, in adopting the Secretary's interpretation,
does not require employers to make the reimbursement within a spe-
cific amount of time."
In addition to providing distinct advantages to employers, Auer is
also very practical8° First, the Court saved millions of tax dollars from
being spent on overtime payments by limiting the number of employ-
ees who are eligible for overtime pay. 81 Second, the decision will reduce
litigation over who is eligible for overtime, which in turn will reduce
costs.82 Furthermore, Auer gives both employers and employees clear
instructions about who is exempts'
From the perspective of exempt employees, Auer clearly limits
their ability to sue for overtime. 84 Salaried employees cannot maintain
actions for overtime payment if their employer's policy only theoreti-
cally subjects them to disciplinary deductions. 86 Otherwise exempt
employees can claim eligibility for overtime only when the employer
establishes an actual practice of making deductions or when a clear
and particularized policy effectively communicates that deductions are
significantly likely. 86 And even if illegal deductions occur, an employee
may not prevail in a lawsuit if the employer reimburses the employee. 87
suspensions of less than a week" or "exempt employees will be subject to unpaid suspensions only
as permitted by the FLSA." See id.
77 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6) (1997); Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA)
at 1255; Canoni, supra note 71, at 111,
78 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6); Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at
1255.
78 117 S.Ct. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1255. The Court is unclear on just how
far the "window of correction" of 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (6) extends. See id; Canoni, supra note
71, at 111. The Court allowed the St. Louis Police Department to rectify the single officer's
deductions by reimbursing him. See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at
1255. The Court, however, did not explain how many improper deductions an employer could
rectify by reimbursement before establishing an "actual practice" of making deductions. See id.
at 911, 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254. Thus, employers might be able to stretch
this window to correct a substantial number of deductions. See Canoni, supra note 71, at 111-12.
" See generally 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254,
81 See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,666, 37,671, 37,672 (1992); Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage Sc Hour Cas.
2d (BNA) at 1254; Canoni, supra note 71, at 105.
82 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage Sc Hour Cat. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
as
 See id.
84 See id.
85
 See id.
"See id.
87 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1255.
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Because Auer does not require employers to modify their vague
overtime policies, employees must continue to live with the uncertainty
and confusion those vague policies create. 88 Employees may be con-
fused by a policy that does not explain clearly when an employee can
receive overtime and what kinds of deductions an exempt employee
must endure.89 Furthermore, if the theoretical possibility of deductions
exists in an unclear policy, actual deductions need not occur for em-
ployees to be affected by that policy, as the Sixth Circuit pointed out
in Michigan Ass'n of Governmental Employees v. Michigan Department of
Corrections. 9° Employees who are uninformed of their rights will most
likely comply with their employer's disciplinary deduction policy,
whether or not that policy legally can apply to those employees."
In addition, because employers will owe overtime to fewer exempt
employees, those employers might subject their exempt employees to
more duties and longer working hours instead of spreading those
hours among hourly employees.92 Moreover, absent the threat of large
overtime liability, employers have less incentive to hire more employees
to spread out the hours for all employees." Longer hours for exempt
employees produce employee stress and fatigue and, in the case of
police forces, compromise public safety."
Auer leaves several issues unanswered.95 For example, it is unclear
how many employees suffering deductions will constitute an "actual
88 See id, at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
89 See id. at 911-12, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
"992 F.2d 82, 86, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 574, 577 (6th Cir. 1993).
91 See id.
92 See Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Auer (No.
95-897); Brief for National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 3, 10, Auer (No. 95-897).
93 See Brief for AFL-CIO at 5, Auer, Brief for National Association of Police Organizations at
3, Auer.
94 See Brief for National Association of Police Organizations at 13, 14, Auer. To the extent
that unions cover such issues as exempt employees' overtime eligibility, unions should ensure
that employees know their rights, especially if employers choose not to rewrite their policies. See
generally Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254. Unions should inform
employees that disciplinary deductions do not apply to them and that if their employer establishes
a practice of making such deductions, they are then entitled to overtime pay. See generally id.
Furthermore, unions should petition employers to clarify their policies to comply with Auer. See
generally id. In addition, because exempt employees now may be subject to additional hours
without overtime compensation, unions should bargain with employers for higher rates of pay
and ceilings on hours,, as well as encourage legislation aimed at limiting hours for exempt
employees. See Brief for AFL-CIO at 5, Auer; Brief for National Association of Police Organizations
at 3, Auer. Public unions, particularly unions of law enforcement personnel, may have additional
concerns about excessive work hours due to employee fatigue, stress and public safety. See Brief
for AFL-CIO at 5, Auer, Brief for National Association of Police Organizations at 3, 13-14, Auer.
95 See 117 S,Ct. at 911, 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
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practice" of making deductions on the part of the employer." Auer,
which involved only one isolated instance of actual deductions, makes
clear that just one employee who suffers an improper deduction will
not convert an entire class of employees from salaried to hourly status. 97
In addition, the Secretary's amicus brief explains that an "actual prac-
tice" involves more than a few isolated deductions under unusual
circumstances and that deductions must occur "with some frequency."99
It is not clear, however, exactly how many instances of improper de-
ductions establish an "actual practice" of making deductions."
Similarly, the employee manual in Auer did not contain discipli-
nary rules that constituted a "significant likelihood" of deductions.'"
Auer involved a vague employee manual in which the disciplinary
deductions could have applied to both salaried and hourly employ-
ees.'°' But what constitutes a positive example of a policy that makes
deductions significantly likely remains an open question.'" The ques-
tion also remains whether vague policy language will always presump-
tively comply with § 541.118(a), just as the Manual's disciplinary de-
ductions presumptively applied to hourly employees alone.'"
In sum, the Supreme Court held in Auer that public employees
were not eligible for overtime pay where there was not an "actual
practice" of making pay deductions. 191
 The Court further held that
public employees were not eligible for overtime pay where the em-
ployer's payment policy did not create a significant likelihood of such
deductions.'" Auer resolves the conflict among the circuit courts as to
whether the theoretical possibility of deductions can trigger overtime
liability or whether actual deductions must occur.'"
Auer benefits employers because it limits the number of employees
who are eligible for overtime payments. 107
 Auer also helps both employ-
ers and employees by clarifying who is eligible for overtime.'" But
"See id. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
97
 See id. at 911-12, S Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
98 See id. at 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (DNA) at 1254; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 22, Auer (No. 95-897).
99
 See Auer, 117 S.Ct. at 911, 912, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
10° See id. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
101 See id.
192 See id.
i" See id.
1 " See 117 S.Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
199 See id.
106 See id.
197
 See id.
166 See id.
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because the Court approved a vague policy manual, employees might
continue to endure confusing disciplinary policies.'°° Thus, employers
should change their policy manuals to comply clearly with Auer, which
both will prevent future lawsuits and give their employees a clear policy
of deductions and discipline."°
1 °9 See Auer, 117 S,Ct. at 911, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) at 1254.
110
 See Id.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. *Employment Relationship Is Touchstone for Defining "Employer"
Under Title VII: Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") was enacted
by Congress to provide for equality in employment and to prevent dis-
crimination by an employer on the basis of an individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. 2 Section 2000e of Tide VII defines an
employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year
. . . ."3
 A split in the circuit courts occurred over the interpretation of
this phrase.' The Supreme Court, in Walters v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises, resolved this circuit split, ruling that the proper test for
determining how many employees an employer "has," for purposes of
Title VII, is to look not at how many employees an employer is com-
pensating on a given day, but at the number of employees with whom
the employer has an employment relationship.' To determine the
number of employment relationships an employer has, the Supreme
Court adopted the "payroll method," which looks to how many em-
ployees are on an employer's payroll in order to calculate the number
of existing employment relationships.' The Court's adoption of this
method permits the inclusion of part-time employees in determining
whether an employer falls within Title VII's coverage.' This decision
prevents employers from circumventing Title VII's remedial goals by
hiring part-time workers.'
In 1983, in Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, for purposes
* By Monika A. Wirtz, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 117 S. CL 660, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1211 (1997).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
3 See id. § 2000e(b).
4
 See generally Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 32 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (DNA)
1511 (1st Cir. 1983) (adopting "payroll method"); Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 E2d
347, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634 (7th Cir. 1983) (adopting "counting method").
5
 117 S. Lt. 660, 664-66, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1211, 1213-14 (1997).
See id.
7 See id.
8 See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying ,text.
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of determining whether an employer had the requisite number of
employees for the requisite number of days under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA"), workers who were paid hourly were
not "employees" for days when they were neither working nor on paid
leave.9 In Zimmerman, the plaintiff sued a former employer alleging
unlawful age discrimination after he was terminated from his position
as vice president." The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion after determining that the defendant-employer did not have
enough employees to fall within the coverage of the ADEA." The
plaintiff appealed the district court's ruling, asserting that the method
used to calculate the number of employees for each week was incor-
rect." The plaintiff asserted that the number of employees should be
determined by counting the number of employees on the payroll for
each work week ("payroll method") . 19 The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the district court ruling that the method for determining the number
of employees for purposes of the ADEA was to count the number of
salaried employees, and to include hourly employees only on days that
they actually worked or were on paid leave ("counting method"). 41 The
court reasoned that since the ADEA provides that an employer must
have twenty or more employees "for each working day" of a week
before a week can be counted, it would be inconsistent with this
language to allow hourly employees who only work certain days each
week to be counted as working each working day.'' The court reasoned
that although the ADEA is a remedial statute and was envisioned to
allow for a liberal construction of, the term "employer," a court's inter:.
2 704 F.2d at 353-54, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 638. Section 630(b) of the ADEA
contains similar language to Title VII § 2000e(b) regarding how to define an employer. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (b); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994). The construction in Zimmerman of "employer" in
the context of the ADEA has been extended to other anti-discrimination legislation including
Tide VII. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 60 F.ad 1225, 1226, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 499, 499 (7th Cir. 1995). '
12 See 704 F.2d at 350, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 635.
11 See id.
12 See id. The plaintiff also challenged the number of employees employed by the defendant,
alleging that 1) certain employees were missing from the employment records; 2) certain officers
and directors should be counted as employees; and 3) certain persons listed on the defendant's
group medical plan should be counted as employees. See id., 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at
636. The Seventh Circuit examined these claims, asserting that even if the plaintiff's assertions
were correct, including these groups of employees would not be material to the outcome of the
case. See id. at 351-52, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 636-37.
13 See id. at 353, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 638.
14 See id. at 354, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 638.
18 See Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 353-54, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 638.
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pretation of "employer" cannot contradict the statutory definition.'°
The court stated that Congress could have exempted smaller employ-
ers from the ADEA's coverage by defining the jurisdictional minimum
in terms of number of employees on the payroll each week or by any
other variation.'? The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since Congress
chose to define the limitation as the number of employees on "each
working day," the method of counting the number of employees who
are actually present at work on each day was the correct way to deter-
mine whether an employer "has" enough employees to fall within the
ADEA's coverage. 13
In 1983, in Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that regular part-time employees are
employees within the meaning of the Title VII provision defining
,
`employer." In Thurber, a waitress filed suit against her employer
under Title VII alleging that her employer discriminated against her
on the basis of sex when the employer refused to train her to be a
bartender and then reduced her schedule after she complained. 2° The
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that
it had subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the number of employees
should be determined by examining the payroll, and not by counting
the number of employees who report to work on a given day. 2 ' The
First Circuit, in affirming the district court, reasoned that a congres-
sional majority intended Title VII to be a remedial statute having a
broad effect.22 The Thurber court rejected the employer's argument
that the words "for each working day" in the statute indicated a con-
gressional intent to restrict application of Title VII to employers who
had fifteen or more employees actually at work each working day. 23
Instead the court reasoned that, although the "payroll method" of
interpreting Title VII might cause a few "Mom and Pop" stores, who
employ a large number of 13rt-time employees, to fall within the
statute, the only burden on such businesses is that they refrain from
discriminating against their employees. 24 The Thurber court held that
16 See id. at 353, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 638.
17 See id. at 359, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 639.
13 See id.
19 717 F.2d 633, 634-35, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1511, 1512-13 (1st Cir. 1983); see
alto Vera-Lozano v. International Broad., 50 F.3d 67, 69-70, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 667,
668-69 (1st Cir. 1995) (re-affirming Thurber).
20 See 717 F.2d at 633-39, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1511-12.
21 See id. at 639, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512.
n See id. at 639-35, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512.
23 See id. at 634, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512.
24 See id. at 635, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512-13.
March 1998	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 405
for purposes of Title VII, an employer "has" an employee wheii there
is an employment relationship, not only when that employee is physi-
cally present at work."
In 1992, in EEOC v. Garden & Associates, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that part-time employees could
not be counted towards the number of employees for purposes of the
ADEA when they were neither working nor on paid leave for each day
of each work week." In Garden & Associates, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought suit on behalf of an em-
ployee alleging that the employee was wrongfully terminated from her
position as a bookkeeper because of her age. 27 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the defendant-employer
did not have enough employees to be considered an "employer" under
the ADEA. 28 In affirming the district court's decision, the Eighth Cir-
cuit adopted the "counting method," holding that part-time employees
who do not work each day of the work week were not "employees" for
that week under the ADEA."
During the Survey year, in Walters v. Metropolitan Educational En-
terprises, the United States Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in
favor of the First Circuit's interpretation." The Court held that the
proper method of determining the number of employees an employer
"has" for purposes of Title VII is by examining the number of employ-
ees with whom the employer has an employment relationship on the
day in question, regardless of whether the employee worked or was
compensated on a given day. 3 ' The Court determined that although in
only nine weeks of 1990 was Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.
("Metropolitan") actually compensating fifteen or more employees on
25 See 717 F.2d at 634-35, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512-13.
28 956 F.2d 842, 843, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 136, 137 (8th Cir. 1992).
27 See id., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 136.
28 See id.
" See Id,, 58 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) at 137.
50 117 S. Ct. at 664, 666, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1213, 1215.
51 See id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted
defendant's motion to dismiss on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, ruling that the defendant
did not have enough employees to fall within Title VIPs definition of "employer." See id. at 662-63,
72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212. The United States Court of Appeals fur the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, reasoning that the proper method for determining
the number of employees under Title VII was by counting the number of employees who were
either working or on paid leave for each working day. See id. at 663-64, 72 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1212-13. The circuit court reasoned that a plain text reading of the phrase "for each
working day" within the context of the statute led to a natural interpretation that the phrase looks
to the number of employees physically at work on each day of the week. See EEOC v. Metropolitan
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each working day, it had between fifteen and seventeen employees on
its payroll fOr most of the year." The Court reasoned that this gave
Metropolitan the requisite minimum number of employees for pur-
poses of Title VILE The difference in the number of employees being
compensated and those on the payroll was a result of Metropolitan's
employment of two part-time workers who ordinarily skipped one
working day each week." The Court reasoned that part-time workers
should be included because the touchstone for determining how many
employees an employer "has" is by looking solely at the number of
existing employment relationships. 35
In Walters, plaintiff Darlene Walters ("Walters") was employed by
defendant Metropolitan, a retail distributor of encyclopedias, diction-
aries and other educational materia1. 36 In 1990, Walters filed a charge
with the EEOC, claiming that Metropolitan (and Metropolitan's Presi-
dent Leonard Bieber ("Bieber")) had discriminated against her on
account of her sex when it failed to promote her to the position of
credit manager." Shortly after filing her grievance with the EEOC,
Metropolitan fired her." In 1993, the EEOC filed suit against Metro-
politan and Bieber, in which Walters intervened, alleging that the
firing of Walters constituted unlawful retaliation. 39 Metropolitan filed
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claiming that
it did not fall within the Title VII statutory definition of "employer"
because it did not have at least fifteen employees "for each working
day in each of twenty weeks within the current or preceding calendar
year. "4°
Educ. Enters., 60 F.3c1 1225, 1228, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 499, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995);
see also Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 353-54, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 638. To conclude
otherwise, the circuit court stated, was to render the words "for cach working day" superfluous
and "contrary to the explicit definitional restriction chosen by Congress." Metropolitan, 60 F.3d
at 1227, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 500 (quoting Zimmerman, 704 F.2d at 353-54, 31 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 638).
32 See Walters, 117 S. CL at 663, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212. Metropolitan's
working days are Monday through Friday and the current and preceding calendar years for
purposes of this claim are 1990 and 1989. See id. The parties stipulated that in 1989, Metropolitan
failed to satisfy the 15 employee minimum. See id.
33 See id. at 664-66, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1213-15.
" See id. at 663, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212.
35 See id. at 666, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1215.
55 See id. at 662, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212.
37 See Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 662, 72 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212.
38 See id.
" See id.
au Sec 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 662-63, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1212.
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Both parties agreed that for determining who was an "employee,"
all individuals with whom the employer had a relationship fell under
the statute.'" Metropolitan, however, argued that under § 2000e(b) an
"employer" only "has" an employee on a given day when the employer
is compensating the individual on that day. 42 Walters, on the other
hand, contended that the test for determining how many employees
an employer "has" should be no different than the test for determining
who qualifies as an "employee."° The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Metropolitan, reasoning that the
"counting method" was the proper test for determining how many
employees an employer "has." 44
The Supreme Court held that the payroll method represents a
fairer reading of the statutory phrase concerning how many employees
an employer "has."45 The Court reasoned that, in the absence of an
indication to the contrary, words in a statute should be given their
ordinary and contemporary meaning.° In this case, the ordinary and
contemporary meaning of how many employees an employer "has,"
according to the Court, is the number of employees with whom the
employer has an employment relationship. 47 The Court concluded that
to accept the Seventh Circuit's counting method would be contrary to
the ordinary and contemporary meaning of how many employees an
employer "has."48 The Court reasoned that to count only employees
who are actually working on a given day would lead to counting even
salaried employees only on days they were actually working. 49 The
Court found it unlikely that Congress would have prescribed a system
that would essentially require employers to keep daily attendance re-
cords of their salaried employees, a task that would be impractical
to administer." Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Metropolitan's
proposed test—which asked "Now many employees were you com-
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1); Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 663, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1212.
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (h); Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 663, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212;
see also EEOC v. Garden Assocs., 965 F.2d 842, 843, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 136, 137
(8th Or. 1992).
43 See Walters, 117 S. Ct, at 663, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212-13. The plaintiff in
Walters cited cases from the Fifth and First Circuits that adopted the payroll method. See id.;
Vera-Lozano, 50 F.3d at 69-70, 67 Fair Fulfil. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 668-69; Thurber, 717 F2d at
634-35, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512-13; Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d
974, 979, n.7, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 319, 323, n.7 (5th Cir. 1980).
44
 See Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 663, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1212-13.
45
 See id. at 664, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1213.
46 See id, (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993)).
47 See id,
42 See id.
49
 See Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 664, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1213.
50 See id.
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pensating on [a given] day?"—simply is not a test that can be derived
from any possible reading of the statutory text. 5'
The Supreme Court further ruled that the statutory phrase "for
each working day" was not rendered superfluous by giving the phrase
"has fifteen or more employees" its ordinary meaning. 52 The Court
reasoned that without this further qualification it would be unclear
whether an employee who arrives or departs mid-work week would
count toward the fifteen-employee minimum for that week." The
phrase "for each working day" eliminates any ambiguity in this instance
for it makes clear that such an employee would not count. 54 The Court
stated that the phenomena of mid-week commencement and termina-
tion of employment, which the Seventh Circuit ruled would be rare
and thus not a proper justification for the phrase "for each working
day," was, in fact, not such a rare occurrence. 55
As a result, the Court held that the payroll method was the better
test for determining the number of employees with whom an employer
had a relationship.56 The Court reasoned that the payroll method was
the simpler method and gave greater consistency to the language of
§ 2000e(b) of Title VII." The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis
of this method, Metropolitan did have the requisite number of employ-
ees for purposes of Title VII."
The Supreme Court in Walters correctly resolved the circuit split
on this issue by adopting an approach that comports with the legislative
intent of Title VII." Title VII was enacted by Congress to act as a
remedial measure to protect employees from discrimination in employ-
ment, and the majority in Congress, at the time of enactment, intended
to give Title VII broad effect." Specifically, the congressional record
clearly indicates that the definition of "employer" was intended to be
51
 See id.
62 See id., 72 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 1213-14.
55 See id., 72 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1214.
"See Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 664-65, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1214. The Court stated
that the -mere' elimination of evident ambiguity is ample—indeed, admirable—justification for
the inclusion of a statutory phrase . ." Id. at 665, 72 Fair Erupt. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 1214.
55 See id. In fact, the Court noted that even Metropolitan had 10 mid-week arrivals and
departures during 1990. See
56 See id. at 665-66, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1214. The Court stated that neither
interpretation of the coverage provision is an entirely accurate measure of the size of a business,
but that the payroll method was the easiest method to administer and helped eliminate potentially
complex and expensive factual inquiries. See id. at 665, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1214.
57 See IS at 665-66, 72 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1214.
55 See id. at 666, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1215.
59 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
6° See Thurber, 717 F.2d at 634-35, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512 (citing 110 CoNns.
REC. 13,087-93 (1964) (Comments of Senators Morse, Saltonstall and others)).
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read broadly. 6 ' For example, Senator Dirksen, a co-sponsor of Title VII,
stated that the definition of "employer" in Title VII was borrowed from
the Unemployment Compensation Act," which states that an employee
is to be counted for each day that an employment relationship exists,
regardless of whether the employee reports to work each day. 63 Fur-
thermore, the EEOC, which acts as the primary agency for implement-
ing Title VII and whose position is entitled to great deference, adopted
the payroll method for the ADEA." The ADEA defines "employer" in
the same way that Title VII does." This resolution creates a sound
policy for defining an employer under Title VII, for it prevents com-
plex and expensive factual inquiry and litigation into the number of
employees an employer "has." 66
The Walters decision prevents employers from circumventing the
reach of the protections afforded employees under Title VIl, 67 Prior to
the Court's ruling, employers in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits could
avoid liability under Title VII merely by utilizing more part-time em-
ployees who could not be included when determining how many
employees an employer "has."" The Court's decision in Walters serves
to extend the protections of Title VII to part-time workers, who are a
growing percentage of the work force."
The inclusion, under Title VII, of more "Mom and Pop" busi-
nesses, which may employ more part-time employees, imposes onthese
businesses only the relatively small burden of refraining from discrimi-
nating against their employees." Congressional debate surrounding
the enactment of Title VII revealed a concern for the over-regulation
of small family and neighborhood businesses." The Walters decision,
however, continues to shield smaller employers who truly do not have
an employment relationship with fifteen or more employees from the
scrutiny of Tide VII and, thus, is not in conflict with the legislative
intent behind Title VII. 72
61 See id.
62 See id. at 634, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512 (citing 110 CoNG. REc, 13,087).
63 See 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1954).
64 See Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 663, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1213.
65 See id.
66 See id, at 665-66, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1214.
67 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 9-18, 26-29 and accompanying text.
62 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
72 See Thurber, 717 F.2d at 635, 32 Fair Einpi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512-13.
71 See id. at 634, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512.
72 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying Text; see also Thurber, 717 F.2d at 634, 32 Fair
Einpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1512.
410	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:365
In sum, the Supreme Court held in Walters that the touchstone
for determining how many employees an employer "has" for purposes
of Title VII is the employment relationship." The Court reasoned that-
the payroll method is the proper method for determining the number
of employees with whom an employer has an employment relation-
ship. 74 The resolution of the circuit split surrounding this issue gives
full and contemporary meaning to the words in Title VII's definition
of "employer" and is consistent with the legislative intent behind Title
VII by protecting a larger portion of the workforce from discrimination
in employment." The Walters decision provides for the inclusion of a
greater number of businesses by permitting the inclusion of part-time
employees in determining whether an employer "has" enough employ-
ees to trigger Title VII provisions." This decision resolves the circuit
court split, furthers the broad remedial purpose behind the passage of
Title VII, encompasses part-time workers who play a greater role in the
workforce and prevents the exploitation of these part-time employees
by employers attempting to use them as a tool for circumventing the
anti-discriminatory purpose of Title VII. 77
B.* Term "Employees" as Used in Anti-Retaliation Provision of Title VII
Includes Former Employees: Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") is sweeping,
remedial legislation which was enacted to proscribe a vast range of
discriminatory conduct and applies to virtually all employers. 2 The
anti-retaliation provision of Title VII ("§ 704(a)") prohibits an em-
ployer from discriminating against any employees or applicants for
employment who have either availed themselves of Title VII's protec-
tion or assisted others in doing so. 5 In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co, the
Supreme Court held that former employees are included within the
73 See 117 S. Ct. at 664-66,72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1213-15.
74
 See id.
75 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
* By Lucia B. Thompson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 117 S. Ct. 843,72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 1856 (1997).
2 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-1562,1995 WL 25831, at *1,66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1285 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995). Title VII provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment . . . because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (1982).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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term "employees" as used in § 704(a), resolving a conflict among the
circuits. 4 As a result, an employer may not retaliate against a former
employee who has filed a Title VII claim against it even though the
employment relationship has terminated. 5 The Court found that for-
mer employees were included within the term "employees" as used in
§ 704(a) because to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the
broader context and primary purpose of Title VII and would vitiate
the protection provided under § 704(a). 6
In 1991, in Reed v. Shepard, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that § 704(a) does not protect former em-
ployees from post-employment retaliation.'' In Reed, an employee
claimed that her employer wrongfully discharged her for confronting
a superior on matters relating to possible sex discrimination.° The
plaintiff alleged further that her employer had subjected her to post-
employment retaliation by physically threatening her on a number of
occasions after she refused to drop her lawsuit.° The court found that
the alleged retaliatory activities, because they were subsequent to and
unrelated to the plaintiff's employment, did not constitute adverse
employment action within the meaning of Title VII.'° The court thus
held that former employees were not "employees" who are protected
under § 704(a))'
In 1992, in Polsby v. Chase, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII
does not protect former employees. 12 Polsby involved an employee of
the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders
See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846, 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1857, 1860. The
Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that the term "employees" as
used in § 704(a) included former employees while the Fourth Circuit held that the term "em-
ployees" as used in § 704(a) did not include former employees. Compare Charlton v. Paramus Bd.
of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 200, 202, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 1414, 1419, 1420 (3rd Cir. 1994)
(former employees are "employees" under § 704(a)) with Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325,
332, 69 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 522, 527 (4th Cir. 1995) (former employees are not
"employees" under § 704(a)).
5 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848-49, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1859-60.
See id.
7 939 F.2d 484, 492-93, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 997, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 487-88, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1000.
9 See id. at 492, 56 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1004. The alleged post-employment
retaliation consisted of a grand jury investigation of the plaintiff's alleged illegal jail activities, a
mysterious physical attack on her person by a disguised assailant urging her to drop her case
against the department, disturbing late-night phone calls threatening her with reprisals for her
lawsuit and someone shooting at her car while she was driving. See id.
I° See id. at 492-93, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1004.
11 See id.
12 970 F.2d 1360, 1365, 1367, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 712, 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1992).
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and Stroke ("NINCDS")," The plaintiff claimed that NINCDS did not
extend her yearly contract because she consulted an NINCDS admin-
istrator, whom she mistakenly thought to be an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") counselor, concerning numerous
alleged acts of sex discrimination. 14 Five months after her termination,
and while her claim was still pending, the plaintiff requested a letter
from her former employer describing her training so that she could
obtain board certification from the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology.° Although NINCDS had informed the plaintiff when she
was hired that she would receive residency credit applicable to certifica-
tion, the letter that NINCDS sent to the American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology reflected a new policy." Without informing the plain-
tiff, NINCDS stated in its letter that it gave no credit towards residency
training.' 7 Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that her former employer
began to slander her professional competence after she requested the
letter."
The Fourth Circuit examined the clear language of § 704(a) and
concluded that former employees were intentionally omitted from the
anti-retaliation protection of Title VII because Congress only included
"applicants for employment" along with "employees" in the provision."
The court declined to base its decision on policy considerations or to
analyze the purpose of the statute, opting instead to interpret the term
"employees" according to its ordinary, contemporary and common
meaning. 2° Furthermore, the court noted that the enumerated unlaw-
ful employment practices that Title VII explicitly forbids did not in-
clude post-employment discrimination, regardless of its severity. 2 '
Thus, the court held that the term "employees" as used in § 704(a) did
not include former employees. 22
In 1994, in Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the term
"employees," as used in the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, in-
cluded former employees." In Charlton, the Paramus School District
13 See id. at 1361-62, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 713.
14 See id. at 1362, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 713.
15 See id., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas (BNA) at 714.
16 See id.
17 See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1362, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 714.
IR See id.
12 See id. at 1365, 59 Fair Dupl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 716.
" See id.
RI See id.
22 See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365, 1367, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 716, 718.
23 25 F.3d 194, 200, 202, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1414, 1419, 1420 (3rd Cir. 1994),
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terminated a tenured school teacher after she rebuffed the sexual
advances of a superior. 24 The plaintiff claimed that, in retaliation for
her post-termination pursuit of a Title VII discrimination action, the
Paramus School District commenced proceedings to revoke her New
jersey state teaching certificate. 25
The court noted that the purpose of the statute was the determin-
ing factor in discerning the scope of protection under § 704(a) .26 Thus,
the court concluded that the term "employees" included former em-
ployees when a retaliatory act was in reprisal for a protected act and
arose out of, or was related to, the employment relationship. 27 The
court reasoned that Congress must not have intended Title VII's pro-
tection from retaliatory acts to end at the time of termination when
the termination itself is the basis of the Title VII claim. 28 Thus, the
court held that the term "employees," as used in the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII, included former employees.29
In 1996, in 1761yrinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, clarifying its previous position in
Reed, held that the term "employees" as used in § 704(a) included
former employees when post-termination acts of retaliation adversely
affected the plaintiff's employment opportunities or were otherwise
related to the former employment relationship." In Veprinsky, an em-
ployee filed a discriminatory discharge claim and subsequently alleged
that his former employer retaliated against him in several ways for
filing the claim.s 1 The court distinguished Reed by emphasizing that it
had not intended to exclude completely former employees from pro-
The Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have also found that the term "employees" as used in
§ 704(a) includes former employees. See O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 869, 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1690, 1694 (9th Cir. 1982); Patchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052,
1055, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 691, 692, 693 (2nd Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank
of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1166, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1977).
24 See Charlton, 25 F,3d at 196, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1415.
25
 See id.
'2
 See id. at 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA.) at 1418.
27 See id., 64 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1419.
2g See id., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1418.
22 See Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200, 202, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1419, 1420.
50 87 F.3d 882, 895, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 170, 171, 182 (7th Cir. 1996); are Reed,
939 F.2d at 492-93, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1004-05.
21 See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 882, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 171. The alleged retaliatory
activities included providing false information to Veprinsky's subsequent employer, refusing to
consider rehiring him for another position and informing the placement firm with which
Veprinsky was working that he had filed the EEOC charge. See id. at 883, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 172, Furthermore, the defendant's director of human resources arranged for legal
representation for an individual that Veprinsky was suing in an unrelated action. See id.
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tection under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII." Rather, it
found that those acts subsequent to and unrelated to the plaintiff's
employment fell outside the purview of the statute." The court ana-
lyzed the term "employees" in the context of furthering the broad
remedial purposes of Title VII instead of relying merely on plain
meaning." Because discriminatory discharge represents one of the
more common forms of unlawful employment actions, the court rea-
soned that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII would be consid-
erably less effective if it did not include former employees within its
scope." The court thus held that § 704(a) included former employees
when an employer's post-termination acts of retaliation adversely af-
fected the plaintiff's future employment opportunities or were other-
wise related to the employment relationship. 36
During the Survey year, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the United
States Supreme Court held that the term "employees," as used in
§ 704(a) of Title VII, includes former employees." The Court stated
that, given that the term "employees" is ambiguous as used in § 704(a),
it is more consistent with the broader context of Title VII and the
primary purpose of § 704(a) to include former employees within the
meaning of the term." By holding that the term "employees" as used
in § 704(a) includes former employees, the Court resolved the circuit
conflict."
52 See id.; Reed, 939 F.2d at 992-93, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1004.
" See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 174.
34 See id. at 889, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 177.
55 See id. at 890, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 178.
36 See id. at 891, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 178. A district court in Illinois recently
applied this standard in Murphy v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 959 F. Supp. 901, 907-08 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
37 117 S. Ct. 845, 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1856, 1860 (1997). This decision is in
accord with decisions interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions of similar statutes as including
former employees in their protection. See id. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085,
1088-89, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the term
"employees" in the anti-retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") includes former employees). Similarly, the Robinson decision has influenced lower
courts' interpretations of other labor statutes. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1860. See, e.g., Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 126-27
(Dist. Cal. 1997) (anti-retaliation provision of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
covers former applicants); Deflaviis v. Lord & Taylor, Inc., 566 N.W.2d 661, 665, 667 (Mich. App.
Ct. 1997) (anti-retaliation provision of Michigan's Civil Rights Act covers former employees);
McKeever v. Ironworker's Dist. Council, No. Civ. A. 96-5858, 1997 WL 109569, at 4:2, 73 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1000, 1002 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1997) (anti-retaliation provision of ADEA covers
former employees).
" See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
99
 See id. at 846-99, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1857, 1860.
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The dispute in Robinson developed after the defendant fired the
plaintiff." The plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that
racial bias motivated his termination.'" The plaintiff then applied for
employment with another company. 42 While the plaintiff's EEOC
charge was pending, his prospective employer contacted the defendant
for an employment reference. 43 The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant, in violation of the and-retaliation provision of Title VII, had
provided his prospective employer with false information and a nega-
tive job reference in retaliation for his having filed a discriminatory
discharge claim with the EEOC. 44
The district court, citing Polsby, dismissed the complaint holding
that the and-retaliation provision did not apply to former employees."
When the plaintiff appealed, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
originally reversed by a divided panel, holding that the term "employ-
ees" as used in § 704(a) included former employees." Concentrating
its analysis on Congress's purpose in enacting the sweeping, remedial
legislation of Title VII, the court stated that a literal interpretation of
the term "employees" would hinder the enforcement mechanism of
the statute.47 The court concluded that including former employees in
the protection of § 704(a) was consistent with Congress's intent to
strengthen, not weaken, Title VII by enacting the provision."
The Fourth Circuit granted the defendant's motion for rehearing
en banc and vacated the original panel's decision.49 On rehearing, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the term "em-
ployees" as used in § 704(a) did not include former employees. 3° The
court found that the statutory language was unambiguous in its use of
the term "employees" and stated that nothing in the statute suggested
the inclusion of former employees in the term. 5 ' Furthermore, the
court stated that Title VII applies to "adverse employment action,"
4° See id. at 845, 72 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1857.
41 See
42 See id.
43 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 845, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1857.
44 See id.
45
 See Robinson, No. 93-1562, 1995 WL 25831, at *I, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1284
(4th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995); Polsby v, Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
712, 716 (4th Or. 1992).
46 See Robinson, 1995 WL 25831, at *1, *3, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas, (BNA) 1284, 1285, 1286.
47 See id. at *2, 66 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1285.
48 See id.
49 See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 328, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 523.
" See id.
" See id. at 329-30, 69 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 525.
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necessarily limiting its scope to events that occur within the duration
of the employment relationship.52 In rejecting the reasoning of the
majority of the circuits, the court indicated that broad policy argu-
ments were unpersuasive in this context and inconsistent with the
established analytical framework for statutory construction."
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit
decision, holding that the term "employees" as used in § 704(a) in-
cludes former employees. 54 The Court analyzed the language of the
provision itself, the specific context of § 704(a) and the broader con-
text of Title VII, determining that the term "employees" was ambiguous
as to whether it included former employees." The Court resolved the
ambiguity in favor of including former employees in light of the
broader context of Title VII. 56
The Court's first step in determining that the term "employees"
as used in § 704(a) is ambiguous was to note the absence of a temporal
qualifier in the provision. 57 Section 701(b), for example, clarifies which
employers are covered under Title VII; the language contains temporal
qualifiers that make plain Congress's intent to have the term "employ-
ees" refer to current employees,m Because the language of § 704(a)
contains no such temporal qualifier, but rather refers merely to "em-
ployees" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections and
does not specify whether the alleged retaliatory action occurred before
or after termination, the Court concluded that the term "employees"
was ambiguous in this context. 59 The Court further noted that § 701(f),
Title VIPs definition section, also lacks any temporal qualifier, defining
an "employee" merely as "an individual employed by the employer." 60
The Court stated that Congress could just as easily have intended the
term "employee" to mean one who "was employed" as one who "is
employed. "61
52 See id. at 331, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 526.
55 See id. at 332, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 527.
54 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
"See id. at 846, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1857-59.
"See id. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
57 See id. at 846 n.2, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1858 n.2.
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982); Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846 n.2, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1858 n.2. The relevant provision states that the act applies to any employer "who has
Fifteen or more employees for each working day;" the use of the present tense clearly evidences
Congress's intent to use the term "employees" to mean current employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(emphasis added).
59 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1858.
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846-47, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1858.
61 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1858.
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The Court further demonstrated the ambiguity of the term "em-
ployees" by pointing out other provisions in Title VII that use the term
more inclusively or differently. 62 In some provisions the term clearly
refers only to current employees, but in others, former employees are
necessarily included." Because the term "employees" has a plain mean-
ing in some contexts, but not in others, the Court concluded that the
term is inherently ambiguous and a court must determine the meaning
of the term for each individual provision of the statute. 61
The Court proceeded to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the use
of the term "employees" in § 704(a) by finding that the term includes
former employees. 65 The Court analyzed the term "employees" within
the broader context of the statute, noting that Congress clearly in-
tended for several provisions of the statute to provide protection to
former employees.° Filing a charge alleging discriminatory discharge
under § 703(a) is a protected activity under Title VII, an act necessarily
performed by a former employee. 67 Because § 704(a) prohibits retali-
ation against an employee for a protected activity and because filing a
charge alleging discriminatory discharge is a protected activity, the
Court concluded that including former employees within the purview
of § 704(a) is more consistent with the statute.°
The Court also accepted the petitioner's argument that excluding
former employees from the definition of "employees" would make
§ 704(a) considerably less effective. 69 The Court noted that employees
would be less likely to exercise their rights under Title VII if they knew
that their employer could retaliate against them in any way as soon as
61 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) (1), 16(b); Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847, 72 Fair Dupl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1858. Both §§ 706(g) and 717(b) list "reinstatement or hiring of employees" as an
affirmative remedial action, necessarily referring to both former and prospective employees when
using the term "employees." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) (1), 16(b); Robinson, 117 S. Ct, at 847,
72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1858;. Similarly, given that discriminatory discharge is a
forbidden ,"personnel action affecting employees" under § 717(a), the "employee" who files the
authorized complaint is necessarily a former employee. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) (1), 16(b);
Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847, 72 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1858. In contrast, the term
"employees," in certain parts of Title VII, clearly refers to current employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h); Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1858. Certain
sections, for example, address salary and promotions provisions. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847,
72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1858; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
63 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847, 72 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1858.
64 See id., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1859.
63 See id. at 849, 72 Fair Emil. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
66 See id. at 848, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1859.
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848, 72 Fair Empl. Pmc. Cas. (BNA) at
1859.
68 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1859.
66 See id.
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the employment relationship ended. 7° Conversely, an employer who
knew that there would be no punishment for retaliating against a
former employee might choose to fire an employee whom it thought
might file a Title VII claim against it.'n Again emphasizing the broader
context of Title VII, the Court stated that it would be a disservice to
the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision to allow employers to
retaliate against an entire class of people who engage in a protected
activity, such as those who file discriminatory discharge claims." Thus,
in light of the broader context of Title VII and the specific primary
purpose of § 704(a), the Court held that the term "employees" as used
in that provision includes former employees."
Although Robinson now secures the protection of Title VIPs anti-
retaliation provision for former employees, the precise scope of that
protection remains undetermined. 74 The circuit courts that, prior to
Robinson, had already held that § 704(a) covered former employees,
differed in articulating a standard." The courts must develop a work-
able standard for assessing which post-termination actions will entitle
a former employee to file a retaliation claim."
In Charlton, the Third Circuit held that post-termination retali-
atory conduct is actionable when it arises out of or is related to the
employment relationship." In Veprinsky, the Seventh Circuit used a
slightly broader standard." In that case, the court, clarifying its earlier
decision in Reed, held that post-termination acts of retaliation that
adversely affect the plaintiff's employment opportunities or are other-
wise related to employment are cognizable under Title VII." The
Veprinsky court declined, however, to overturn Reed, implying that
physically threatening behavior, even for the purposes of attempting
to force a former employee to drop a lawsuit, neither adversely affects
7° See id.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
73 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848, 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1858, 1860.
74 See id. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
76 See, e.g., Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel Inc., 87 F.Sd 882, 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
170, 174 (7th Cir. 1996); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas, (DNA) 1414, 1418-19 (3rd Cir. 1994).
76 See, e.g., Veprinsky, 87 F.Sd at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.3d
at 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1418-19.
77 See Charlton, 25 F.3d at 197, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1416.
78 See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 882, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 171.
79 See id.; Reed, 939 F.2d at 492-93, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1004.
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the plaintiff's employment opportunities nor is otherwise related to
employments°
"Otherwise related to employment," in the Veprinsky standard,
thus seems not to refer to activities, like physically threatening behav-
ior, which are not ordinarily a natural extension of an employment
relationship." In contrast, providing references to a previous em-
ployee's prospective employers is a natural extension of an employ-
ment relationship and is thus "otherwise related to employment."82 The
Seventh Circuit has continued to apply the Veprinsky standard since the
Supreme Court decided Robinson."
As a result of federal courts using slightly different standards for
determining which post-termination acts will be actionable retaliatory
acts, another split in the circuits could develop as to the required
standard for a former employee's § 704(a) claim." The decision that
creates a unified standard is likely to provide a remedy both when the
previous employer's retaliatory activity impairs the plaintiff's future
employment opportunities and when the retaliatory activity takes the
form of an act that is a natural extension of the employment relation-
ship, such as providing a reference for a former employee's prospective
employer.B5 The interesting question is whether a new standard will
88 See Veprinsky, 87 F.Sd at 888, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 176; Reed, 939 F.2d at
492-93, 56 Fair Dupl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1004. In Reed, the alleged post-employment retaliation
consisted of a grand jury investigation of the plaintiffs alleged illegal jail activities, a mysterious
physical attack on her person by a disguised assailant urging her to drop her case against the
department, disturbing late-night phone calls threatening her with reprisals for her lawsuit and
someone shooting at her car while she was driving. See 939 F.2d at 492, 56 Fair Em pi. Prac. Cas.
(DNA) at 1004.
I" See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 888, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 176.
92 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) al 1860; Veprinsky, 87 F.3d
at 888, 71 Fair Etnpl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 176.
85 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Env]. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1860; Veprinsky, 87 F.Sd
at 882, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 171; Murphy v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 959 F. Supp.
901, 907-08 (N.D. 111. 1997). In Murphy, the court held that an employer's disclosure to the
plaintiff's former coworkers of confidential information regarding the plaintiffs alcohol and drug
treatment adversely affected the plaintiff's employment prospects and thus constituted post-ter-
mination retaliation when the former employee was seeking reinstatement. See Murphy, 959 F.
Supp. at 907-08.
84 See, e.g., Veprinsky, 87 F.Sd at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.Sd
at 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1419.
85 See, e.g., Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 845, 72 Fair Drip]. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1857. In Robinson,
the defendant's providing the plaintiff's prospective employer with a false reference both ad-
versely affected the plaintiff's future employment opportunities and was a natural extension of
the employment relationship. See id. In contrast, the post-employment physical threats by the
defendant neither adversely affected the plaintiff's future employment prospects nor was a natural
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provide a remedy in a situation like the one in Reed.86 Physical threats
neither impair a former employee's future employment prospects nor
are they a natural extension of the employment relationship, but such
acts clearly call for a remedy. 87
Given the uncertainty that the lack of a standard for determining
what post-termination acts will be prohibited under § 704(a) creates,
employers should be aware of an increased risk of Title VII liability. 88
Clearly, as discussed above, employers must execute cautiously acts that
affect the plaintiff's prospective employment and acts that are consid-
ered a natural extension of the employment relationship. 89 To shield
themselves as much as possible from liability, employers' policies
should be meticulously evenhanded. 90 For example, if an employer
usually responds to a reference request with a form letter, the employer
should be wary of sending a much more detailed letter outlining the
faults of a specific former employee who had previously filed a Title
VII claim against the employer." Similarly, employers should not men-
tion former employees' Title VII claims. 92 The negative effect of this
necessarily increased awareness is the employer's decreased ability to
render honest negative evaluations of employees who happen to have
filed a Title VII claim against them, thus impairing future employers'
ability to evaluate a prospective employee accurately. 93 Employers may
also have to be wary of employees who attempt to shield themselves
from negative job references by filing a Title VII claim, thus putting
the employer in the difficult position of ensuring that any job refer-
ences given are not seen as retaliatory."
extension of the employment relationship. See Reed, 939 F.2d at 492, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(DNA) at 1004.
Be
 See Reed, 939 F.2d at 492, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1004.
87 See id.
88 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1860; Veprinsky, 87 F.Sd
at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(DNA) at 1419.
" See Robinson, 117 S. CL at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1860; Veprinsky, 87 F.3d
at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1419.
9° See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (DNA) at 1860; Veprinsky, 87 F.3d
at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1419.
91
 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860; Veprinsky, 87 F.3d
at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1419.
92 See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 883, 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 172, 174.
95 See id.
94 See id.
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Although employers are thus more susceptible to liability after
Robinson, employees are now enjoying a safer environment for address-
ing their complaints through the proper channels without as much
fear of retaliation. 95 Employees should be aware, however, that there
are still numerous factors that may limit this new found protection. A
potential plaintiff should be wary that the mere fact of the Robinson
decision does not prove that his or her former employer's acts were
retaliatory." The former employer could make proving retaliation very
difficult by streamlining the reference process and issuing bland refer-
ences in retaliation against a once stellar employee. A plaintiff will also
need to prove that the alleged retaliatory act bore the necessary con-
nection to the employment relationship.`' As discussed above, this
nexus might be difficult to prove in situations like Reed, where physical
threats, because they are not considered a natural extension of the
employment relationship, may not bear the necessary relationship to
the former employee's future employment prospects."
Just as the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson brought the
interpretation of § 704(a) into accord with the interpretation of anti-
retaliation provisions of similar statutes, the decision will likewise in-
fluence the interpretation of protective provisions in other labor stat-
utes." For example, the Robinson decision may influence lower courts'
95 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
96 See id.
97 See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.3d at
200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1418-19.
95
 See Reed, 939 F.2d at 492-93, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1004.
99 See Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 65 Cal. Rini. 2d 112, 126 (Dist. Cal. 1997); Deflaviis
v. Lord Sc Taylor, Inc., 566 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Mich. App. Ct, 1997); McKeever v. Ironworker's Dist.
Council, No. Civ. A. 96-5858, 1997 WL 109569, at *9, *5, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1002,
1004 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1997). In McKeever, for example, the court followed the statutory construc-
tion in Robinson in concluding that retirees are included within the coverage of § 623(a) (1) of
the ADEA. See McKeever, 1997 WL 109569, at *2-3, *5, 73 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (DNA) at 1001-02,
1004. The McKeever plaintiffs were union members who were over age 65 and retired when their
former employer discontinued their medical benefits on the basis of their age. See id. at *1, 73
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1000-01. Like the Robinson Court, the McKeever court stated that
such a finding is more consistent with the broader context that other ADEA sections provide and
with the ADEA's general remedial purposes. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1860; McKeever, 1997 WL 109569, at *9, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1002.
The court further explained that to find otherwise would potentially undermine the protective
purposes of the statute. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860;
McKeever, 1997 WL 109569, at *3, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1002.
Similarly, in Deflaviis, a Michigan state court followed exactly the Supreme Court's analysis
in Robinson when interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of Michigan's Civil Rights Act. See
Deflaviis, 566 N.W.2d at 664; Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 843, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1856.
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a prospective employment opportunity when
his former employer retaliated against hint for a previously filed age discrimination lawsuit by
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interpretation of other federal or state statutes.'" Practitioners should
be aware of the potential interpretive ramifications that the Supreme
Court's decision in Robinson may have on the other state and federal
statutes that affect their clients' rights and liabilities.m
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in Robinson decided that the
term "employees" as used in § 704(a) of Title VII includes former
employees.luThus, a former employee who previously filed a Title VII
claim against an employer is protected from that employer's retaliation
even after the end of the employment relationship.'" The Court in-
cluded former employees within the meaning of the term "employees"
as used in § 704(a) because protecting them from post-termination
retaliation is consistent with the broader context and primary purposes
of Title VII.R4 The courts have yet to develop a workable standard for
determining what post-termination employer actions will be action-
able.'" Employers, for their part, may no longer retaliate against for-
mer employees who have availed themselves of Title VII's protection
and may find themselves streamlining the reference process to avoid
increased liability.'" Employers should be aware of an increased risk of
liability and should examine closely their policies regarding post-ter-
mination employment activity. Employees can anticipate greater free-
dom in the ability to redress their grievances, but they should also be
aware of a potentially decreased chance of receiving a reference that
providing the prospective employer with a negative reference. See Deflauiis,566 N.W.2d at 663.
The court stated that, although it was not bound by federal precedent, the Supreme Court's
decision was highly persuasive. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1860; Defaviis, 566 N.W.2d at 664.
In Sada, a California state court relied on Robinson in deciding that a "former applicant"
was protected under the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") in light of the
primary purpose of anti-retaliation provisions—maintaining unfettered access to the statutory
remedial mechanisms. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1860;
Sada, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126. In that case, the defendant fired the plaintiff from her job as an
independent contractor after learning of her national origin during an interview for a full-time
position, See Sada, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115-16.
1 °11 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1860; Sada, 65 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 126; Defloviis, 566 N.W.2d at 665; McKeever, 1997 WL 109569, at *3, *5, 73 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1002, 1005.
101 See, e.g., Sada, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126; Deflaviis, 566 N.W.2d at 665; McKeever, 1997 WL
109569, at *3, *5, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1002, 1005.
1 °2 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 1860.
1 °3 See id.
101 See id.
1 °5 See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel Inc., 87 F.3d 882, 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 170,
174 (7th Cir. 1996); Charlton v. Paramus ad. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1414, 1418-19 (3rd Cir. 1994).
106 See Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 886, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 174; Charlton, 25 F.3d at
200, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1418-19.
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includes more than purely basic information. 107 Both employers and
employees should also be aware of the possible persuasive effects that
this decision may have on other courts' interpretation of similar stat-
utes. 'I's
C. White Males Have Standing To Bring Hostile Environment Claims
for Discrimination Directed Towards Black and Female
Coworkers: Childress v. City of Richmond'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.' Section 706(b) of Title VII grants individuals a
private right of action against their employers. 3 This private right of
action is designed to assist the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") in fulfilling Title VII's goal of eradicating unlawful
discrimination in the workplace. 4 An individual must be a "person
claiming to be aggrieved" to have standing to file a claim with the
EEOC. 5 Although Title VII does not expressly define "person claiming
to be aggrieved," all circuits that have considered this standing require-
ment have interpreted the language broadly to include people who
allege injuries resulting from indirect discrimination. 6 In 1997, in
107 See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849, 72 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 1860.
108 See, e.g., Sada, 65 Cal, Rims. 2d at 126; Deflaviis, 566 N.W.2d at 665; McKeever, 1997 WL
109569, at *3, *5, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1002, 1004.
* By Mary-Alice Brady, Staff Member, BOSTON COLIMA LAW REvtaw,
120 F.3d 476, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749 (4th Cir. 1997).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701 et seq., 703(a), 42 U.S,C. § 2000e et seq., 2000e-2(a) (as
amended 1994) [hereinafter Title V11]. The statute provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id.
2 Title VII § 706(b). Section 706(b) of Title VII grants "a person claiming to be aggrieved,
or by a member of the Commission" the authority to file a complaint with the EEOC alleging a
violation of Title VII. Id. A "person claiming to be aggrieved" must file a complaint with the
EEOC, which in turn determines whether the individual has an injury sufficient to justify an
issuance of a right-to-sue letter. Id.
4 See EEOC V. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 445, 453, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 972, 976,
984 (6th Cir. 1977).
5 See Title VII § 706(b).
6 See Childress, 120 F.Sd at 481, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753; EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477, 482-83, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1501, 1505 (5th Cir. 1980); Bailey
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Childress v. City of Richmond, the Fourth Circuit helped to solidify the
holdings of numerous circuits by interpreting broadly Title VII's stand-
ing requirement and holding that Title VII's "person claiming to be
aggrieved" allowed a person to sue for indirect discrimination.?
In 1972, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the United
States Supreme Court held that a white tenant had standing to sue his
landlord under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("Title VIII")
for discrimination directed towards nonwhite applicants. 9 In
Trafficante, a white tenant in an apartment complex alleged that his
landlord violated Title VIII by refusing to rent apartments to nonwhite
applicants.9
 The white tenant claimed that the discrimination directed
towards minorities caused him to suffer a loss of benefits derived from
interracial associations. 19
The Supreme Court reasoned that Title VIII's vague statutory
requirement that claims must be brought by a "person aggrieved"
evidenced a congressional intent to confer standing broadly under the
statute." In so construing the language of Title VIII, the Court adopted
the Third Circuit's reasoning in a Title VII case, thereby analogizing
Title VIII to Title VII." The Court agreed with the Third Circuit's
opinion that the use of the language "a person claiming to be ag-
grieved" evidenced a congressional intent to extend standing to its
constitutional limits.' 3
 The Court recognized that the language of Title
VIII is broad and inclusive and, therefore, reasoned that a loss of
Co., 563 F.2d at 452-59, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 983-84; Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547
F.2d 466, 469, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1976). Indirect discrimination
is discrimination directed towards one group that indirectly injures a person not a member of
that group. See Waters, 547 F.2d at 469, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411.
7 See 120 F.3d at 981, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 753.
8 See 409 U.S. 205, 207, 209 (1972). The district court dismissed the claims, holding that the
tenant lacked standing to sue because he was not within a class towards which the discrimination
was directed. See id. at 208. In affirming the district court's ruling, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted Title VIII narrowly on the issue of standing, explaining
that only people who are the direct objects of discriminatory practices can bring claims. See id.
9 See id. at 207-08.
1 ') See id. at 208, 209-10. In particular, the white tenant alleged that he lost both social
advantages gained from living in an integrated community and business privileges derived from
associating with minority groups and suffered embarrassment and financial damages from being
labeled as a resident of a "white ghetto." See id. at 208.
" See id. at 209.
12 See id. (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 648
(3d Cir. 1971)). In Hackett, the court held that by using the broad phrase "a person claiming to
be aggrieved" under Title VII, Congress intended to define standing to its constitutional limits.
See 445 F.2d at 446, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 649.
13 See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (citing Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 650).
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benefits derived from interracial associations was a sufficient injury to
place a white tenant within the meaning of a "person aggrieved" as
defined by Title VIII." Thus, the Supreme Court held that the white
tenant had standing to bring suit against his landlord for discrimina-
tion directed towards nonwhite applicants. 15
In 1976, in Waters v. Heublein, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a white female had standing
to sue her employer under Title VII for discrimination directed to-
wards racial and ethnic minorities." In Waters, a white female employee
filed suit against her employer for failing to provide women and mi-
norities the same job and salary opportunities as white males.'? Spe-
cifically, she claimed that she had been performing the same job as
male employees, but was receiving lower pay." Moreover, she alleged
that, in general, women and minorities were placed in low-status posi-
tions and received lower pay than white males.' 9
The Ninth Circuit found the case indistinguishable from 'Rat,:
ficante, reasoning that because Tide VIII and Title VII have similar
statutory language, purposes and structure, they are subject to the
same interpretation.° Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme
Court's comparison of Title VIII to Title VII in Trafficante and ex-
plained that the court here was merely applying the same analogy. 2 ' In
addition, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that interracial harmony is just
as important in the workplace as it is at home. 22 Consequently, the
court explained that the benefits derived from interracial associations
are as great, if not greater, at work than at home, emphasizing that in
today's mobile society people are more likely to know their coworkers
than their neighbors. 25 Hence, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
injury alleged by the plaintiff—a loss of benefits derived from interra-
cial associations—qualified her as a "person claiming to be aggrieved"
14 See id. at 209-10.
15 See id. at 212.
16 547 F.2d 466, 467, 470, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1409, 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1976).
17 See id. at 467, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1410. The district court dismissed the
claims of discrimination directed towards minorities, holding that the petitioner lacked standing
to sue for discrimination directed towards groups of which she was not a member. See id., 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1409-10.
"See id., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1410.
19
 See id.
20 See id. at 469, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411 (citing Traffieante, 409 U.S. 205).
21
 See Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 1411-12 (citing
Trafficante, 409 U.S. 207).
22 See id. at 469, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411.
20 See id.
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under Title VII." Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that a white female
employee had standing to sue her employer under Title VII for dis-
crimination directed towards racial and ethnic minorities.°
Likewise, in 1980, in EEOC v. Mississippi College, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII permits a white
female employee to bring suit against her employer for discrimination
directed towards minorities. 26 In Mississippi College, a white female
employee filed suit against her employer claiming violations of Title
VII resulting from the employer's failure to consider her for a vacant
full-time position as an assistant professor in the psychology depart-
ment.27 She later amended her complaint to include allegations that
the employer violated Title VII by discriminating against women with
respect to promotions, recruitment, pay and job classifications and by
failing to recruit and hire both male and female minorities.°
The Fifth Circuit implicitly reasoned that although the claimant
was not the direct object of the discrimination directed towards mi-
norities, it nevertheless affected her.29 Relying on Trafficante, the court
reasoned that by allowing claims to be brought by a "person claim-
ing to be aggrieved," Congress intended to confer standing broadly."
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's acceptance of
a loss of important benefits derived from interracial associations as a
cognizable injury under Title VIII, as well as other circuits' recognition
24 See id. at 469-70, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411-12.
25 See id. at 470, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1412. Similarly, in 1977, in EEOC u Bailey
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a white female employee
had standing to sue her employer under Title VII for discrimination directed towards females
and blacks. 563 F.2d 439, 454, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 972, 985 (6th Cir. 1977). The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that Trafficante compelled the court's conclusion that the white female had
standing to sue her employer for discrimination directed towards blacks. See id. at 452, 453, 15
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 983 (citing Traffiranie, 409 U.S. at 209-10). The Sixth Circuit
explained that the Supreme Court's analogy of Title VIII to Title VII coupled with its adoption
of the Third Circuit's broad interpretation of standing reveals the Supreme Court's opinion that
Title VII and Title VIII are subject to the same interpretation. See id. Moreover, because the
Supreme Court in Trafficante recognized the loss of important interracial benefits as a cognizable
injury under Title VIII, the Sixth Circuit determined that it was compelled to recognize the same
injury under Title VII. See id. Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that a white employee had standing
to sue her employer under Title VII for discrimination directed towards blacks. See id. at 454, 15
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 985.
Y6 626 F.2d 477, 483, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1501, 1505 (5th Cir. 1980).
27 See id. at 479, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1502.
28 See id. at 479-80, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1502. The district court dismissed the
claim, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue for discrimination that was directed
towards a class to which she did not belong. See id. at 481, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1503.
29 See id. at 482, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1504.
5° See id., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505 (citing Traffieanle, 409 U.S. 205).
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of the same injury under Title VII and thus, the Fifth Circuit likewise
recognized such an injury." Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit implicitly
extended this reasoning to include a right to work in an environment
that is free from unlawful discrimination. 32 Accordingly, the court rea-
soned that an employer's discriminatory practices can create a work
environment permeated with discrimination and, therefore, a white
employee properly may allege an injury—a loss of important benefits
derived from interracial associations—to qualify her as a "person claim-
ing to be aggrieved" under Title 'VII." Hence, the court held that the
white female had standing to sue her former employer under Title VII
for discrimination directed towards minorities."
During the Survey year, in Childress v. City of Richmond, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that white males
had standing under Title VII to sue their employer for indirect dis-
crimination." Specifically, in Childress, the court held that seven white
male police officers had standing under Title VII to bring hostile en-
vironment claims against their supervisor for discrimination directed
towards black and female coworkers." In doing so, the Fourth Circuit
helped to solidify the holdings of numerous circuits by interpreting
broadly Title VIPs standing requirement and holding that Title VII's
"person claiming to be aggrieved" language allows a person to sue for
indirect discrimination."
In Childress, seven white male police officers alleged that their
supervisor, a white male, had made numerous disparaging comments
about black and female officers over a two-month period." The white
male officers explained that these comments were made in the pres-
ence of both the black and white female and male officers, as well as
in the sole presence of the white male officers." They claimed that
these disparaging remarks created a hostile working environment.40
Further, they asserted that the hostile working environment resulted
in a loss of "teamwork" among the officers of different races and
sexes.'" They alleged that such a loss of "teamwork" might lead officers
31 See Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 482, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505.
32 See id. at 483, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505 (citing Thafficante, 409 U.S. 205).
33 See id. at 482, 483, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505.
34 See id. at 483, 23 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505.
33 120 F.3d 476, 481, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 755 (4th Cir. 1997).
36 See id.
37 See id. at 480-81, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753.
" See id. at 478, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 751.
" See id.
1° See Childress, 120 F.3d at 478, 74 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 751
41 See id.
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of one segment of the police force to become hesitant in assisting
officers of another group while on duty.42
In overturning the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' hos-
tile environment claims, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the lower
court's reasoning that discrimination against one group actually favors
another group." Recognizing Congress's grant of a private right of
action to "a person claiming to be aggrieved" under Title VII, the
Fourth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether the white
male officers were "person [s] claiming to be aggrieved" within the
scope of Title VII 44 The court first considered Supreme Court prece-
dent and particularly its holding in Trafficante, a Title VIII case.45 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that because Title VIII and Title VII have
similar language, purposes and structure, the statutes are subject to the
same analysis.46 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Congress in-
tended to confer standing broadly through Title VIPs "person claiming
to be aggrieved" language, applying the same reasoning as the Su-
preme Court when construing Title VIII's "person aggrieved" lan-
guage.47 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit explained that the Supreme
Court had already implicitly applied such a broad construction to Title
VIPs "person claiming to be aggrieved" language by its analogy of Title
VIII to Title VII in Trafficante and its adoption of the Third Circuit's
broad interpretation of Title VII's standing requirement."
Next, the Fourth Circuit noted that every other circuit that has ad-
dressed the issue of standing under Title VII has adopted the Traf-
ficante Court's broad construction of the phrase "person aggrieved"
and has held that white persons have standing to sue for indirect
discrimination." In addition, the Fourth Circuit explained that Con-
42 See
43 See id. at 480, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 752. The district court dismissed the
claims, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because the alleged discrimination was
directed at black and female officers, nut at the white male officers. See id. at 478-79, 74 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 751. The court reasoned that discrimination against one group is
discrimination favoring another group and, therefore, the plaintiffs had no cognizable injury. See
id. at 479, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 752. The court further reasoned that the plaintiffs
could not recover for violations of other people's rights. See id.
44 See id. at 480, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 752.
45 See Children, 120 F.3d at 480-81, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 752-53 (citing
Trafficanie, 409 U.S. 205).
46 See id. at 480, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 752.
47 See id. at 480-81, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753 (citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205).
4t See id.
49 See id. at 481, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 753 (citing EEOC v. Mississippi College,
626 F.2d 477, 481-83, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1501, 1504-05 (5th Cir. 1980)); EEOC v.
Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 452-54, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 972, 983-85 (6th Cir. 1977);
Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1409, 1411-12
(9th Cir. 1976).
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gress's failure to overrule any of these cases when it passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 evidenced its acceptance of the circuits' interpreta-
tion of Title V11.5° Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the white
male officers had standing to bring hostile environment claims against
their supervisor under Title VII for discrimination directed towards
black and female officers. 5 '
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Childress has four crucial implica-
tions. 52 First, the Fourth Circuit's broad construction of Title VII's
standing requirement is in accord with the holdings of all the circuits
that have addressed this issue and thereby helps provide certainty and
predictability by clarifying the meaning of Title VII's standing require-
ment." The solidification of the circuits' interpretation of Title VII's
"person claiming to be aggrieved" language will help employers, em-
ployees, the EEOC and the judicial system by avoiding unnecessary
litigation. Because employers will know they may be held liable for
indirect discrimination, they should be less likely to engage in unlawful
discriminatory practices. 54 In addition, such clarity will assist employees
who are contemplating filing a Title VII claim with the EEOC better
determine if they have standing to do so. 55 Thus, the certainty and
predictability will lead to greater efficiency and will assist the EEOC in
satisfying Title V1I's goal of eradicating unlawful discrimination."
Second, the Fourth Circuit's holding will further aid the EEOC in
fulfilling Title VII's goal of eliminating unlawful discrimination in the
workplace.51 By allowing both direct and indirect victims of discrimina-
tion to file claims with the EEOC, the court is increasing the possibility
that discrimination will be reported." Thus, the Fourth Circuit's rec-
ognition of standing for indirect discrimination likely will increase the
" See Childress, 120 F.3d at 481, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753. The court noted that
Congress made extensive revisions to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See id. (citing Pub.
L. No. 102-66, Title 1, 105 Stat. 1074-76 (1991)), Moreover, the court cited Cannon v. University
of Chicago, which explained that "it is realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar
with these unusually important precedent [sic] from this and other federal courts and that it
expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them." Id. (citing Cannon, 441 U.S.
677, 699 (1979)).
51 See id.
52 See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 481, 483, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505;
Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 452, 454, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 985; Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411, 1412.
54 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
55 See Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 444-45, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 976.
56 See id at 453, 15 Fair Empl. Prac.	 (BNA) at 984.
57 See id.
58 See Childress, 120 F.3d at 481, 74 Fair Empi. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 753; Bailey Co., 563 F.2d
at 444-45, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 976.
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number of incidents of discrimination that are brought to the EEOC's
attention . 59
Although some might argue that the Fourth Circuit's recognition
of standing for indirect discrimination will lead to a flood of frivolous
cases, courts have not considered this to be a valid concern." Every
circuit that has addressed the issue has recognized standing for indirect
discrimination.' The theoretical possibility of opening the proverbial
floodgates has not been cause for concern in any of these circuits. 62
Moreover, this holding, like those of other circuits, is limited to the
issue of standing." An individual filing a claim with the EEOC still must
prove a valid injury. 64 The requirement of proof of an actual injury will
weed out most frivolous claims 65 In addition, upon the filing of a claim,
the EEOC must attempt to resolve the matter through informal meth-
ods before it may grant an individual a right-to-sue letter." Hence, the
EEOC remains a filtering device for non-legitimate claims. 67
 In sum,
while the number of lawsuits will not rise necessarily, the amount of
59 See Childress, 120 F.3d at 481, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (DNA) at 453.
60 See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 481-83, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1501, 1504-05 (5th Cir. 1980) (silent on floodgate argument); Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 452-53, 15
Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 983-84 (same); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1409, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1976) (same).
61 See, e.g., Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 483, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505; Bailey
Co., 563 F.2d at 454, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 985; Waters, 547 F.2d at 470, 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1412.
62 See, e.g., Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 481-83, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1504-05
(silent on floodgate argument); Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 452-53, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (IINA)
at 983-84 (same); Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70, 13 Fair Env]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411-12 (same).
65 See Childress, 120 F.3d at 481 n.8, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA) at 753 n.8; Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d at 483, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1505; Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 454, 15
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 985; Waters, 547 F.2d at 470, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1412.
64
 See, e.g., Childress, 120 F.3d at 481 n.8, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753 n.8; Waters,
547 F.2d at 470, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1412.
65 See, e.g., Childress, 120 F.3d at 481 11.8, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753 n.8; Waters,
547 F.2d at 470, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1412.
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994); Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 445, 15 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas.
(BNA) at 976 (citing § 706(b) of Title VII which sets forth that the EEOC "shall endeavor to
eliminate any such unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, concili-
ation, and persuasion").
67 See Bailey Co., 563 F.24 at 445, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 976. Though some might
contend that the EEOC might be overburdened by claims, this result also has not been realized.
See, e.g., Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 481-83, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1504-05 (silent
on floodgate argument); Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 452-53, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 983-84
(same); Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411-12 (same). Again,
no circuit that has recognized standing for indirect discrimination has found the need to address
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reported discriminatory practices probably will increase, thereby bring-
ing a greater number of Title VII violations to the EEOC's attention. 68
Third, the Fourth Circuit's recognition of a person's standing to
sue for indirect discrimination should help deter employers from util-
izing discriminatory practices.° The knowledge that employees might
have standing to sue as a result of indirect (and not just direct)
discrimination may further discourage employers from engaging in
discriminatory practices in the workplace. For example, knowing that
white employees may sue for indirect discrimination, the supervisor in
the Childress case might have refrained from making racially and sexu-
ally disparaging comments to the white officers both within and out-
side the presence of black and female officers." Thus, the court's
recognition of standing for indirect discrimination will help further
Title VII's goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace. 7 '
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's holding acknowledges that discrimi-
nation is harmful to everyone within our society, not only to a particu-
lar segment." All circuits that have addressed the issue of standing
under Title VII have acknowledged that discrimination may lead to a
loss of important benefits derived from interracial associations." In the
employment area, discrimination hinders productivity because it leads
to a loss of qualified employees and thereby results in the employment
of less capable people. 74 Further, discrimination may create intra-office
this argument. See, e.g., Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 481-83, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1504-05 (silent on floodgate argument); Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 452-53, 15 Fair Enipl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 983-84 (same); Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411-12
(same),
68 See Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 444-45, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 976.
69
 See Childress, 120 F.3d at 481, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753 (holding that white
males may sue for discrimination directed towards blacks and females).
7° See id. at 478-79, 74 Fair Enipl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 750-51.
71 See Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 453, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 984.
72 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); Childress, 120 F.3d
at 453, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 781. In support of Title VIII, which has the same policy
goals as Title VII, Senator Davits explained that the unlawful discrimination clearly affects the
"whole community." See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211.
73 See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA)
at 1501, 1505 (5th Cir, 1980) (discrimination results in deprivation of benefits derived from
interracial associations); Waters v. lieublein, Inc„ 547 F.2d 466, 469, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1976) (benefits include personal and business contacts); ff.
Trafficanie, 409 U.S. at 208 (Title VIII case describing benefits from interracial contact as includ-
ing social and business advantages).
71 See Paula 13, Stolker, Weigh My Job Performance, Not My Body: Extending Title VII to
Weight-Based Discrimination, N.Y.L. Sew J. Heat. RTS. 223, 228 (Fall, 1992);• see also Bailey Co.,
563 F.2d at 442, 15 Fair Enipl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 973 (appellant explained that employer's
discriminatory practices resulted in less educated and experienced men being placed in higher-
status positions).
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tensions, which cause employees to be less productive." in the aggre-
gate, such discriminatory practices lead to a reduced level of produc-
tivity, and thereby harm the overall economic well-being of society."
Hence, the courts have recognized that an important benefit of eradi-
cating discrimination in the workplace is interracial and inter-gender
harmony." Because all people, regardless of their race or sex, have
an interest in such harmony, discrimination that creates interracial or
inter-gender discord injures everyone." Thus, the Fourth Circuit's
recognition of a person's standing to sue for indirect discrimination
acknowledges that the efforts to eradicate discrimination are commu-
nity-wide endeavors and not merely battles to be fought by specific
groups within our society."
In sum, in Childress v. City of Richmond, the Fourth Circuit held
that white male police officers had standing under Title VII to sue their
supervisors for discrimination directed towards black and female co-
workers." In so doing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that an indi-
vidual does not have to be the direct target of unlawful discrimination
to suffer a cognizable injury.s' By recognizing that the white male
police officers have standing to sue their supervisors for indirect dis-
crimination, the Fourth Circuit has taken a step forward in the effort
to eradicate unlawful discrimination in the workplace." The Fourth
Circuit has acknowledged the universally harmful nature of such dis-
crimination and has sent a message to employers, employees and
society that the endeavor to eradicate employment discrimination re-
quires the joint efforts of everyone within the workplace."
75 See Childress, 120 F.3c1 at 478-79, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 751. For example, in
Childress, the white male officers claimed that the discrimination created tensions between die
different groups within the force and resulted in a loss of "teamwork." See id. at 478, 74 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 751. They further claimed that this loss of teamwork could cause some officers
to hesitate when called to assist another officer while on duty. See id.
28 See Stolker, supra note 74, at 228; see also Childress, 120 F.3d at 478-79, 74 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 751; Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 442, 15 Fair Env]. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 973.
" See, e.g., Waters, 547 F.2d at 469, 13 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1411.
78
 See, e.g., Childress, 120 F.3d at 480-81, 74 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 753; Waters, 547
F.2d at 469, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411; cf. Trafficanle, 409 U.S. at 211 (Title Viii
case).
2° See, e.g., Childress, 120 F.3d at 480-81, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753; Waters, 547
F.2d at 469, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1411; cf. Trafficanle, 409 U.S. at 211 (Title VIII
case).
80 120 F.3d at 481, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 753.
8t See id. at 480-81, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 752-53.
82 See supra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
88 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A.*Employees Not Bound by Agreements To Arbitrate ADA Claims Unless
They Knowingly Waive Their Judicial Remedies: Nelson v. Cyprus
Bagdad Copper Corp. 1
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") to
reverse judicial hostility to arbitration agreements and to place arbitra-
tion agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.2 The FAA
allows federal district courts to stay proceedings when a claim can be
referred to arbitration and to compel arbitration when one party has
not complied with an arbitration agreement. 8 Even when the FAA is
not invoked, the United States Supreme Court has established a federal
policy favoring arbitration of employment disputes.``
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII") to ensure equality of employment opportunities and protection
from discrimination. 1 In 1990, Congress enacted the Equal Opportu-
nities for Disabled Act, popularly referred to as the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), to extend legal protection from dis-
crimination to disabled employees. 6 The powers, remedies and proce-
dures available under the ADA mirror those available under Title VII.'
Title VII provides for consideration of employment discrimination
claims in several forums, including arbitration and the courts, and also
provides that submission to one forum does not preclude subsequent
submission to another. 8 The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII
and the ADA as manifesting Congress's intent to make its policy against
* By Mark Reilly, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 119 F.3d 756, 6 A.D. Cases (DNA) 1714 (9th Cir. 1997).
2 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 55 Fair Empl, Frac, Cas,
(BNA) 1116, 1119 (1991); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4.
4 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46 11.6, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
81, 85 n.6 (1974).
5 See id. at 44, 7 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 84. Title VII provides in pertinent part: it
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin .. .." 42
U.S.C. § 2000c-2(a) (1) (1994).
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (4). The ADA provides in pertinent part: "No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." Id. § 12112(a).
7
 See id. § 12117(a).
g See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47-48, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000c-5(b), (c), (f) (Supp. II 1972)).
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discrimination a top priority. 9 When faced with determining whether
to compel arbitration of a particular Title VII or ADA claim, courts
must consider the federal policies of opposing discrimination and
favoring arbitration.'° By requiring employers to prove that employees
knowingly agreed to arbitrate their claims, the Ninth Circuit in Nelson
v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Carp. continues to give the federal policy
against discrimination the highest possible priority."
In 1974, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that an employee's Title VII claim was not pre-
cluded even though the same complaint was filed under a collective
bargaining agreement and resolved by an arbitrator." In Alexander, an
employee alleged that a company discharged him because of his race
in violation of Title VII." The district court dismissed the case because
an arbitrator had previously adjudicated the discrimination claim in
the employer's favor, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam." In determining whether the em-
ployee's claim was precluded, the Supreme Court examined the legis-
lative history of Title VII and concluded that Title VII was designed to
supplement, rather than replace, other employment discrimination
laws." The Court reasoned that it is not inconsistent to enforce both
contractual and statutory rights in their respective forums." Further-
more, the Court rejected the argument that the employee waived his
Title VII cause of action, explaining that a union may not waive an em-
ployee's Title VII rights because Title VII concerns individual, rather
than collective, rights.''' The Court added that submitting a grievance
to arbitration did not constitute a waiver because resorting to the
arbitral forum is the exercise of an independent contractual right."
Thus, the Court held that an arbitrator's resolution of a complaint filed
under a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude the em-
ployee's subsequent Title VII claim."
9 See id. at 47, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85.
10 See id. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90.
11 119 F.3d 756, 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) 1714, 1718 (9th Cir. 1997).
12 415 U.S. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90.
" See id. at 39, 42, 7 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 82, 83.
14 See id. at 42-43, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 83-84. Though the arbiter found for the
employer, the arbiter did not specifically refer to the employee's racial discrimination claim. See
id. at 42, 7 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 83.
19 See id. at 48-49, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 85-86.
16 See id. at 50, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86.
17 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 86-87.
" See id. at 52, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 97.
19 See id. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90.
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In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the United
States Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement could subject
an employee's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA") to compulsory arbitration." In Gilmer, an employee
alleged that his employer discharged him because of his age in viola-
tion of the ADEA. 2 ' In response, the employer filed a motion to compel
arbitration. 22 The Court stated that unless Congress specifically in-
tended to preclude the waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights in question, courts should hold the employee to his bargain to
arbitrate the statutory claim. 23 The Court noted that the party seeking
to avoid arbitration bears the burden of showing that Congress in-
tended to preclude a waiver. 24 The Court determined that the em-
ployee did not meet this burden, 23 The Court rejected the argument
that compulsory arbitration is improper because it deprives claimants
of the judicial forum provided by the ADEA. 26 The Court also rejected
the argument that an employee's rights are less protected by the
arbitral process than by the judicial forum.27 The Court distinguished
Alexander, where the employee had exercised his contractual right
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, because the employee
in Gilmer agreed individually to arbitrate all of his claims. 28 Thus, the
Court held that the employee's ADEA claim could be subject to com-
pulsory arbitration because the employee failed to show that Congress
intended to preclude arbitration of such claims. 29
In 1992, in Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an employee
failed to show that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of Title
VII claims." In Mago, an employee alleged that her employer sexually
harassed her and discriminated against her because of her sex in
violation of Title V11. 3 ' In response, the employer moved to compel
2° 500 U.S. 20, 23, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1116, 1118 (1991).
21 See id. at 23-24, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1119.
22 See id. at 24, 55 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1119. The employee had submitted a
securities registration form, which contained a mandatory arbitration clause, to the New York
Stock Exchange. See id. at 23, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118.
23 See id. at 26, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1120.
24 See id.
25 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1123.
26 See id. at 29, 55 Fair Dupl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1121.
27 See id. at ao, 55 Fair Esnpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1121.
26 See id. at 35, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1123.
29 See id. at 23, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118.
50 956 F.2d 932, 935, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 178, 180 (9th Cir. 1992),
61 See id. at 934, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 179,
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arbitration pursuant to her employment agreement. 32 The Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that the ADEA and Title VII have similar aims and
provisions." The Ninth Circuit also noted that, similar to Gilmer, the
parties agreed upon a privately negotiated commercial arbitration
agreement." The court then applied the reasoning of Gilmer and
concluded that the employee failed to show that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration of Title VII claims." Thus, the Ninth Circuit held
that the arbitration agreement compelled the employee to arbitrate
her Title VII claims."
In 1994, in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a Title VII
plaintiff may only be compelled to forego her statutory remedies and
arbitrate her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such disputes
to arbitration.32 In Lai, employees signed registration forms that in-
cluded an agreement to arbitrate any disputes." The employees later
sued their immediate supervisor and the employer, alleging that their
supervisor raped, harassed and sexually abused them." In response,
the employer moved to compel arbitration.° The Ninth Circuit distin-
guished Alexander and Gilmer because the issue was not whether em-
ployees could agree to arbitrate statutory employment claims, but
whether these particular employees had agreed to arbitrate such
claims.'" The court then examined congressional intent with respect
to the employee's ability to waive his or her Title VII rights. 42 Recog-
nizing Title VII's crucial purpose of preventing employment discrimi-
nation, the court concluded that Congress intended at least a knowing
agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may
be deemed to have waived statutory rights." In applying the knowing
agreement standard, the Ninth Circuit determined that the employees
32
 See id.
33 See id. at 935, 58 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
34 See id.
33 See Map, 956 E2d at 935, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
36 See id.
57 42 F.3d 1299, 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 953, 937 (9th Cir. 1994).
38 See id. at 1301, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 934. The forms provided that the
employees submit their claims to arbitration pursuant to the requirements of any organizations
to which the employees later registered. See id. The employees subsequently registered with the
National Association of Securities Dealers, which required that any disputes with its members'
businesses be arbitrated. See id.
39 See id.
90 see id.
41 See id. at lao, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 935.
92 See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1304-05, 66 Fair Env'. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 936-37.
43 See id. at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
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could not have understood that by signing the registration forms they
had agreed to arbitrate sexual discrimination claims." Thus, the court
held that the employees were not bound by an agreement to arbitrate
their Title VII claims because they did not knowingly contract to forego
their statutory remedies."
During the Survey year, in Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
employee was not bound by an agreement to arbitrate contained in
the Employee Handbook ("Handbook") because the employee did not
knowingly contract to forego his statutory remedies provided by the
ADA. 46 In Nelson, an employee alleged that his employer violated the
ADA by terminating him because he was unable to work shifts that
caused him medical difficulty." The employer had previously issued
the Handbook, which contained a grievance resolution procedure. 48
Nelson signed an acknowledgment that he received the Handbook,
that he agreed to read and understand its contents and that he would
contact his supervisor if he had any questions." The employee initiated
the formal grievance process, but then refused to continue the process
and was advised by counsel to file suit." The district court granted
summary judgment to the employer, reasoning that the arbitration
clause contained in the Handbook was enforceable and that the em-
ployee knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive his rights to a judicial
forum."
The Ninth Circuit first noted that prior to Gilmer, federal anti-dis-
crimination laws had been interpreted to prohibit any waiver, even a
knowing waiver, of statutory remedies in favor of arbitration. 82 The
44 See id.
45
 See id.
45 119 F.3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718. In dissent, Circuit Judge Rymer argued that
the majority should have followed the district court by evaluating the validity of the waiver under
Arizona contract law, which recognizes that an employee handbook may be incorporated into an
employment contract. See id, at 764, 6 A D Cases (BNA) at 1720 (Rymer, J„ dissenting). Thus,
because Nelson did not argue that the district court's conclusion was erroneous under Arizona
law, the dissent would have held that the case was not ripe for appeal. See id. (Rymer, J.,
dissenting).
47 See id. at 758-59, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1715-16. The employer required Nelson to work
rotating twelve hour shifts despite previously experienced medical difficulties in working such
shifts. See id. at 758, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1715.
45 See id. The formal grievance resolution procedure contained in the Handbook provided
four steps culminating in an appeal to an arbitrator. See id. at 758-59, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at
1715-16.
49 See id. at 758, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1715.
w See id. at 759, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1716.
5/ See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 759, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1716.
52 See id. at 760, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1716,
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Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court in Gilmer held that
individuals can contractually agree to arbitrate employment disputes
and thereby waive their statutory rights. 53 Cognizant of the federal
policy favoring arbitration, the Ninth Circuit then examined congres-
sional intent with respect to waiving statutory rights under the ADA. 54
The Ninth Circuit noted that the legislative history of the ADA mir-
rored that of Title VII." Extending its holding in Lai, the court con-
cluded that the ADA, like Title VII, requires a knowing agreement. 56
In applying the knowing agreement standard, the court first ex-
plained that the signed acknowledgment form did not suffice as a valid
waiver.57 The court noted that the employee agreed only to "read and •
understand" the Handbook rather than be bound by its provisions."
The court emphasized that nothing in the form notified the employee
that he was agreeing to waive any rights or remedies afforded him by
anti-discrimination statutes." Additionally, the court determined that
the employee's continued employment subsequent to receiving the
Handbook did not amount to the type of knowing agreement contem-
plated by Lai." The court noted that nothing in the form or the
Handbook itself put the employee on notice that he was somehow
agreeing to waive his statutory rights by continuing to perform his
work. 6 ' The court added that the employer must explicitly present to
the employee any bargain to waive the right to a judicial forum for
ADA claims and the employee must explicitly agree to waive the spe-
cific right in question.° Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the employee
was not bound by an agreement to arbitrate contained in the Hand-
book because the employee did not knowingly contract to forego his
statutory remedies provided by the ADA."
Provided with inadequate guidance from the Supreme Court in
determining whether employees have contractually waived their statu-
tory rights, courts have struggled to balance the federal policy favoring
arbitration and the federal policy against discrimination. 64 In determin-
55 See id.
5 '1 See id., 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1716-17.
55 See id. at 761 n.9, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1717 n.9.
56 See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 761, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1717.
52 See id. at 761, 6 A.D. Cases (RNA) at 1718.
56 See id.
59
 See id.
(k) See id. at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1719.
61 See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
62 See id.
65 See id.
64 See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 55 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118; Alexander, 415
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ing that an arbitrator's resolution of a complaint filed under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement did not preclude the employee's subsequent
Title VII claim, the United States Supreme Court, in Alexander, ele-
vated the federal policy against discrimination above the federal policy
favoring arbitration." Only seventeen years later, however, the United
States Supreme Court reversed field in Gilmer and elevated the federal
policy favoring arbitration above the federal policy against discrimina-
tion in determining that an employee's ADEA claim could be subject
to compulsory arbitration." The Court distinguished the individual
agreement to arbitrate in Gilmer from the collective bargaining agree-
ment to arbitrate in Alexander. 67 The Court noted that in the collective
bargaining context, the interests of the individual employee may be
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargain-
ing unit." Thus, because the employee in Gilmer had individually
agreed to arbitrate his ADEA claim, concerns regarding collective
representation were inapplicable." Although the Supreme Court con-
cluded that an individual agreement to arbitrate can be enforced, the
Court was silent as to what kind of agreement suffices to waive the
judicial remedy."
Without any guidance, the Ninth Circuit has set its own course."
After accepting the reasoning of Gilmer in Mago that employees can
contractually waive their statutory rights, the Ninth Circuit then fo-
cused on what type of agreement is necessary to waive the judicial
remedy." In Lai, the Ninth Circuit held that employees may only be
compelled to forego their statutory remedies and arbitrate their Title
VII claims if they have knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to
arbitration." In Nelson, the Ninth Circuit extended the holding in Lai
to ADA claims when it determined that employers could not compel
the arbitration of employees' ADA claims where the employees did not
U.S. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 90; Nelson, 119 F.3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA)
at 1718; Lai, 42 F.3(1 at 1305, 66 Fair Einpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
65 See 415 U.S. at 59-60, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 90.
66 See 500 U.S. at 23, 55 Fair Emil'. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118.
87 See id. at 35, 55 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1123.
68 See id. at 34, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1123.
69 See id. at 35, 55 Fair Ernpl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1123.
71) See id.
71 See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718; Lai, 42 F.Sd at 1305, 66 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
72 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118; Nelson, 119 F.3d at 762,
6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718; Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 937; Map,
956 F.2d at 935, 58 Fair alp!. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
79 See 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 937.
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knowingly contract to forego their statutory remedies." Though the
Ninth Circuit accepts that arbitration may be compelled, the court
insulates employees from unknowingly agreeing to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims.75 By requiring employers to prove that employ-
ees knowingly agreed to arbitrate their claims, the Ninth Circuit con-
tinues to give the federal policy against discrimination the highest
possible priority. 76
More specifically, employers will find it more difficult to compel
employees to arbitrate their statutory claims through employee hand-
books in light of the Nelson decision." With respect to what constitutes
a knowing waiver, the Ninth Circuit appears to require that the em-
ployee fully understand the consequences of signing an arbitration
clause. 78 Thus, an acknowledgment form indicating the receipt of a
handbook that contains an arbitration clause should notify the em-
ployee that by signing the form the employee additionally agrees to
waive rights and remedies afforded him or her by civil rights statutes: 79
Additionally, the acknowledgment form should notify the employee
that by continuing to perform his or her duties the employer will
presume that the employee has agreed to waive his or her statutory
rights." Hence, an employer must be forthright in presenting the
arbitration clause to the employee, and the employee must have the
opportunity to agree knowingly to waive his or her rights.B'
Because employers will have to prove a knowing waiver to compel
arbitration, the Ninth Circuit will protect employees from unknowing
agreements to arbitrate." As Lai and Nelson have demonstrated, the
Ninth Circuit has effectively shielded employees from employers who
are seeking to avoid the judicial forum, even in the aftermath of
Gilmer. 83 As a result, employees are more likely to present their statu-
tory claims in federal court as opposed to arbitration. 84 Consequently,
74 See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
75 See id.; Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937; Mago, 956 F.2d at 935,
58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
75 See Nelson, 119 F.Sd at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 761-62, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
79 See id. at 761, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
8° See id. at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718. The court explained that "the choice must be
explicitly presented to the employee and the employee must explicitly agree to waive the specific
right in question." Id.
Bi See Nelson, 119 F.3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
" See id.; Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
85 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 55 Fair Ent)]. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118; Nelson, 119 F.Sd at 762,
6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718; Lai, 42 F.Sd at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
81 See Nelson, 119 F.Sd at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718; Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305, 66 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 937.
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the federal court system will suffer from further over-burdening be-
cause the federal courts will have to hear harassment and discrimina-
don suits that otherwise would have been submitted to an arbitrator.
Additionally, employers expecting to save considerable costs by arbi-
trating these claims will be forced to expend substantial resources
preparing for trial as opposed to the more economical arbitral forum.
In summary, the Ninth Circuit in Nelson held that ADA plaintiffs
may be compelled to arbitrate their claims only if they knowingly waive
their judicial remedy. 85 Although it applied the Gilmer holding in Mago,
the Ninth Circuit continues to give the highest possible priority to the
federal policy against discrimination by requiring a knowing waiver of
statutory rights." In particular, the Nelson decision may prevent many
employers from enforcing arbitration clauses contained in employee
handbooks against employees claiming discrimination." As a result,
the court system will likely suffer further over-burdening, and employ-
ers will be forced to expend substantial resources defending discrimi-
nation suits in the judicial forum. Nevertheless, employers are not
completely foreclosed from compelling arbitration of ADA and other
statutory claims." Employers may still compel arbitration where they
can prove that the employee made a knowing waiver of judicial retne-
dies. 89
III, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
A. *Non-Vested Employee Benefits Protected Under Section 510 of
ERISA: Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchinson, Topeka &
Sante Fe Railway Co.'
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act ("ERISA") to protect the rights of employees, retirees and their
beneficiaries to employee benefit plans through a uniform body of
federal law. 2 During the Survey year, in Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'ri
86 See 119 E3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
86 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23, 55 Fair Empl. l'rac. Cas. (BNA) at 1118; Nelson, 119 F.Sd at 762,
6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718; Lai, 42 F.Sd at 1305, 66 Fair Empl. Pruc. Cas. (BNA) al 937; Mar,
956 F.2d at 935, 58 Fair Empl. Piac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
67 See 119 F.3d at 762, 6 A.D. Cases (BNA) at 1718.
88 See id.
89
 See id.
By Sally A. Jameson, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 117 S. Ct. 1513, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2825 (1997).
3 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974); see also Henry H. Rossbacher et al., El?ISA's Dark Side:
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v. Atchinson, Topeka C.? Sante Fe Railway Co. ("Inter-Modal Rail IP), the
Supreme Court of the United States held that section 510 of ERISA
prohibits employer interference with an employee's right to both
vested and non-vested benefits.' Previously, a conflict existed among
the circuits as to whether section 510 of ERISA protected non-vested
welfare benefits,' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict and held that section 510 applies to both vested and non-
vested benefits.' The Court's decision in Inter-Modal Rail II has sig-
nificant implications for both employees and employers because the
Court failed to define the exact scope of section 510 and declined to
delineate the point at which an employer's fundamental business de-
cisions begin to run afoul of section 510.6 With these issues left unset-
tled, employees and employers must continue to be wary of the pro-
tection offered by and the difficulties in complying with section 510 of
ERISA.7
In 1993, in Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that section 510 of ERISA
Retiree Health Benefits, False Employer Promises and the Protectiveludiciary, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 305,
305 (1997).
3 See 117 S. Ct. 1513, 1515, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2825, 2827 (1997) [hereinafter
Inter-Modal Rail II]. Section 510, which forbids employer interference with employee rights under
an existing benefit plan, states in relevant part:
It shall he unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which
he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for the
purpose of interfering with any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan . . .
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-406, Title I, § 510, 88 Stat. 895 (1974) and
commonly cited as § 510 of ERISA). Vested benefits, such as pension benefits, are non-forfeitable.
See Rossbacher et al., supra note 2, at 305. Non-vested benefits, such as health and disability
benefits, are subject to unilateral changes by management. See Court Leaves Outsourcing, Benefits
Issues Unsettled, 155 Lab, Rd. Rep. (BNA) 315, 315 (July 7, 1997) [hereinafter Outsourcingi.
4 The Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held that § 510 of ERISA prohibits employer
interference with an employee's right to both vested and non-vested benefits while the Ninth
Circuit held that § 510 of ERISA prohibits employer interference with an employee's right to
vested benefits only. Compare Shahid v Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404, 1411 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that § 510 of ERISA prohibits employer interference with both vested and non-vested
benefits), and Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256, 258, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2209,
2210 (7th Cir. 1995) (same), and Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546, 16 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1689, 1691 (11th Cir. 1993) (same), with Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n
v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 80 F.3d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Inter-Modal
Rail (holding that § 510 of ERISA prohibits employer interference with vested employee
benefits only). Thus, the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Inter-Modal Rail I created the conflict
among the circuit courts. See 80 F.3d at 351.
r
 See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. at 1515, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827.
6 See id. at 1516-17, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828; see also Outsourcing, supra
note 3, at 314.
7 See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. CL at 1516-17, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (DNA) at 2828; see
also Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 314.
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prohibits employer interference with an employee's right to both
vested and non-vested benefits. 8 Seaman involved a real estate salesper-
son entitled to health insurance coverage and participation in a 401(k)
pension plan pursuant to her employment contract." Her employer,
Arvida, notified her that her employment contract would be termi-
nated so that Arvida could eliminate the costs of providing health
insurance and contributing to the 401(k) plan.'" Arvida offered the
employee an independent contractor position which did not provide
health or pension benefits." When the employee refused to sign the
new contract, Arvida terminated her." The employee then sued
Arvida, alleging that her discharge resulted from her refusal to accept
a change in status from an employee to an independent contractor
and a concomitant loss of non vested health benefits in violation of
section 510 of ER1SA."
The Seaman court first focused on the purpose of the statute,
reasoning that section 510 was intended to prohibit interference with
an employee's exercise of protected rights and with the attainment
of future rights." The court reasoned that Congress did not intend to
leave employees unprotected after only some of their rights were
vested." Further, the court noted that the plain language of section
MO states that employers may not interfere with "the attainment of any
right to which [a] participant may become entitled." 16 Thus, the court
reasoned that the validity of a section 510 claim does not hinge upon
whether the benefits involved are vested or non-vested and held that
section 510 prohibits employer interference with employees' rights to
additional non-vested benefits.' 7
In 1995, in Heath v. Varity Corp., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that section 510 of ERISA prohibits
employer interference with an employee's right to both vested and
non-vested benefits.'" Heath involved an employee terminated shortly
before he became eligible for early retirement. 18 The discharge did not
8 985 F.2d at 546, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1691.
9 See id. at 544, 16 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 1689.
10 See Id.
11
 See id.
12 See id.
13 See Seaman, 985 F.2d at 544, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1689.
14
 See id. at 545, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1690.
13 See id., 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 1691.
19 Id. at 545-46, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1691 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1974)) (emphasis added).
17 See id. at 546, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1691.
18 71 F.Sd 256, 258, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2209, 2210 (7th Cir. 1995).
19 See id. at 257, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2209.
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affect the employee's pension, which was long vested under the terms
of the employer's plan, but it did prevent him from becoming eligible
for additional non-vested benefits. 2°
The court first construed the statutory language of section 510,
forbidding employer action "for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which [a] participant may become entitled
under the plan."21 The court noted that "plan" as defined in ERISA
includes both pension and welfare plans. 22 In addition, the court rec-
ognized that these types of plans include both vested and non-vested
benefits.23 Thus, the court concluded that section 510 protects both
types of benefits.24
The court acknowledged that ERISA does contain an apparent
contradiction: although an employer is free to modify or abolish a
benefit plan by following appropriate amendment procedures, an em-
ployer cannot interfere with an employee's right to benefits under an
existing plan.28 The court explained this apparent contradiction as
simply a reflection of the compromise reached between competing
interests when ERISA was adopted, 26 The court concluded that an em-
ployer may modify or abolish a plan by following appropriate amend-
ment procedures but may not wrongfully interfere with vested or
non-vested benefits that existing plans provide. 27 Thus, the court held
that section 510 applies not only to vested benefits but also to non-
vested benefits. 28
In 1996, in Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that section 510 of ER1SA prohibits
employer interference with an employee's right to both vested and
non-vested benefits. 2° Shahid involved an employee who alleged that
her employer, Ford Motor Company ("Ford"), terminated her to de-
prive her of all non-vested benefits for which she would qualify under
Ford's Voluntary Termination Plan ("VTP"). 3° Ford argued that the
20 See id.
2 ' Id. at 258, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2210.
22 See id.
23 See Heath, 71 F.3d at 258, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2210.
21 See id.
25 See id. at 2210-11.
26 See id. at 2211. The court explained that during ERISA's legislative debates, employers
secured the right to modify plans, while employees secured the right to qualify for benefits under
existing plans. See id.
27 See id.
28
 See Heath, 71 F.3d at 258, 19 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2210.
"76 F.3d at 1411.
38
 See id. at 1408; see also Revocation of Severance Offer and Termination of Employee Did Not
March 1998	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 445
employee had no entitlement to the benefits because Ford had no
obligation to offer the VTP and could terminate the plan at any time."
Rejecting this argument, the court stated that the plain language
of section 510 contradicted Ford's narrow view of the statute. 32 The
court further noted that ERISA expressly exempts employee welfare
benefit plans like the VTP from the sections concerned with vesting
and accrual of benefits. 33 Moreover, the court reasoned that the plain
language of the statute does not limit its application to vested bene-
fits." Thus, the court concluded that section 510 of ERISA protects
non-vested benefits, like those offered by the VTP, as well as vested
benefi ts. 33
During the Survey year, in Inter-Modal Rail II, the United States
Supreme Court held that section 510 of ERISA prohibits employer
interference with an employee's right to both vested and non-vested
benefits. 36 In Inter-Modal Rail I, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held, in contrast to all the other circuits which ruled
on the issue, that section 510 of ERISA did not protect non-vested
employee benefits." The Supreme Court's holding in Inter-Modal Rail
II resolved the conflict among the circuit courts surrounding this
issue. 38
The dispute in Inter-Modal Rail II arose when the Sante Fe Termi-
nal Services, Inc. ("SFTS"), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Atchin-
Violate ERISA Where Employee Engaged in Miscondud, [New Developments] Pens. Plan Guide
(CCH) 41 23,9180, at 25,265-16 (Apr. 29, 1996). Before the employee formally requested that
Ford allow her to participate in the VTP, Ford terminated her for allegedly accepting and coercing
kickbacks in exchange for referrals of Ford business to a travel company. See Shahid, 76 F,Sd at
1408; see also Revocation of Severance Offer and Termination of Employee Did Not Violate ERISA
Where Employee Engaged in Misconduct, supra, at 25,265-16.
51 See Shahid, 76 F.3d at 1411. Although the court noted that Ford's argument was sensible
in that an employer should not he penalized for offering gratuitous benefits, the court reasoned
that § 510 was designed to protect employees' expectations in benefit plans and thus held the
employer to its promises. See id. at 1412.
32 See id, at 1411.
35 See id. at 1412 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-406,
Title I, § 201(1), 88 Stat. 852 (1974) and commonly cited as § 201(1) of ERISA). Section 201(1)
of ERISA expressly suites that an employee welfare benefit plan, which includes non-vested
benefits, is exempt from the vesting requirements of other benefits covered by ERISA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1051(1). Thus, § 201(1) indicates that ERISA's protection is not limited to vested benefits
but extends to non-vested benefits as well. See id.
34 See Shahid, 76 F.3d at 1412.
33
 See id. at 1411.
56 117 S. Ct. at 1515, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 2827.
37 See 80 F.3d 349, 351 (9th On 1996); see also Action Barred Because ERISA Does Not Cover
Suits For Benefits Recovery Under Railroad Retirement Act, [New Developments] Pens. Plan Guide
(CCII) 23,918X, at 25,265-21 (May 13, 1996) [hereinafter Action Barredj.
38 See supra note 4.
446	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:365
son, Topeka and Sante Fe Railway Co. ("ATSF"), terminated a group of
employees for declining to continue employment under a new em-
ployer who would substantially reduce both the group's vested and
non-vested benefits." SFTS transferred cargo between railcars and
trucks at ATSF's Hobart Yard in Los Angeles, California and provided
its employees with pension, health and welfare benefits through em-
ployee benefit plans subject to ERISA's comprehensive regulations."
In January 1990, ATSF entered into a formal service agreement
with SFTS.4 ' The newly-formed agreement stated that SFTS would
continue to do the same work it had done without a contract for
the previous fifteen years at the Hobart Yard.42 Seven weeks later, ATSF
exercised its right to terminate the newly-formed agreement and
opened up the Hobart Yard work for competitive bidding." ATSF
terminated SFTS employees who declined to continue employment
with the successful bidder, In-Terminal Services ("ITS" ). 44 Employees
who continued their employment with ITS lost their Railroad Retire-
ment Act benefits and suffered a substantial reduction in their pen-
sion, health and welfare benefits."
The terminated employees sued SFTS, ATSF and ITS in federal
district court, alleging that the respondents violated section 510 of
ERISA by terminating them for the purpose of interfering with their
attainment of both vested and non-vested rights under the benefit
plans adopted by ATSF." The petitioners contended that the substitu-
tion of ITS for SFTS forced them to accept significantly reduced
bene-fits, thus interfering with the attainment of their rights in viola-
tion of section 510 of ERISA. 47 The district court granted the respon-
dents' motion to dismiss these section 510 claims."
In Inter-Modal Rail I, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 49 The court reinstated the peti-
tioners' claim under section 510 for interference with their pension
benefits but affirmed the dismissal of their claim for interference with
39 See 117 S. Ct. at 1514-15, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2826.
40 See id. at 1514, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2825-26.
41 See id., 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2826.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. at 1514, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2826.
.° See id. at 1514-15, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2826.
46 See id. at 1515, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2826.
47 See id.
48
 See id.
49 See 80 F.3c1 at 353; Aaiun Barred, [New Developments) Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) at 25,265—
21.
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their welfare benefits." The court reasoned that the existence of a
present right is a prerequisite to section 510 relief, and although the
employees did have a present right to vested pension benefits, the
employees had no present right to future, anticipated, non-vested
welfare benefits. 51 Thus, the court held that the petitioners did not state
a cause of action for interference with non-vested welfare benefits. 52
In Inter-Modal Rail II, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the Ninth Circuit decision, holding that section 510 bars employer
interference with an employee's right to both vested and non-vested
benefits." The Court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit's decision con-
tradicted the plain language of section 510. 51 In construing the plain
language of the statute, the Court noted that ERISA defines "plan" to
include both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pen-
sion plan. 55 Because "plan" includes employee welfare benefit plans
and because employee welfare plans offer benefits that do not vest,
Congress's use of the word "plan" in section 510 "all but forecloses the
argument that section 510's interference clause applies only to 'vested'
rights."56 The Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to confine
section 510's protection to vested rights, it could easily have substituted
the term "pension plan" for "plan" or the term "nonforfeitable right"
for "any right."57 Thus, the Court concluded that section 510 draws no
distinction between vested and non-vested rights."
The Court also noted that an employer's right to unilaterally
amend or eliminate its welfare benefit plan does not justify a departure
from the plain language of section 510. 5' The Court explained that the
flexibility an employer enjoys to amend or abolish its welfare plan is
counterbalanced by section 510, which prohibits blatant employer in-
terference for the purpose of circumventing the provision of promised
benefits.6° Thus, the Court concluded that the power to amend or
abolish a welfare plan does not include the power to interfere with an
5° See 80 F.3d at 351.
Si See id.
52 See id.
53 1 17 S. Ct. at 1517, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828.
54 See id. at 1515, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827.
55 See id.
56 id.
57 See id.
56 See Inter
-Modal Rail II, 1 i7 S. Ct. at 1515, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827.
53 See id. at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 51 2827.
50
 See id.
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employee's right to vested and non-vested benefits under an existing
plan . 61
In addition, the Court noted that in certain situations, section 510
does not prohibit employer actions that affect an employee's attain-
ment of vested or non-vested benefits so long as the employer acts
without the purpose of interfering with these benefits. 62 The Court
stated that "when an employer acts without this purpose, as could be
the case when making fundamental business decisions, such actions
are not barred by section 510."63 Thus, the Court concluded that
section 510 of ERISA prohibits blatant employer interference with an
employee's right to both vested and non-vested benefits s4
Several significant issues underlie the Supreme Court's ruling in
Inter-Modal Rail IL First, the decision has a number of important
implications for employees. On its face, Inter-Modal Rail II appears to
grant broad protection to employees by prohibiting employer interfer-
ence with both their vested and non-vested rights under existing bene-
fit plans. 65 It is possible, however, to conceive of certain kinds of em-
ployee benefits included in an employee benefit plan that will fall
outside the scope of section 510. 66 Although by definition all employee
benefits are characterized as either vested or non-vested, some benefits,
such as completely discretionary employer contributions to a sim-
plified employee pension plan, are so speculative and discretionary
that they might fall outside the scope of section 510.67 In situations
involving these types of benefits, where the attainment of the benefit
is thoroughly contingent on an employer's discretion and entirely
within an employer's control, the benefit is probably too speculative to
support a section 510 claim 68 Thus, employees should be aware that
even though the Court interpreted section 510 of ERISA broadly, the
possibility remains that some extremely speculative and discretionary
employee benefits are not protected under section 510 of ERISA. 69
61 See id., 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827-28.
65 See id., 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828.
63
 Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. CL at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828.
See id.
65 See id. at 1515-16, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827; see also Outsourcing supra
note 3, at 315.
66 See, e.g., Garrat v. Walker, 121 F.Sd 565, 570, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1444, 1448
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that completely discretionary employer contributions to a simplified
employee pension plan were so speculative and discretionary that they fell outside the scope of
§ 510).
67 See id.
so See id.
69 See id.
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Furthermore, employees should note that the decision in Inter-Mo-
dal Rail H might not extend blanket protection to traditional kinds of
non-vested employee benefits under section 510 of ERISA." It is pos-
sible to argue in a technical sense that section 510 of ERISA, when
applied to non-vested benefits, only protects an employee's right to
cross the "threshold of eligibility." In other words, one can argue that
the plain language of section 510 simply means that an employee who
is eligible to receive non-vested benefits has already attained his or her
rights under the plan simply by becoming eligible to receive them. 72
Thus, any subsequent actions taken by an employer cannot, by defini-
tion, interfere with the attainment of an employee's rights under the
plan."
This argument hinges on a technical• and narrow reading of the
word "attainment" in section 510 of ERISA. Although the argument
might seem tenuous, the Supreme Court acknowledged the argument
in Inter-Modal Rail II and suggested that the Ninth Circuit consider it
on remand.74 Thus, employees should remain wary of the scope of
section 510 of ERISA. 75 Although on its face Inter-Modal Rail II appears
to clearly settle the issue, the possibility remains that if courts accept
this technical argument, non-vested employee benefits are not pro-
tected under section 510 of ERISA. 79
The decision in Inter-Modal Rail II also has significant implications
for employers and the attorneys who advise them. In its opinion, the
Court noted that an employer has the right to interfere with an em-
ployee benefit plan when making "fundamental business decisions,"
but failed to explain what might constitute a "fundamental business
decision."77 For example, it is unclear whether an employer's decision
to subcontract would qualify as a "fundamental business decision" in
situations where the employer is only partly motivated by a desire
to reduce employee benefits." The decision to subcontract is almost
always driven by considerations of the cost of employee benefits. 79
Thus, the Court's decision in Inter-Modal Rail II will have a significant
" See 117 S. Ct. at 1516-17, 20 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 2828.
71 See id.
72
 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
76 Set 117 S. Ct. at 1516-17, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828.
76
 See id.
77
 See id.; see also Outsourcing, supra note ;' 3, at 315.
72 See Inter-Modal A 117 S. Ct. at 1516, 20'Employee Benefits Cas. (ANA) at 2828.
79 See Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 315.
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impact on the way employers attempt to reduce the cost of employee
benefi ts."
Inter-Modal Rail II involved an employer making a contracting
decision based solely on its blatant desire to reduce benefit costs." Most
employer decisions, however, are more complex and the motivations
behind these decisions are not so obvious." The Supreme Court's
ruling in Inter-Modal Rail 11 does not address the more common situ-
ation in which an employer makes a subcontracting decision based
partly on business considerations and partly on benefit considera-
tions. 83 Thus, the Court failed to provide any guidance on what consti-
tutes acceptable employer interference with an employee benefit plan
when it is part of a "fundamental business decision" to subcontract."
Furthermore, because subcontracting offers many advantages to
employers, more cases involving this issue are likely to surface as
employers continue to choose subcontracting as an attractive business
option." The advantages of subcontracting include the flexibility to
employ only when necessary, the ability to acquire expertise and skills
in particular business areas and the ability to shop around for the best
fit for an employer's needs. 86 Subcontracting also allows employers to
reduce other labor costs such as training, wages and recruiting ex-
penses.87 Thus, the decision in Inter-Modal Rail II creates a dilemma
for employers: although employers may choose to subcontract because
of the many business advantages it offers, employers face potential
liability under section 510 of ERISA for the concomitant loss of em-
ployee benefits." This dilemma will inevitably create substantial litiga-
tion as the courts attempt to draw a line between an acceptable funda-
mental business decision which permissibly infringes on employee
benefits and a decision which violates section 510 of ERISA. 89
Because the decision in Inter-Modal Rail II failed to explain how
much of a role cutting employee benefits can play in business deci-
sions, it will be difficult for employers to discern whether an employ-
Bo See id.
81 See id.
82 See generally Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. 1519, 20 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 2825.
See also Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 316.
85 See Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 315.
81 See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828.
85
 See id.; see also Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 515, 316.
"See Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 316.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 315, 316.
89 See id.
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ment decision violates section 510 of ERISA. 9° Yet, Inter-Modal Rail II
is clear on one point: to avoid running afoul of ERISA, employers must
have a fundamental business reason other than wanting to cut benefit
costs when taking an action that infringes on existing employee benefit
plans.9 ' For example, if an employer chooses to subcontract in order
to make fundamental changes in the way it does business, then that
decision should not violate section 510 of ERISA. 92 If business consid-
erations are only part of an employer's reasoning, however, and benefit
costs are also a factor, an employer may confront problems with ERISA
compliance." If cutting benefit costs is the sole factor in an employer's
decision to subcontract, the employer's decision is a clear violation of
section 510 of ERISA. 94 To remain safely in compliance with section
510 of ERISA, employers who want to reduce their benefit costs may
opt to adjust their employee benefit plans instead of subcontracting or
terminating employees. 95 Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly held in
Inter-Modal Rail II that adjusting employment benefit plans is an ac-
ceptable way to curtail employee benefits under ERISA. 98
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held in Inter-Modal Rail II that
section 510 of ERISA prohibits employer interference with an em-
ployee's right to both vested and non-vested benefits.° The Court
based its decision on the plain language of section 510. 98 The decision
in Inter-Modal Rail II is likely to have a significant impact on both
employees and employers as the courts proceed to define the exact
scope of section 510 and to delineate what constitutes a "fundamental
business decision" that permissibly affects employee benefits. 99 Most
importantly, Inter-Modal Rail II instructs employers that to remain in
compliance with section 510 of ER1SA, employers should refrain from
" See id. at 316.
91
 See generally Inter
-
Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. 1513, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2825.
See also Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 315, 316.
92
 See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828; see
also Outsourcing, supra note 9, at 316.
" See Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 316.
94 See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 2827; see
also Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 316.
95
 See Inter-Modal Rail 11; 117 S. Ct. at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827; see
also Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 316.
"See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S: Ct. at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) at 2827; see
also Outsourcing, supra note 3, at 316.
97 See 117 S. Ct, at 1516-17, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2828; see also Outsourcing;
supra note 3, at 314.
98
 See Inter-Modal Rail II, 117 S. Ct. at 1515, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827,
99
 See id.
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subcontracting or terminating employees for the sole purpose of re-
ducing benefit costs.m
1V. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A.*Negligent Hiring Supervision and Training—The Scope of the
Assault and Battery Exception: Senger v. United States 1
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") in 1948,
waiving sovereign immunity in cases involving the negligent or wrong-
ful acts of governmental employees acting within the scope of their
employment. 2
 Section 2680(h) of the FICA ("§ 2680(h)"), however,
bars government liability in "fairly claim arising out of assault [or]
battery," as well as for other specified intentional torts.' Recently, the
task of defining the jurisdictional boundary of the Act has proven
problematic in situations where an assault or battery has occurred
largely due to government personnel's negligent hiring, supervision
or training.' The Supreme Court's reluctance to define the scope of
the FTCA in such cases has prompted disagreement among the circuits
as to whether the government is liable where its own negligent hiring,
supervision or training is the proximate cause of the alleged harm.'
Relying on statutory language and relevant legislative history, a major-
ity of circuits have interpreted the phrase "arising out of" broadly, and
in so doing, presently exclude claims alleging negligent hiring, super-
vision and training against the government.' Contrary to these deci-
sions, the Ninth Circuit, in Senger v. United States, recently reaffirmed
its minority position, allowing claimants to assert such claims.'' In so
100 See id. at 1516, 20 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2827; see also Outsourcing, supra note
3, at 316,
*Byfared M. Viders, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 103 F.3d 1437, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 598 (9th Cir. 1996).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
5 See id. § 2680(h).
4 See Cuccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 1033 (2nd Or. 1988).
5 See Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 404 n.8 (1988) (expressly declining to consider
whether negligent hiring, negligent supervision or negligent training may ever provide the basis
for liability under the FTCA for a foreseeable assault or battery by a government employee).
6 See Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 395-96 (4th Cir. 1987); Hoot v. United States,
790 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986); Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395, 399 (6th Cir. 1986);
Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d 116, 117-18 (5th Cir. 1985).
7 See, e.g., Senger v. United States, 103 F.2d 1437, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 598 (9th
Cir. 1996); Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1987); Kearney v. United States, 815
F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1987); Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986).
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doing, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that principles of tort liability
demand a result contrary to the plain language of the statute. 8
In 1985, in United States v. Shearer, the United States Supreme
Court held that the federal government could not be held liable under
the FTCA for negligent retention or supervision of a serviceman who
murdered another serviceman while away from the military base In
Shearer, the mother of an army private who was kidnapped and mur-
dered by a fellow serviceman sued the government under the FTCA,
claiming that the Army's negligence caused her son's death.l° Chief
Justice Burger, in a plurality opinion joined by three other Justices,
concluded that the express "arising out of language of § 2680(h)
indicated a legislative intent to bar claims for supervisory negligence
where there would have been no claim without an assault and battery."
In reaching its conclusion, the plurality considered the language
of the statute as well as the tort principles underlying the FTCA.' 2 The
plurality reviewed the legislative history of § 2680(h) and noted that
Congress did not distinguish between "negligent supervision" claims
and respondeat superior claims for determining whether sovereign
immunity had been waived in a given situation.'s This history, coupled
with the statute's language "arising out of assault or battery," prompted
the plurality to read § 2680(h) broadly enough to encompass claims
like respondent's that sound in negligence but stem from a battery
committed by a government employee. "
8 See Sengen 103 F.2d at 1437, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (13NA) at 598; Aforrig 821 F.2d at
1426; Kearney, 815 F.2d at 535; Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1502.
9 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
10 See id. at 53-54. Defendant in Shearer was convicted or murder in a New Mexico court and
had also been convicted by a German court of manslaughter in 1977 while assigned to an Army
base in Germany. See id.
" See id. at 53, 55-56, 59-60. Four Justices concurred on the alternative basis that the
plaintiff's claim was, in any event, barred under the Feres doctrine. See id. at 57, 59-60. Feres
involved a wrongful death action brought by the executrix of. the estate of a soldier killed in a
fire while asleep in his barracks. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 136-37 (1950). In Shearer,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a total of eight Justices, noted, inter alia, (1) the special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors, (2) the effects of the maintenance of suits under the
Act on discipline and (3) the extreme consequences that might be realized if such suits were
allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty. See
473 U.S. at 57. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. See id. at 59.
12 See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55.
13 See id. at 55-56.
14 See id. (emphasis in original). Despite different rationales, eight Justices ultimately con-
cluded that a serviceman could not recover under the FTCA for the government's negligent
failure to prevent another serviceman's assault and battery. See id.
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In 1986, in Thigpen v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that § 2680(h) bars all negligent
supervision claims that depend upon the existence of an assault or
battery by a governmental employee. 3 In Thigpen, two minors, aged
fourteen and twelve, were admitted to the United States Naval Hospital
in Beaufort, South Carolina.' 6
 During the course of their respective
treatments, a corpsman responsible for monitoring their vital signs
sexually assaulted the two minors." Pursuant to the FTCA, plaintiffs
filed a civil suit against the government after learning that the corps-
man in question had pled guilty to a Texas charge of indecency with
a child before he entered the Navy.'' In affirming the dismissal of
plaintiffs' claims of negligence against the physicians, hospital staff and
supervisory Naval personnel, the court held that § 2680(h) barred
claims where an assault or battery constituted an integral part of
plaintiff's action, irrespective of prior governmental negligence.' 9
In reaching its conclusion, the court found the Shearer decision
particularly persuasive despite its plurality status." Additionally, the
court noted that the plain language of § 2680(h) makes no special
allowances for claims alleging breach of independent governmental
duties.° Allowing such claims, the court reasoned, would invite plain-
tiffs to disguise assault or battery claims amidst allegations of breach
of government's supervisory duties. 22 Were that to occur, the court
feared that the congressional mandate embodied by the FTCA would
be circumvented." On these grounds, the court held that § 2680(h)
bars claims that allege negligent supervision but depend upon the
existence of an assault or battery by a government employee.24
18 800 F.2d 393,395 (4th Cir. 1986). Thigpen is representative of cases wherein various circuits
have adopted the Shearer plurality's reading of the "assault and battery" exception. See, e.g.,
Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492,1495,1498 (10th Cir. 1993) (barring claim of negligence
against United States in case of medical battery in Veterans Affairs hospital because claim was
contingent on employment relationship); Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031,1034,1036-37
(2d Cir. 1988) (barring claim that United States was negligent in failing to supervise undercover
agent under intentional tort exception because claim was not "entirely independent" of the
employment relationship).
16 See 800 F.2d at 393.
17
	 id. at 393-94. The corpsman was convicted of one count of contributing to the
delinquency of a fourteen-year-old child and two counts of committing a lewd act upon a
twelve-year-old child. See id. (citing State v. Rodriguez, 302 S.E.2d 666 (S.C. 1983)).
18 See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 394.
19
 See id. at 394-95.
20
 See id. at 395.
21 See id. at 395-96.
n See id. at 596.
28
 See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 396.
24 See id. at 395. In a lengthy concurrence, Judge Murnaghan agreed with the majority's
decision on the grounds of the Feres doctrine. See id. at 398 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
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In 1986, in Bennett v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the "assault and battery" ex-
ception to FTCA liability did not insulate the government from liability
for negligent hiring and retention of a particular teacher." In Bennett,
parents brought an action for damages on behalf of their children who
were kidnapped, assaulted and raped by a teacher at a Bureau of
Indian Affairs boarding school ("BIA school"). 25 The BIA school con-
ducted no investigation before giving the teacher a position, although
he admitted on his employment application that he had been arrested
and charged with violating Oklahoma "Outrage to Public Decency"
statutes. 27 Such an investigation would have revealed that the teacher
had been charged with acts of child molestation similar to those he
committed at the BIA school. 28 Reversing the district court's ruling, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that § 2680(h) did not insulate the govern-
ment from liability where the government was negligent in hiring and
continuing to employ the teacher.29
In reaching its conclusion, the Bennett court made three signi-
ficant determinations." First, despite its factual similarity, the Shearer
decision was not controlling in light of its four-justice plurality status. 3 '
Second, Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that where the govern-
ment had notice and could have prevented a crime by the exercise of
due care by its employees, the government is liable for its own negli-
gence." Third, to remain consistent with the purpose of the FTCA—to
provide a forum for the resolution of claims against the federal gov-
ernment for injury caused by the government's negligence-
§ 2680(h) 's waiver of sovereign immunity should be read broadly." On
the basis of these considerations, the Bennett court concluded that the
provision which retains sovereign immunity for claims "arising out of
Contrary to the majority, however, he argued that a claim does not "arise out of an assault or
battery where it is based directly on the breach of a clear and recognizable affirmative duty, owed
by the United States to the plaintiff, to protect the plaintiff from harmful conduct of others. See
id. at 400-01 (Murnaglian,J., concurring).
28 803 F.2d 1502,1503 (9th Cir. 1986).
26 See id.
22 See id.
28 See id.
" See id. at 1503,1505.
66 See Bennett, 803 F,2d at 1503-04.
81
 See id. at 1503.
82 See id. Noting that the government has accepted liability for negligent management
resulting in assaults and batteries by inmates and patients under governmental supervision, the
cour t failed to discern any principled reason to permit recovery when the government has been
negligent in supervising non-employees, but to deny recovery when the government has been
negligent in supervising an employee. See id. at 1503-04.
" See id. at 1504.
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assault [or] battery" does not insulate the government from liability
with respect to a claim alleging negligent hiring."
In 1987, in Kearney v. United States, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government cannot invoke
§ 2680(h) immunity where a claimant's injury arises out of a battery
by a government employee and the government's own negligence
is the alleged proximate cause of that injury." In Kearney, a husband
sought recovery against the government under the FTCA for the
wrongful death of his wife at the hands of an Army Private who was a
prisoner in the government's custody following his arrest for the rape
of another enlisted servicewoman." In reaching its conclusion, the
court reasoned that § 2680(h) shields the government solely from
respondeat superior liability by employees, but does not extend to the
consequences of the government's own negligence.''' In addition, the
court found no principled reason for retaining immunity for those
batteries committed by governmental employees, while waiving immu-
nity for those batteries committed by non-employees under govern-
mental control (i.e., prisoners and patients)." On these grounds, the
Kearney court held that the "assault and battery" exception does not
preclude government liability for assaults and batteries that result from
the negligent supervision of its employees."
In 1988, in Sheridan v. United Stales, the United States Supreme
Court held that the negligence of government employees who allow a
foreseeable assault and battery to occur may subject the government
to FTCA liability." In Sheridan, three naval corpsmen found a fellow
serviceman lying face down in a drunken stupor on the floor of
Bethesda Naval Hospita1. 4 ' While the corpsmen attempted to take him
to the emergency room, he broke away, revealing the barrel of a rifle
in his possession.42 Thereafter, the corpsmen fled, without subduing
the serviceman or alerting the appropriate authorities that he was
34
 See id.
"815 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1987).
" See id. at 535.
37 See id. at 537.
33 See IS
" See IS at 538; see also Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426, 1426 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the "assault and battery" exception in § 2680(h) did not preclude U.S. government liability
where the Navy hired a go-go dancer to perform in a club for enlisted men, and because the
Navy failed to provide adequate supervision, the dancer was assaulted and raped by an enlisted
man in the women's restroom).
4°487 U.S. 392, 401 (1988).
41
 See id. at 395.
See id.
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heavily intoxicated and brandishing a weapon." Later that evening, the
serviceman fired several rifle shots into petitioners' automobile injur-
ing one of the petitioners and damaging their car. 44 Proceeding under
the FTCA, petitioners alleged that their injuries were caused by the
government's negligence in allowing the serviceman to leave his work-
place, Bethesda Naval Hospital, intoxicated and with a loaded rifle in
his possession."
The majority began its analysis with the "settled and undisputed"
principle that, in at least some situations, direct causation of an injury
by an assault or battery will not preclude liability against the govern-
ment for negligently allowing the assault to occur." The Court then
emphasized the corpsmens' assumption of duties vis-a-vis the assailant
entirely independent of their status as governmental employees. 47 Spe-
cifically, the corpsmen, by voluntarily undertaking to provide care to a
person who was visibly drunk and armed, assumed responsibility to
perform their good Samaritan task in a careful manner." Noting that
the breach of this duty, separate and distinct from any supervisory
obligation, would have provided a basis for liability if the assailant had
been an unemployed civilian patient or a visitor in the hospital, the
Court concluded that § 2680(h) did not bar plaintiffs claim." In so
doing, the Court established that FTCA claims may be based on a
breach of duty, so long as the duty is wholly unrelated to the govern-
ment's employment relationship with the assailant." In a footnote,
however, the Court declined to consider whether breach of govern-
mental duties pertaining to negligent hiring, supervision or training
may ever provide the basis for liability under the FTCA. 5 '
Justice Kennedy issued a concurring opinion wherein he con-
cluded that where plaintiffs tort claim is based on the mere fact of
government employment (i.e., a respondeat superior claim) or on em-
ployment-related activities between the assailant and the government
(i.e., a negligent hiring, supervision or training claim), § 2680(11) 1 s
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 394-95.
46 See id. at 399 n.4; see also United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 158 (1963). In Muniz,
prisoners beat plaintiff with chairs and sticks until he was unconscious. See 374 U.S, at 152. He
alleged that prison officials negligently failed to provide enough guards to prevent the assaults
leading to his injuries. See id. The Court allowed claimant to assert his claim. See id. at 150.
47 See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 401-02.
45 See id.
45 See id. at 401-03.
"See id. at 401,
51
 See id. at 402 n.8.
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exception applies and the United States is immune from prosecution.52
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,
dissented on the basis of statutory interpretation and the legislative
history of § 2680(h).55 In the dissenters' opinion, "arising out of
suggests a sweeping exception intended to preclude liability in any case
in which the battery is "essential to the claim."54 In conclusion, the
dissent commended the majority for refusing to adopt a position which
would hold the government liable for negligently supervising a gov-
ernment employee who commits an assault and battery within the
scope of his employment. 55
During the Survey year, in Senger v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
held that the "assault and battery" exception to the FTCA does not
immunize the government from liability for negligently hiring and
supervising a government employee who commits an assault or bat-
tery.56 In February 1991, Kerry Senger, a tow truck driver, responded
to a request from the Postal Service to move an illegally parked vehicle
from the parking lot of the main post office in Portland, Oregon. 57
Upon learning that his vehicle was being towed, Ervin Lee Brown, a
postal employee with a history of violent behavior, ran out of the post
office building to the tow truck, grabbed Senger by the neck and
threatened to kill him if he did not put the car down. 58 Brown and
Senger were separated shortly thereafter by the Postal Service's security
guard.59 In addition to the criminal charges filed against Brown, Senger
sued the United States for lost wages, medical expenses and non-eco-
nomic damages stemming from the altercation. 60 Proceeding under
the FTCA, Senger advanced the following three arguments: (1) the
"See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 406-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" See id. at 408-11 (O'Connor, J„ dissenting).
54 See id. at 408-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55 See id. at 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Referring explicitly to the majority's consideration
in footnote 8, the dissent added, "I trust that the courts will preserve at least this core of the
assault and battery exception." Id.
55 103 F.3d at 1442, 12 Indiv. Ernpl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 601-02. In addition to its analysis
of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), the court also considered the duty that a possessor of land has, under
Oregon law, to warn business invitees of the intentional acts of third parties. See id. at 1443, 12
Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 602. Jitstice Wallace issued a separate opinion wherein he
concurred with the majority's interpretation of the FTCA, but dissented as to its state law analysis.
See id. at 1443-44, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 602-04 (Wallace, J., concurring and
dissenting).
57 See id. at 1439, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 599.
58 See id. Plaintiffs affidavits (which the government did not contest) suggest that Brown had
a history of violent behavior. See id. at 1440, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 600.
59 See id. at 1439, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 599.
5° See id. Brown, initially charged with assault and menacing, was later convicted of menacing.
See id. As a result, he was suspended from work for 82 days. See id.
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Postal Service negligently employed and retained an employee whose
dangerous disposition posed a risk to others; (2) the Postal Service
negligently supervised the assailant, thus rendering futile any attempt
to thwart the assault before it occurred; and (3) the Postal Service
negligently failed to warn Senger, a business invitee, of Brown's dan-
gerous propensities.°
At the outset, the Senger court noted that the Ninth Circuit, unlike
other circuits, had not adopted the position of the Shearer plurality.62
Although the court conceded that its reasoning was contrary to that
of most circuits, it noted that its position was tacitly permitted given
the Supreme Court's failure definitively to resolve the issue in Sheri-
dan." The court proceeded to cite a line of Ninth Circuit cases involv-
ing negligent hiring and supervision on the part of the government
that hold that the "assault and battery" exception does not preclude
liability under the FTCA.°
These cases, the court reasoned, were particularly significant be-
cause they distinguished between negligence based entirely on a the-
ory of respondeat superior on the one hand and independent negli-
gent acts or omissions by the government that are proximate causes of
the harm on the other. 65 Having articulated this distinction, the court
reasoned that the FTCA barred solely those claims grounded in the
former theory of liability. 66 Accordingly, because Senger's claim was
grounded in the government's negligent hiring and supervision of its
employee, the court held that the assault and battery exception to the
FTCA did not immunize the government from liability. 67
In Seeger, the Ninth Circuit declined the opportunity to align itself
with a majority of circuits regarding the scope of § 2680(h), and in so
doing, has threatened to undermine public policy central to the
61 See id. The district court dismissed the first two claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to the "assault and battery" exception to the FTCA. See id. Finding that Brown's attack
on Senger was unforeseeable as a matter of law, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the United States on the negligent failure to warn claim. See id. at 1438, 12 Indiv, Empl.
Rights Cas. (BNA) at 599. Thereafter, Senger appealed both the dismissal of the first two claims
and the grant of summary judgment on the third claim. See id
62 See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441, 12 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. at 601. But see Franklin v. United
States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1498 (10th Cir. 1993); Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 1034 (2d
Cir. 1988).
63
 See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441 -42, 12 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 601.
n See id. at 1441, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 601. The court relied most heavily on
Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1987); Kearney, 815 F.2d at 535; and Bennett, 803
F.2d at 1502. See id. at 1439, 12 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas, (BNA) at 599.
26 See Sever, 103 F.3d at 1441, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 601.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 1442-43, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 602.
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FTCA. 68 The opinion's fatal flaw, and the one that has relegated Senger-
to a minority position, is its failure to rectify its conclusion in light of
the FTCA's language and legislative history. 69 Because the court's con-
clusion runs afoul of established tenets of statutory construction, it
invites criticism and, quite possibly, reversal."
The decision in Sengeris at least tacitly authorized by the Supreme
Court, given the Court's unwillingness definitively to establish the
scope of § 2680(h). 71 Indeed, the Court, in Sheridan, explicitly declined
to rule on the issue of FTCA liability for negligent hiring, supervision
and training." Both the concurrence and dissent in Sheridan make
clear, however, that at least four current members of the Court are
steadfastly opposed to the minority rule as articulated in Senger." jus-
tice O'Connor's dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia,
adamantly rejected a claim of negligent supervision stemming from a
government employee's assault or battery while acting in the scope of
employment. 74 In addition, Justice Kennedy concluded his concur-
rence with a warning to future courts that a claim for negligent hiring
would fall within the scope of § 2680(h)'s exception, thereby immu-
nizing the government from liability.'" Thus, should the Court en-
deavor to resolve the present inconsistency among the circuits, it ap-
pears that it would repudiate the minority rule embodied by Senger."
Predispositions aside, the Court's decision to recognize negligent
supervision, hiring or training claims as viable under § 2680(h) would
hinge largely on the focus of their analytical inquiry." Should the
Court's reasoning weigh statutory construction and legislative history
more heavily than tort principles, the minority position reflected in
Senger would be nearly impossible to defend." On the other hand,
should the Justices look beyond congressional intent and examine the
6° See id. at 1441-42,12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 601-02.
Gg See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 408-10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55-57;
Senger, 103 F.3d at 1438-43,12 Indio. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 598-602; Thigpen, 800 F.2d at
396.
7° See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 409-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 394.
71 See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 902 n.8; Senger, 103 F.3d at 1442,12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas.
(BNA) at 601.
" See 487 U.S. at 402 n.8.
" See id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74 See id. at 408-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75 See id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7° See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring), 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Compare Senger, 103 F.3d
at 1442-43,12 lndiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 602, with Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 395-96, and Hoot
v. United States, 790 F.2d 836,838 (10th Cir. 1986).
77 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
78 See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55-57; Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 594.
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solid tort law foundation upon which Senger relies, the Ninth Circuit's
narrow reading of § 2680(h) would likely prevail. 79
The court's narrow interpretation of § 2680(h) in Senger belies
both the legislative history and prior constructions of parallel excep-
tions to the FTCA." Indeed, instead of merely barring claims "for"
assault or battery, Congress used the more sweeping language "arising
out of to indicate that § 2680(h) did not distinguish between claims
sounding in negligence and those sounding in respondent superior."
Accordingly, the express language of the statute suggests that a claim-
ant's negligent hiring and supervision claims would be barred. 82
Furthermore, the legislative history of § 2680(h), albeit limited, is
wholly incompatible with the Senger court's interpretation." Rather
than distinguishing among theories of liability, it appears Congress
intended § 2680(h) to bar claims arising out of a certain type of factual
situation—namely deliberate attacks by government employees." Con-
gress reiterated its intent in 1974 when it amended § 2680(h) to waive
sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional torts of
law enforcement officers." In addition, the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of § 2680 provisions regarding intentional torts other than as-
sault and battery also supports the finding that government liability
under the FTCA did not turn on the adequacy of supervision or
warnings. 86 Lastly, the Senger court's reasoning implicitly rejects the
established notion that all waivers of sovereign immunity be strictly
construed in favor of the sovereign.87
79 See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 401-02; Senger, 103 F5d at 1441, 12 Indiv. Erupt. Rights Cat. (BNA)
at 601; Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1505.
8° See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 409 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441-42, 12
Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 600-01.
L See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 55-57; Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441-42, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 600-01.
84 See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55. Congress advised the Department of Justice that the exception
would apply "where some agent of the Government gets in a light with some fellow ... (aind
socks him." See id. (quoting Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942)).
BB See id. at 56. The premise of the legislation was that 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), unamended,
"protect[cdl the Federal Government from liability when its agents committed] intentional torts
such as assault and battery." See id. (quoting,S. REP. No. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C,A.N. 2789, 2791). This remains true even though Congress had reason to believe that
"several incidents" of "no-knock raids" by federal narcotics agents were the result or inadequate
supervision. See S. REP. No. 93-588, at 2.
86 See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 56.
87 See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441-42, 12 Entity. Empl. Rights Cm. (BNA) at 600-01; Thigpen, 800
F.2d at 394. On the topic of sovereign immunity, see Garcia u United States, 776 F.2d 116, 118
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The significance of the Senger opinion's construction becomes
apparent when one considers the practical repercussions of its decision
that may cumulatively undermine the purpose of the FTCA. 88 If plain-
tiffs, like Senger, are permitted to recover against the government for
negligent activity that precedes the immediate cause of harm (i.e.,
assault or battery), claimants will invariably avoid the § 2680(h) excep-
tion. 89 Indeed, one can imagine few instances where an assault could
not possibly have been prevented by some act or omission on the part
of the government. 90 Accordingly, where the fact pattern of a claim is
one of assault and battery, a plaintiff could circumvent the § 2680(h)
bar simply by pleading negligence or breach of duty on the part of the
government.9 ' Despite the magnitude of these practical ramifications,
Senger fails to address these matters. 92
Such a result would practically nullify Congress's intent in enact-
ing the FTCA.90 Rather than shielding the government from liability—
the essential purpose of § 2680—the minority rule subjects the federal
government to innumerable claims alleging negligent hiring, supervi-
sion and training.° Holdings, such as the Senger decision, have taken
affirmative steps towards rendering the federal' treasury the ultimate
deep pocket for every plaintiff injured in an altercation with a federal
employee.95 Courts that weigh policy considerations, legislative intent
and statutory construction heavily have refused to adopt the minority
rule as embodied by Senger. 96 As a result, most circuits and at least four
Justices of the Supreme Court, hold that the drafters of the FICA
intended to bar recovery in situations, such as Senger, where claimaint's
injuries were the immediate result of an assault or battery, irrespective
of any prior negligence on behalf of the government. 97
Despite these formidable criticisms, the rationale of the Senger
court rests on a sound application of tort principles." Indeed, under
(5th Cir. 1985), and Radii? v. United States, 699 F.2d 681, 685, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2560, 2563
(4th Cir. 1983).
" See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 396.
"See id. at 394.
9° See id. at 395.
91 See id. at 396.
92 See Senger, 103 F.3d at 1441-42, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas: (BNA) at 600-01.
"See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 395.
94 See Kearney, 815 F.2d at 536-37 (citing Jablonski ex rel. Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391,
395 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing policy underlying § 2680(h)).
95
 See id. at 536.
96 See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 408-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 395-96.
97 See supra notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
9" See 103 F.3d at 1441-42, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 601; Thigpen, 800 F.2d at
398-99 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
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certain circumstances, the government may assume an affirmative duty
to protect a plaintiff from the violent conduct of others upon entering
into a "special relationship" with a given plaintiff." Such a "special
relationship" exists, for example, between a hospital and its patient, as
in Thigpen; a school and its pupils, as in Bennett, or a property owner
and a business invitee, as is the case in Sengerm Although the scope
of the government's duty is determined by the factual circumstances
and the appropriate application of state law, the presence of at least
some affirmative duty in that context is undeniable. 141 Accordingly, an
actual assault or battery need not be alleged to find a breach of a
defendant's affirmative duty. 102
In Senger, therefore, the government technically breached its duty
towards plaintiff, a business invitee, by subjecting him to the danger
that an employee (i.e., Brown) potentially presented.'" In failing either
to warn plaintiff of this risk or to take affirmative steps to control its
employee's conduct, the government breached its affirmative duty to
the plaintiff. 1th It follows that the actual nature of the harm, be it
assault, battery or otherwise, is irrelevant for purposes of establishing
prima facie tort liability)" In other words, courts ought to consider the
nature of the harm solely to evaluate the severity of the plaintiff's
injuries rather than to determine whether such a claim exists.'" A
finding of government liability, therefore, would not hinge on two
purely fortuitous events—that an assault or battery occurred and that
the assailant was on the federal payroll. 107
In summary, the Ninth Circuit in Sertger reaffirmed the minority
position that the assault and battery exception does not immunize the
government for negligent hiring, supervision or training of an em-
ployee.'" In reaching its conclusion, the court ignored important prin-
ciples of statutory construction and disregarded the policy matters that
underlie the FICA)" As a result of this oversight, most circuits and at
99 See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 399 (Murnaghan, J., concurring); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 315, 383 (5th cd. 1984).
1 " See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 399 (Murnaghan, J., concurring); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra
note 99, at 315, 383.
1 ° 1 See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 399 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
In Set id. at 399 n.10.
1 " See 103 F.3d at 1442-4:3, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 602.
1 " See id.; Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 399 n.10 (Murnaghan, J„ concurring).
1" See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 399 n.10 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
I" See id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
1 °7 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
1 °11 See supra notes 68-97 and accompanying text.
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least four current members of the Supreme Court look disfavorably
upon holdings such as Senger."° Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit's com-
mitment to the minority rule, as articulated in Senger, finds support in
well-established doctrines of tort liability." Thus, depending upon
one's approach, Senger is either a misguided refutation of congres-
sional intent or a sound application of tort principles."'
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A.*Summary Suspension of Public Employee Without Pay Does Not
Violate Due Process: Gilbert v. Homarl
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution prohibit state action that
deprives a person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.' In a series of landmark decisions during the early 1970s, the
United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional guarantee
of due process applies to legitimate claims of entitlement to public
benefits, including a tenured public employee's interest in continued
employment, and prohibits the government from terminating such
benefits without first providing the interest-holder adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard. 2 A public employee who is summarily
deprived of a qualifying property interest in continued employment
thus may challenge the termination procedures on the grounds that
I° See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 67-107 and accompanying text.
* By Daniel T. Gallagher, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1
 117 S.Ct. 1807, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1473 (1997).
2 U.S. Curis.r. amend. V, XIV § 1. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part: "No person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. Coign . .
amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§
s See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Bd, of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 1 hulls ,. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 23, 27-28 (1972); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-602, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 33, 35-36 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970). The Court first extended due process protection to govern-
ment benefits awarded by statutory "entitlement" in Goldberg u. Kelly, a case widely regarded as
the inauguration of a "due process revolution" in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. 397
U.S. at 261-63; EILNEST GELLIIORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
192-96 (4th ed. 1997). In Goldberg, the Court held that because eligibility for public assistance
benefits is a matter of statutory definition, recipients have an interest in continued benefits that
rises to the level of a constitutionally protected "property" right, and therefore state action that
deprives the recipient of such benefits must satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
See 397 U.S. at 261-63, 262 n.8.
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they violate the Due Process Clause. 4 In adjudicating procedural due
process public employment claims, the Court has historically adopted
a case-by-case balancing approach, determining what process the em-
ployee is due by weighing the competing private and public interests
at stake as well as the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property
interest in continued employment.' In Gilbert v. Hamar, the Court
reaffirmed the ad hoc nature of procedural due process adjudication
and held that the Due Process Clause does not require a state employer
to provide notice and a hearing before suspending a public employee
without pay. 6
In 1972, in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the United
States Supreme Court held that a government employee may enjoy a
constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment
that the state cannot take away without first providing due process of
law in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard.? In Roth, an
untenured state university professor whose one-year contract was not
renewed sued a university, claiming it had violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to procedural due process by failing both to notify
him of the reasons for his non-retention and to provide him an oppor-
tunity to challenge the decision. 8 The Court reasoned that when a
government employee establishes—whether on the basis of a formal
contract, reasonable reliance on the employer's representations or
statutory protection against at-will dismissal—a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" to continued employment, the employee has a property
right at state law that merits protection under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Court thus held that
when a public employee enjoys a vested property interest in continued
government employment, state action that deprives the employee of
this property interest must satisfy due process by providing, at a mini-
mum, notice of the reasons for termination and "some kind of hear-
ing" at which to challenge it.'"
4 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 27.
3 See Richard J. Pierce, The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 CoLum. L. REV.
1973, 1981 (1996).
6 117 S.Ct. at 181I-13, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 1475-77.
7 408 U.S. at 576-77, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 27.
8 See id. at 566-69, 1 lathy. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 25-24.
9 See id. at 576-77, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 27. The Court in Roth concluded,
however, that the plaintiff's interest in continued employment at the state institution did not
constitute such a protected property right, because his expectation of re-employment was merely
unilateral or subjective, unsupported by any mutual agreement with his employer or any existing
rules of state law. See id, at 578, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 28.
16 See id. at 569-70, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 25, 27.
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In 1979, in Barry v. Barchi, the United States Supreme Court
clarified the procedural safeguards the Constitution affords to prop-
erty interests in public benefits, holding that the Due Process Clause
does not require a state agency to hold a hearing before suspending a
property interest in a government benefit, so long as there is a prompt
post-suspension hearing to permit the deprived party to petition for
reinstatement." In Barchi, a state horse-racing licensing board tempo-
rarily suspended the license of the plaintiff, a trainer whose horse
tested positive for drugs in a routine post-race urinalysis." Under the
board's disciplinary procedures, license suspension was a summary
adjudication that did not permit the licensee to be heard." The plain-
tiff challenged the suspension procedures, arguing that the lack of
pre-suspension and prompt post-suspension hearings deprived him of
a property interest in his license in violation of his Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to due process."
The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument regarding a pre-sus-
pension hearing, reasoning that the state's important interest in main-
taining the integrity of the horse-racing industry and protecting the
public from harm outweighed the licensee's interest in avoiding sus-
pension, and that the drug testing procedures, which were conducted
by experts, minimized the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
licensee's interest.' 5 The Court further reasoned, however, that the
harm to a licensee resulting from summary suspension necessitated a
prompt post-suspension hearing to determine whether there was prob-
able cause to validate the charges and to determine whether the statu-
tory conditions justifying license suspension were satisfied.' 6 The Court
thus held that it is not a violation of constitutional due process to
suspend an individual's enjoyment of a property right in a public
benefit without a prior hearing, provided that a prompt post-suspen-
sion hearing follows as a check against erroneous deprivation.°
In 1985, in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the United
States Supreme Court determined the minimum due process to which
a government employee is entitled prior to termination, holding that
11 443 U.S. 55,63-64 (1979).
12 See id. at 59.
13 See id. at 60-61. Although the board was required to hold a post-suspension hearing to
evaluate the grounds for a suspension, it could take up to 30 days to issue its final ruling, during
which time the suspension would remain in effect. See id. at 61.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 64-65.
16 See Barchi, 443 U.S. at 66.
17 See id. at 63-64.
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a tenured public employee must receive notice of the grounds for
discharge and ,an opportunity to respond in person or in writing prior
to dismissal."' In Loudermill, a municipal school board fired the plain-
tiff, a school security guard, when it discovered that he had failed to
disclose a prior felony conviction on his employment application.' 9 The
plaintiff challenged the termination procedures, arguing that the lack
of a pre-dismissal hearing deprived him of his property interest in
continued employment without due process. 2° The Court reasoned
that in deciding whether termination of a public employee complied
with due process, it had to balance three factors: (1) the private interest
affected by the dismissal, (2) the risk of erroneous termination and
(3) the governmental interest served by both the summary termination
of an unsatisfactory employee and the avoidance of additional proce-
dural burdens." Applying this test to the plaintiff's dismissal, the Court
determined that the severity of depriving an employee of his means of
livelihood, coupled with the risk of an erroneous termination when
many factual issues were in dispute, outweighed the government's
interest in summarily discharging a convicted felon from a position of
public trust. 22 The Court therefore concluded that a public employee
is constitutionally entitled to a pre-termination hearing to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that the charges against the
employee are true and sufficient to warrant dismissal." The Court held
that due process is satisfied when the state provides a discharged
employee notice of the reasons for dismissal and an opportunity to
respond in person or in writing prior to termination."
In 1988, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mallen, the United
States Supreme Court held that a government interest of sufficient
importance to justify summary suspension of a constitutionally pro-
19 470 U.S. 532, 545-46, 1 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 424, 429-30 (1985).
19 See iti. at 535-36, I Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 425-26.
29 See id. at 536, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (I3NA) at 426.
21 See id. at 542-44, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 428-29 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S, at
335).
22 See id. at 544-45, 1 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 429. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that a government employer shares the employee's interest in avoiding an
erroneous termination, because it is preferable to keep a trained employee on the job pending
a hearing on the charges against the employee, and because the government has an interest in
keeping its citizens gainfully employed rather than forcing them, perhaps erroneously, onto the
welfare rolls, See id.
23 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46, I Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 430.
94 See id. (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170-71 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(public employee with protected property interest in continued employment, who was terminated
after receiving written notice of the reasons and an opportunity to respond in person or in writing,
received all the process he was due)).
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tected property interest, coupled with factors minimizing the risk of
an erroneous deprivation, may also justify a significant postponement
of a post-deprivation hearing. 25 In Mallen, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation ("FDIC"), acting pursuant to congressional statute,
summarily suspended the plaintiff, the president of a federally insured
bank, after he was indicted by a grand jury for allegedly violating
federal banking law." The plaintiff argued that the statute's authoriza-
tion of a ninety-day delay before the FDIC was required to hold a
post-suspension hearing deprived him of his property interest in con-
tinued employment in violation of due process. 27 The Court, relying
on Barchi, stated that in limited cases requiring prompt action, an
important government interest, coupled with substantial assurance
that a suspension is not baseless, may justify postponing an opportunity
to be heard until after an initial deprivation of a property interest in
employment.29 Turning to assess the length of the post-suspension
hearing delay, the Court similarly reasoned that the important govern-
ment interest in protecting depositors and maintaining public con-
fidence in the bank outweighed the private harm suffered by the
suspended employee during the interim hearing delay. 29 The Court
further reasoned that the employee's ex parte indictment by a grand
jury minimized the risk that his suspension was baseless or mistaken."
The Court therefore held that an important government interest,
coupled with factors minimizing the risk of an erroneous deprivation,
may justify a lengthy postponement of a post-suspension hearing and
a continued deprivation of a constitutionally protected property inter-
est. 31
During the Survey year, in Gilbert v. Homar, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state employee suspended without pay was
not entitled to notice and a pre-suspension hearing under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Ainendment." In Gilbert, the Court
clarified dicta in Loudermill concerning the due process rights of sus-
"486 U.S. 230, 240-42 (1988).
26 Set id. at 236-37. The FDIC acted pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g) (1), which provides that
when an officer of a federally insured bank is charged or indicted by a United States Attorney
with a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust punishable by imprisonment, the appropriate
banking agency may suspend the officer if it finds that continued service or participation may
threaten the interests of depositors or public confidence in the bank. See id. at 238.
27
 See id. at 239-40.
23 See id. at 240-41 (citing Barchi, 443 U.S. at 64-66).
29 See id. at 241-43.
39 See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 244-45.
31 See id. at 245.
32 117 S.Q. 1807, 1810, 1813, 12 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) 1473, 1474, 1476-77 (1997).
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pended employees, as well as its general approach to due process
claims involving property interests in public employment." Gilbert es-
tablishes that when a public employee's property interest in continued
employment is adversely affected by state action, there is no absolute
due process right to notice and a hearing, but rather the procedural
safeguards of the Due Process Clause will be determined by a case-by-
case weighing of the competing private and public interests at stake."
In Gilbert, the plaintiff, Richard J. Homar, was suspended without
pay from his job as a police officer at East Stroudsburg State University
("ESU"), a Pennsylvania State institution." ESU suspended Homar
after Pennsylvania state police had arrested him in a drug raid and
charged him with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and
felony criminal conspiracy to violate the controlled substance law."
The state police informed ESU of Homar's arrest, and ESU's director
of human resources immediately suspended Homar without pay pend-
ing an investigation into the criminal charges. 87 Although the state
police dropped the charges against Homar six days later, his suspen-
sion remained in effect while ESU conducted its own investigation."
Three weeks after his suspension, the director met with Homar to
hear his side of the story. 39 One week later, the director demoted
Homar to the position of groundskeeper and awarded him backpay at
a reduced rate for the period of his suspension, explaining that the
demotion was based on admissions Homar had allegedly made to the
state police about his personal drug use and his association with known
drug dealers.° The next day, ESU President James Gilbert met with
Homar and afforded him an opportunity to respond to this alleged
confession.4 ' Following Homar's response, Gilbert sustained his demo-
tio n. 42
55 See id, at 1811-14, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1475-77.
34 See id. at 1811-12, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1475-76.
55 See id. at 1810, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1474.
36 See id,
"See Gilbert, 117 S.Q. at 1810, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1474, The director
suspended Homar pursuant to an executive order of the governor of Pennsylvania that authorized
summary suspension without pay of any state employee charged with a felony. See id. at 1813, 12
Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1477.
58 See id. at 1810, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1474.
56 See id. The director told Hamar only that the state police had provided information about
him that was "very serious in nature"; he did not reveal that he had received a report of a
confession Homar allegedly had given to the state police on the day of his arrest, and thus did
not afford flosuar an opportunity to respond to these alleged statements. See id.
"See id. at 1810-11, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 1474-75.
41 See id, at 1811, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1474-75.
42 See Gilbert, 117 S.Ct. at 1811, 12 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1475.
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Homar filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Gilbert and other
members of the ESU administration, alleging that their failure to
provide him notice and a hearing prior to suspending him without pay
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.43 After the
district court granted summary judgment for defendants, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding it
unconstitutional to suspend without pay a tenured government em-
ployee without providing pre-suspension notice and an opportunity to
be heard." The Third Circuit based its holding on its reading of dicta
in Loudermill, where the United States Supreme Court stated that a
government employer who perceives a hazard in keeping an employee
on the job can satisfy constitutional due process by suspending the
employee with pay as an alternative to dismissal without a hearing. 45
The Court concluded that the Third Circuit had misread Loudermill
and reversed.16
The Court rejected as "indefensible" the Third Circuit's conclu-
sion that the Loudermill dicta strongly suggested an absolute due proc-
ess rule that a tenured public employee could not be suspended with-
out pay in the absence of prior notice and a hearing. 47 Although the
Court acknowledged Loudermill's claim that suspension with pay
satisfies due process, it denied that this claim entails the corollary that
suspension with pay is the only alternative to summary termination
consistent with an employee's due process rights. 48 Moreover, the Court
reasoned, the absolute rule enunciated by the Third Circuit is incon-
sistent with the balancing approach the Court historically has adopted
in its procedural due process precedents. 49 Due process adjudication,
45 See id.
44 See Homar v. Gilbert, 89 E3d 1009, 1015-16, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1368,
1372-73 (3d Cir. 1996).
45 see id.
46 See Gilbert, 117 S.Ct. at 1811-12, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1475-76.
47 See id. The Court First addressed the threshold question of whether suspension of a tenured
public employee without pay infringed a constitutionally protected property interest, thereby
necessitating a due process inquiry. See id. at 1811, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1475.
Whereas the Court had held in Roth that procedural due process is required before a tenured
government employee may be terminated, the Court observed that it had never had the oppor-
tunity to decide whether the Due Process Clause applies when the discipline imposed on a public
employee falls short of termination. See id. Because the point had not been contested by the
petitioners, however, the Court assumed, without deciding the matter, that Homar's suspension
without pay infringed a protected property interest and proceeded to inquire what process was
due under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
48 See id. at 1812, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cm, (BNA) at 1476,
48 See id., 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1475-76 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria and Restatulant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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the Court concluded, rejects sweeping categorical rules, favoring in-
stead an ad hoc approach to determining the procedural safeguards
that each particular situation demands. 5°
To determine whether Homar's suspension without pay satisfied
due process, the Court balanced the three factors it had articulated in
Loudermill. 51 In weighing the severity of the harm suffered by Homar,
the Court reasoned that it had to consider both the duration and
finality of his deprivation.52 Because Homar faced temporary suspen-
sion without pay rather than termination, the Court concluded that
his loss was relatively insubstantial, so long as he received a sufficiently
prompt post-suspension hearing." On the other side, the Court rea-
soned, ESU had a significant interest in immediately suspending an
employee who occupied a position of public trust and high visibility
and who faced felony charges." The Court rejected Homar's argument
that ESU's interest would be served just as well by suspending him with
pay, insisting that the Constitution does not require the government
to give an employee charged with a felony a paid leave at taxpayer's
expense or to bear the additional expense of hiring a replacement
while still paying the suspended employee. 55 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that ESU's significant interest in preserving public confidence
in its police force outweighed Hotnar's interest in avoiding suspension
without pay.56
The Court then evaluated the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
Homar's property interest under the summary suspension procedure
and the likely value of additional procedural safeguards, noting that
this was the most important factor in resolving the case. 57 The Court
reasoned that, as with a pre-termination hearing, the purpose of a
pre-suspension hearing is to determine whether there are reasonable
5° See id., 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1476. The Court noted that it has frequently
recognized that when pre-deprivation due process is impractical or when an important govern-
ment interest justifies immediate suspension of a protected property interest, a prompt post-dep-
rivation hearing can satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. See id. (citing Mallen,
486 U.S. at 240; Barchi, 443 U.S, at 64-65).
5 t See Gilbert, 117 S.Ct. at 1812,12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (ANA) at 1476; supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
52
 See Gilbert, 117 S.Ct. at 1813,12 Indiv. Env!. Rights Cas. (ANA) at 1476.
55 See id.
54 See id. A suite university's interest in maintaining public confidence in its police force, the
Court reasoned, is at least as significant as the government's interest in preserving the integrity
of the sport of horse racing was in Barr hi. See id., 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (ANA) at 1476-77
(citing Barchi, 443 U.S. at 69).
55 See id., 12 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1476.
55
 See Gilbert, 117 S.Ct. at 1813,12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1476-77.
57
 See id., 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (ANA) at 1477,
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grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and
justify the proposed action." The Court further reasoned that, as with
the grand jury indictment of the bank official in Mallen, Homar's
arrest on felony charges by the state police provided "reason enough"
for the director to believe that suspension without pay was justified."
Because an independent third party had already determined that there
was probable cause to believe that Homar had committed a serious
crime, the Court concluded, there was no need for the director to
provide Homar a pre-suspension hearing to protect against erroneous
deprivation. 60 The Court thus held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require the state to provide notice
and a hearing before suspending an employee without pay. 61
Finally, the Court stated that whether Homar had in fact received
a sufficiently prompt post-suspension hearing was a "separate question"
not presently before it.° The Court noted that ESU did not provide
Homar a post-suspension hearing until eighteen days after the state
police had dropped the criminal charges against him. 63 The Court
further observed that once the charges had been dropped, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation increased substantially, at which point there
likely would have been some value in holding a prompt hearingP The
Court, however, declined to decide whether the post-suspension hear-
ing delay had violated Homar's right to due process and remanded the
issue to the Third Circuit for further proceedings.tt
The Court's decision in Gilbert is consistent with its prior decisions
on summary suspensions of protected property interests in public
benefits and does not signal any reversal of recent due process juris-
"See id. (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 430).
55 See id. at 1813-14, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1477 (citing Mallen, 486 U.S. at
240-41).
6° See id. at 1814, 12 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1477.
61 See Gilbert, 117 S.Ct. at 1810, 1813, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1474, 1476.77.
The Court rejected Homar's contention that, assuming the director had discretion not to suspend
him, he was entitled to an opportunity to be heard and to persuade the director of his innocence.
See Id. at 1814, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1477. The Court reasoned that, unlike a
termination, where the employee's only meaningful opportunity to invoke the employer's discre-
tion is prior to the dismissal, a suspension is temporary and affords the employee ample oppor
tttnity to be heard later. See id. The Court further reasoned that a short delay in obtaining a
hearing actually benefits the suspended employee because it permits the employer to obtain more
accurate information about the employee's alleged offense and ensures that a decision about
continued suspension is not made in excessive haste. See id.
62 See id., 12 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas, (BNA) at 1477-78.
65 See id., 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 1477.
64 See id., 12 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1478 (citing Mallen, 486 U.S. at 243).
65 See id at 1814-15, 12 Indiv. Empl, Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1478.
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prudence. In Barchi and Mallen, for example, the Court held that
temporary deprivation, without prior notice or hearing, of a property
right in a public benefit did not violate the Due Process Clause." In
each case, the state summarily suspended enjoyment of an employ-
ment-related property interest after the interest-holder had allegedly
broken the law.° In concluding that the deprivation satisfied due
process, the Court in each case emphasized three points: the state had
a substantial interest in maintaining the integrity of a public institution
by promptly removing an alleged lawbreaker from a position of public
trust, the suspended employee suffered a relatively slight harm from a
temporary deprivation of a property interest, and an ex parte finding
of the interest-holder's probable wrongdoing minimized the risk of an
erroneous deprivation," Given the similarity of the plaintiff's situation
in Gilbert to the facts of these prior cases, the Court's express reliance
on these precedents to uphold the summary suspension without pay
of a state university police officer facing felony charges is a fairly
predictable outcome."
Similarly, the Court's refusal in Gilbert to acknowledge an absolute
rule mandating that a public employee is entitled to notice and a
hearing prior to suspension without pay is consistent with its longstand-
ing case-by-case balancing approach to due process claims involving
deprivations of property interests in public benefits: 7° The Court's
application of the balancing test in Gilbert, however, particularly its
weighing of the harm Homar suffered as a result of his deprivation,
appears strained, yielding the following contradiction in its reasoning:
66 See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240-41; Barchi, 443 U.S. at 63-64.
67 See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 236-37; Barchi, 443 U.S. at 59.
"See supra notes 14, 27-28 and accompanying text. As the Court noted in Gilbert, the Mallen
opinion does not expressly state whether the bank president was suspended with or without pay.
See Gilbert, 117 S.Q. at 1812 11.1, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1476, n.l. The Court
observed, however, that the plaintiff in Mallen protested the "denial of an income stream" during
the period of his suspension, thus warranting the inference that his suspension was without pay.
See id.
69 See Homer, 89 F.3d at 1023, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (RNA) at 1378-79 (Auto, j.,
dissenting) .
70 See supra notes 10-30 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit's reading notwithstand-
ing, Loudermill was no exception to this ad hoc model of due process adjudication, for there the
Court relied on a three-factor balancing test to determine the procedural protections to which
the discharged plaintiff was due. See 470 U.S. at 542-45, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at
428-29. The Third Circuit's contention that the dictum in Loudermill "strongly suggested" an
absolute rule of due process that contradicts the balancing approach the Court expressly adopted
in that case is thus a strained reading of precedent at best. See Homar, 89 F.3d at 1015-16, 12
Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1372-73. Indeed, the Loudermill dictum is construed better
not as a normative statement of a due process rule, but rather as a descriptive statement of how
a government employer might avoid a constitutional challenge to disciplinary action altogether.
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the plaintiff's loss was relatively insubstantial because his suspension
was brief and he received a sufficiently prompt post-suspension hear-
ing, yet the postponement of the plaintiff's post-suspension hearing
still may have been sufficiently lengthy to constitute a due process
violation.
On the one hand, the ostensible brevity of Homar's suspension
without pay figured prominently in the Court's assessment of the
severity of his injury: the temporary nature of a suspension (in contrast
to the finality of termination), coupled with its short duration when
there is a "sufficiently prompt post-suspension hearing," meant that
Homar's property interest in continued receipt of a paycheck was not
severely infringed." Homar's due process challenge thus failed because
the Court concluded that the brief duration of his property deprivation
made his loss "relatively insubstantial" in comparison with the state's
"significant interest" in preserving the integrity of law enforcement. 72
On the other hand, thus having attributed a near dispositive impor-
tance to the brevity of Homar's period of suspension, the Court re-
manded the issue of the constitutional adequacy of the post-suspension
procedures, observing that whether Hamar in fact had received a
sufficiently prompt post-suspension hearing was a "separate question"
that it would not consider in the first instance." The Court even went
so far as to suggest that, because the risk of erroneous deprivation
increased substantially after the state police dropped the criminal
charges against Hamar, ESU's failure to provide Homar a post-suspen-
sion hearing for another sixteen days may have constituted a due
process violation. 74 Thus, on the Court's reasoning, the duration of
Homar's suspension was both sufficiently brief to render his suspension
consistent with due process and sufficiently lengthy to constitute a
potential due process violation.
For if the employer suspends an employee with pay, there is no deprivation of a property interest,
and thus no grounds for implicating the Due Process Clause. See id. at 1024, 12 Indiv. Empl.
Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1379 (Alito, J., dissenting).
71 See Gilbert, 117 &Ct. at 1813, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 1476 (citing Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982) (when weighing the private harm caused by
deprivation, court must consider the importance of the private interest affected, as well as the
length and finality of the deprivation)). The Court also reasoned that the "short delay" in holding
a post-suspension hearing actually served to minimize the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation
of Homar's property interest by affording state officials an opportunity to obtain more accurate
information about the alleged wrongdoing that prompted the disciplinary action. See id. at 1814,
12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1477.
72 See id. at 1813, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1476.
73 See id. at 1814-15, 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1478.
71 See id., 12 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1478.
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Perhaps the clearest practice implication of the Court's strained
reasoning on this point is that a due process challenge to a disciplinary
suspension without pay should encompass both pre-suspension and
post-suspension procedures, thereby forcing the court to address di-
rectly the constitutional adequacy of the postponement, if any, of the
employee's post-suspension opportunity to be heard. A court might
conclude that such a post-suspension hearing delay, even though
lengthy, nevertheless is justifiable under the substantial governmental
interest rationale of Mallen:75 Yet this strategy at least would have the
effect of limiting the court's freedom to construe a significant post-
ponement as a "short delay" that resulted in a "relatively insubstantial"
deprivation of a property interest.
Gilbert is likely to fuel speculation that the current Supreme Court
is aiming to complete a due process "counterrevolution" that has been
underway for the past twenty years. 76 Following landmark decisions in
the early 1970s that extended due process protection to a host of
property interests in public benefits, including tenured government
employment, the Court, some argue, gradually has retreated from
these early progressive gains, undertaking to lower the procedural
barriers the Constitution erects against state deprivations of such novel,
state-created property interests. 77 The due process balancing test may
be the primary engine of this movement to restrict constitutional
hearing rights. 78 For, as Gilbert illustrates, this balancing approach en-
ables the Court to invoke the public or governmental interest in sum-
mary deprivation as an effective counter-weight to the claimant's inter-
est in continued receipt of a valuable entitlement, and thus to uphold
deprivation procedures that might be deemed constitutionally inade-
quate if the severity of the claimant's harm were the sole considera-
tion. 79 Recent academic commentary predicted that the Supreme
Court, having relied on a balancing test to limit the due process
75 See 486 U.S. at 241-44.
76 See Pierce, supra note 5, at 1973. Among the scholars who have asserted the Supreme
Court's repudiation of the "due process revolution" of the early 1970s is Yale law professor Charles
Reich. See Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 731, 731-33 (1990). Reich's earlier writings on the importance of private "entitlements"
to public benefits as a source of wealth in contemporary American society figured prominently
in the Court's original recognition of constitutionally protected property interests in public
benefits. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (citing Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965); The New Properly, 73 YALE L.J.
733, 733 (1964)).
77 See Pierce, supra note 5, at 1973; Reich, Beyond the New Property, supra note 76, at 731-32.
78 See Pierce, supra now 5, at 1981; Reich, Beyond the New Property, supra note 76, at 731-32.
79 See 117 S.Ct. at 1813, 12 Indiv. Empi. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1476-77.
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protection afforded recipients of various public benefits, would look
next to constrain the due process rights of public employees who
claim a constitutionally-protected property interest in continued em-
ployment." Gilbert could be the opening salvo in this latest due process
counter-offensive, signaling the Court's intention to limit the capacity
of public employees to challenge dismissal, suspension or other disci-
plinary action on constitutional grounds.
In summary, in Gilbert v. Homar the Court held that the Due
Process Clause does not require a government employer to provide
notice and a hearing before suspending a public employee without
pay 81 Gilbert establishes that to determine the procedural due process
rights of suspended government workers, courts must weigh the public
interest served by summary suspension against the severity of the
employee's resulting injury and the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of a vested property right in continued public employment.82 The
Court's reliance on a balancing test in Gilbert is consistent with its
recent decisions on due process claims involving terminations and
suspensions of government benefits, and perhaps signals the begin-
ning of a movement to restrict the due process hearing rights of public
employees.'
B.* California Proposition 209 Does Not Impose Unconstitutional
Burdens Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson'
Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative, provides that
It) he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treat-
ment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting."2 In Coalition for Economic
Equity v. Wilson, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit recently
upheld the validity of Proposition 209 in the face of constitutional and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") challenges. 2 The
"See Pierce, supra note 5, at 1992-95.
di See 117 S.Ct. at 1810, 1815, 12 Indiv. Empi. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1474, 1477.
82 See id. at 1812, 12 Indiv. Empi. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1476.
83 See supra notes 49, 67-70, 77-81 and accompanying text.
* By Juliana Capata, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 110 F.3d 1431, 1446, 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 821, 833, 834 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
2 CAL. CoNtsr. art. I, § 31(a). Proposition 209 became an operative provision of the California
Constitution after voter approval on November 6, 1996. See id.
3 110 F.3d 1431, 1446, 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 821, 833, 884 (9th Cir.), cert.
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court found that Proposition 209 was not invalid on its face and that
it did not isolate minorities or women for specific political burdens, 4
The adoption of Proposition 209 in California abolished affirma-
tive action by law, at least in government employment, contracting and
education. 5 Although Proposition 209 presently applies only to govern-
ment entities, it could eventually threaten private affirmative action
programs as well.' The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari of
Wilson, effectively upholding the validity of Proposition 209, yet leaving
unanswered questions as to the status of affirmative action.' Over the
past few years, courts in various jurisdictions have been asked to con-
sider the legitimacy of various preferential treatment programs.' Re-
cent judicial activity in the area of affirmative action signals a move-
ment toward limiting, or perhaps even eliminating, preferential
treatment in both the public and private arenas. 9
In 1995, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, the United States Su-
preme Court held that federal and state racial classifications must be
narrowly tailored and must serve a compelling state interest.'" Plain-
tiffs, Adarand Constructors ("Adarand"), lost out on a subcontracting
bid to a government contract because Adarand was not certified as a
small business controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 ( 1997); see also Ed Mendel, Prop. 209 Becomes State Law; Agencies That Don't
Comply with Ban on Preferences Targeted, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 29, 1997, at Al.
4
 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1440, 1446, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 827-28, 832-33.
5 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).
6 See Employment Discrimination—Race: Supreme Court Ruling Could Render Moot Debate Over
Affirmative Action, ABA Told, U.S.L.W., Aug. 12, 1997, available in WESTLAW, BNA-USLW data-
base, 66 USLW 2093.
7 See 118 S. Ct. 397, 397 (1997); see also Richard Carelli, Prop. 209 Survives Justices' Scrutiny,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1997, at Al. California cases subsequent to Wilson, such as Monterey
Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, attempted to evade the uncertainty of Wilson and implement the goals
of the California Civil Rights Initiative. See No. 96-16729, 1997 WL 538757, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept.
3, 1997); see also Dave Lesher, Appeals Court Voids Slate Contracting Law Business: End to Goal of
Hiring Firms Owned by Women or Minorities Could Have the Effect of Prop. 209, But Faster, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at Al.
8 See Taxman v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Ed., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550, 71 Fair Entpl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 848, 850 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 934 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). In Hopwood and Taxman, the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits were faced with issues similar to those in Wilson. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550, 71
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 850; Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934. In both of these cases the court
came down on the side of limiting affirmative action programs. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1565, 71
Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 862; Hopwood, 78 FAL at 962.
9 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-39, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA)
1831, 1843-44 (1995); Thxman, 91 FM at 1565, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 862; Hopwood,
78 F.3d at 962; see also Employment Discrimination—Race: Supreme Court Ruling Could Render Moot
Debate Over Affirmative Action, ABA Told, supra note 6.
19 515 U.S. at 235-39, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1843-44.
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individuals," as set out in a federal statute." Adarand contested the
statute, claiming that it discriminated on the basis of race in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.'?
Both the United States District Court for the District of Colorado and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected Adarand's claim,
applying a standard of lenient scrutiny.' 5 The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari."
The Supreme Court concluded in Adarand that equal protection
under the Constitution should be equivalent to that afforded by the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, should face the
same degree of scrutiny.' 5 The Court stated that because the Constitu-
tion prohibits unequal treatment at the state level, "it would be un-
thinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on
the Federal Government." 16 The Court then addressed racial classifica-
tions, noting that because they are potentially harmful at all levels of
"See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3) (A) (1994); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1831. The dispute involved a construction project where Mountain Gravel & Construc-
tion Company held the prime contract, funded by the United States Department of Transporta-
tion. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1831. The prime contract's
terms provided that Mountain Gravel would receive additional compensation if it hired a sub-
contractor certified as a small business controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals." See id. Both Adarand and Gonzales submitted bids, with Adarand's bid being the
lowest. See id. Gonzales, a minority-owned company, was awarded the contract. See id. Mountain
Gravel's Chief Estimator submitted an affidavit staling that Mountain Gravel would have accepted
Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment it received by hiring Gonzales instead.
See id.
12 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204-06, 67
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1830-31. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part: In]o
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . .
U.S. CoNs.r. amend. XIV, § 1. Federal law required the statute in dispute to be included in most
federal agency contracts. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3) (A); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205, 67 Fair nap!.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1831. The statute required, in pertinent part: "[t]he contractor shall presume
that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other indi-
vidual found to be disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a)
of the Small Business Act." 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (3) (C) (ii).
13 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 210, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1832-33.
14 See id., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1835.
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 515 U.S. at 215-16, 235, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (RNA)
at 1835, 1843.
16 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 215, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1839 (quoting Balling a Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954)).
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government, it is especially important that the justifications for any
classifications be clearly identified and unequivocally legitimate." The
Court thus imposed a standard of strict scrutiny on any federal racial
classification, requiring the governmental actor to narrowly tailor its
legislation to further a compelling state interest." Having significantly
altered the analysis in instances of government discrimination, the
Supreme Court remanded Adarand to the lower court for further
consideration."
In 1982, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that a state initiative prohibiting inte-
grative school busing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment on the grounds that it established an impermissi-
ble racial classification. 2° In 1978; the Seattle School District adopted
the "Seattle Plan" to desegregate its schools. 2 ' The plan required man-
datory busing." Shortly thereafter, opponents of the Seattle Plan intro-
duced a ballot initiative, Initiative 350, which prohibited school boards
from requiring any student to attend a school other than the one
geographically nearest or next-to-nearest his or her home." The initia-
tive contained various exceptions, however, allowing the school boards
to assign students away from their neighborhood schools for practically
all purposes other than integration. 24 A majority of voters approved the
initiative, sparking a lawsuit. 25 Plaintiffs, the Seattle, Tacoma and Pasco
school districts, challenged the initiative on the grounds that it estab-
lished an impermissible racial classification because it disallowed bus-
ing for racial reasons but permitted it for all other reasons. 26
The Seattle Court, reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment
equates all individuals, found that Initiative 350 unequally reordered
the political process, resulting in a unique and substantial burden on
11 See id. at 236, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cris. (BNA) at 1843.
1B See id. at 235, 67 Fair Eitipl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1843.
19 See id. at 237-39, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1844.
20 458 U.S. 457, 470, 479, 486 (1982); see U.S. CONS'''. amend. XIV, § 1; WASH. Row. CODE
§ 28A.26.010 (repealed by Laws 1991, ch. 116, § 26).
21 See Seatite, 458 U.S. at 461.
22
 See id.
23 See WASH. REV. CODE. § 28A.26.010; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 462. This Note uses the gender
specific pronoun "he" and its derivatives to represent individuals of both genders..
24 See WASH. REV. Coon § 28A.26.010; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 462. For example, a student could
be assigned beyond his neighbor hood school if he required special education, care or guidance
or if the local school was unfit or inadequate because of overcrowding. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at
462.
25 See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 463-64.
20 See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 464-65. The United States and
several community organizations intervened in support of the District. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 464.
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racial minorities. 27 The Constitution guarantees individuals the ability
to petition all levels of government and seek equality at all stages of
bureaucracy. 28 The Court explained that the initiative drew distinctions
between those problems that involve racial matters and those that did
not and reasoned that such differentiation impedes the path of minori-
ties seeking protection against unequal treatment. 29 Further, the initia-
tive restructured Washington's political process by removing the
authority of local school boards to enact programs to desegregate
schools and placing this power at the hands of a different governmen-
tal body—the state-wide electorate." The Court concluded that the
political restructuring created a racial classification in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 '
In 1982, in Crawford v. Board of Education, the United States
Supreme Court held that Proposition 1, an amendment to the Califor-
nia State Constitution, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection.32 Proposition 1 prohibited state courts
27 See U.S. Corrs-r. amend. XIV, § 1; WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010; Seattle, 458 U.S. at
467-70.
21' See U.S. CoNsT, amend. XIV, § I; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 468.
29 See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 468, 480.
3° See id. at 466.
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 486-87; see also Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969). The Seattle Court relied on the reasoning from Hunter in reaching its
decision. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. In Hunter, the United States Supreme Court struck down
an amendment to the Charter of the City of Akron, holding that the amendment constituted a
material and odious denial of equal protection of the laws, See id. at 393. The amendment in
question, section 137 of the Akron City Charter, required that any ordinance (including any
currently in effect) dealing with racial, religious or ancestral discrimination in housing be
approved by a majority of the voters of Akron. See id. at 387. Prior to the amendment's enactment,
any ordinance became effective 30 days subsequent to approval by the City Council. See id. at
390. The Hunter Court stated that not only did section 137 suspend operation of the existing
1964 ordinance, but it also required voter approval before any future ordinance relating to racial,
religious or ancestral discrimination could take effect. See id. at 389-90. The amendment disad-
vantaged those who would benefit from such laws and placed a special burden on minorities
seeking their protection. See id. The. Court reasoned that this constituted an explicit racial
classification because it treated ethnic housing matters differently from other racial and housing
concerns. See id. at 390, 392. The Court held that the amendment was therefore subject to the
most rigid scrutiny, which was an early form of strict scrutiny. See id. Compare Hunter, 393 U.S.
at 392, with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. The Court found that the City's justification was not
compelling and held that section 137 was discriminatory towards minorities and amounted to a
denial of equal protection. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392-93.
32 458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. Coxsz. art. I, § 7(a)
(1983). The proposition provided, in relevant part:
A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein
or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the Slate of California or any public
entity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil
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from ordering mandatory pupil reassignments or transportation, ex-
cept to remedy violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Minority students alleged that the proposition
created a racial classification and imposed a burden on minorities
seeking to exercise specific state-created rights." They argued that the
Amendment limited the power of state courts to enforce state-created
rights to desegregate schools, although other. state-created rights could
be addressed by the state courts without limitation. 35 The Supreme
Court, distinguishing between state action that discriminates on the
basis of race and action that addresses race-related matters, reasoned
that Proposition 1 did not operate to embody a racial classification."
The Court implied that a mere repeal or modification of desegregation
laws does not burden minority rights to the extent of being a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause." Finally, the Court discounted the
petitioners' argument that Proposition 1 was enacted with discrimina-
tory intent, pointing out that the purposes of the initiative were clear
in the text and that the state electorate, which is composed of all races,
approved the initiative." Finding that Proposition 1 was not discrimi-
natory on its face and that the state did not intend it to apply in a
discriminatory fashion, the Supreme Court held that the proposition
was not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5°
In 1996,  in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that Amendment 2 of Colorado's Constitution, a provision
which permitted discrimination based on sexual orientation, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 4° Prior to the enactment of Amendment
2, Colorado law included ordinances affording protection to persons
transportation. In enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Consti-
tution, no court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of
pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific
violation . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal
decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy
the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution , . .
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
33 See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 532.
54 See id. at 536.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 537-38.
37 See U.S. CoNs-r. amend. XIV, § 1; Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539.
38 See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 543-45.
39 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7(a); Crawford, 458 U.S. at 542, 545.
"116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1180, 1187 (1992); see U.S. Corm..
amend. XIV, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 30b.
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discriminated against because of their sexual orientation.'" Amend-
ment 2 rescinded these provisions and further prohibited "all legisla-
tive, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local govern-
ment designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as
homosexual persons or gays and lesbians." 42 Plaintiffs, who included
aggrieved homosexuals and municipalities, contended that the amend-
ment subjected homosexuals to immediate and substantial risk of dis-
crimination based on their sexual orientation."
In Romer, the Court reasoned that the amendment isolated homo-
sexuals from protection against discrimination afforded others and
offered no means to reinstate those policies or laws." The Court noted
that the amendment denied homosexuals the usual political safe-
guards, which they could employ only by enlisting the citizenry of
Colorado to pass laws or amend the state constitution. 45 The Supreme
Court found Amendment 2 bore no rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental interest." The Supreme Court thus held that Colo-
rado Amendment 2 was in violation of the equal protection principles
of the Fourteenth Amendment." •
During the Survey year, in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,
a unanimous three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 209, a California
voter initiative, which provides in relevant part that, "[t] he state shall
not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any indi-
vidual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or
public contracting."48
 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because a denial
of equal protection requires, at the least, a classification that treats
individuals unequally, Proposition 209, a state law that prohibits clas-
sifications based on race or gender, did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 The court found that the
41 See Ranter, 116 S. Ct. at 1623, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1183.
42 COLO. CONST. art. U, § 30b; see Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1183.
46 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1183.
44 See id. at 1625, 70 Fair Enapl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1184.
46 See id. at 1627, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1185-86.
46 See id. at 1628-29, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1187.
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1187.
48 CAL. CONST. an  I, § 51(a); Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
834.
49 See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1445-46, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 831-33.
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initiative was constitutional on its face and did not reorder the political
process to burden women or minorities. 50 The court also held that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not preempt Proposition 209. 5 '
One day following the adoption of Proposition 209, several indi-
viduals and groups, calling themselves the Coalition for Economic
Equity ("Coalition" or "plaintiffs"), claiming to represent the interests
of minorities and women, filed a complaint in the Northern District
of California against several officials and political subdivisions of the
State of California. 52 The Coalition brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that Proposition 209 denied both women and racial
minorities equal protection of the laws." It further alleged that Titles
VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educa-
tional Amendments of 1972 preempted the Proposition. 54 The Coali-
5° See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1440, 1446, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 827-28, 832-33.
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (1994); Wilson, 110 F.Sd at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (DNA)
at 834, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
52 See Wilson, 110 F.Sd at 1435, 73 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 823. The Coalition included
civil rights organizations in California and across the country, such as the NAACP, the California
Labor Federation and the Women Construction Business Owners and Executives. See id. at 1431,
73 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 822. Defendants included Pete Wilson, Governor of California;
Daniel Lundgren, Attorney General for the State of California; Joanne Corday Kozberg, Secretary
of State and Consumer Services Agency; and James Gomez, Director, Department of Corrections.
See id.
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979); Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1435, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at
823. The statute states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
54 See infra note 51; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000.d; 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1435, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 823. Tide VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 states, "irdo person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000-d. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 provides, in relevant part, "Endo
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from, participation in, be denied
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don challenged Proposition 209 only to the extent that it prohibited
governmental agencies from offering preferential treatment to women
and minorities." With its complaint, the Coalition filed an application
for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, which
the district court granted. 56 A defendant/intervenor, Californians
Against Discrimination and Preference, together with the state, then
applied to the district court for a stay of the preliminary injunction
pending appeal." The Ninth Circuit, instead of addressing the stay,
reached the merits of the case and handed down a decision."
In reviewing the district court's issuance of a temporary restrain-
ing order and preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit used "conven-
tional" equal protection analysis to determine whether Proposition 209
was invalid on its face. 59 Reasoning from Adarand, the court stated that
the first step in deciding whether a law violates the Equal Protection
Clause is to identify the classification it draws.6° Finding that Proposi-
tion 209 actually prohibited the state from classifying individuals by race
or gender, the court held that as a matter of law, Proposition 209 did
not violate the Constitution on its face. 61
Next, the court turned to the constitutionality of Proposition 209
as a matter of "political structure," addressing the Coalition's argument
that the initiative imposed an unequal burden on women and minori-
ties by denying them the right to seek preferential treatment from the
lowest levels of government. 62 Distinguishing Seattle, the Ninth Circuit
held that Proposition 209 did not reallocate political authority in a
discriminatory manner, stating that the initiative instead addressed
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ...." 20 U.S.C. § 1.681(a). 	 •
55 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1435, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 824. The Coalition sought
as relief a permanent injunction enjoining the state from implementing and enforcing Proposi-
tion 209 and a declaratory judgment that the proposition was unconstitutional. See id, 73 Fair
Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 823,
56 See id.
57 See id. at 1936, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 824.
58 See id. Before reaching the merits of the case, the court analyzed whether this conflict was
necessary following Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1072 (1997). See
Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1436-37, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 825. In Arizonans, the Supreme
Court warned against "premature adjudication of constitutional questions . when a federal
court is asked to invalidate a State's law." See 117 S. CL at 1074. The Ninth Circuit found, based
upon the district court's findings and the factual basis of the case, that the conflict really was
necessary. See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1438, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 826.
58 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1439-40, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 826-28.
60 See id, at 1440, 73 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 827; see also Adarand, 515 U.S at 214,
67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1834.
61 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1440, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) al 827-28.
62 See 14.• 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 828.
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race and gender-related matters in a neutral fashion.° The court rea-
soned that even though Proposition 209 restructured the political
process in that laws on preferential treatment must be addressed by
state amendment, Proposition 209 must burden an individual's right
to equal treatment to be held invalid under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Proposition 209, the court explained, not only failed to burden
the right to equal treatment, but also created an impediment to receiv-
ing preferential treatment, a burden the Constitution itself imposes. 65
Comparing this case to Crawford, the court implied that Proposi-
tion 209 involved the repeal of race-related legislation and policies not
required by the Constitution in the first place.° The court reasoned
that this type of action did not offend the Equal Protection Clause
because the removal of antidiscrimination laws has never been viewed
as creating an apparently invalid racial classification. 67 Seattle and
Romer, on the other hand, both involved situations where the state was
singling out race and gender preferences for unique political bur-
dens.° In each of these cases, the court stated, the majority was placing
political obstructions in the path of minorities aiming to acquire pro-
tection against unequal treatment.° In Wilson, the court reasoned it
was irrational to apply "political structure" equal protection principles
where the group claiming to face those obstacles constituted a majority
of the electorate, implying that it was nonsensical to believe a majority
would vote to impose burdens upon itself. 7°
Finally, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Proposi-
tion 209 was invalid under the Supremacy Clause because Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 preempted it." Acknowledging that federal
65 See id. at 1444, 73 Fair Erupt. Prac. Cas, (ANA) at 830-31; see also Seattle, 458 U.S. at 479-80;
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
64 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1445, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 832,
65 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1445, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA)
at 832.
" See U.S. Garin. amend. XIV, § 1; Wilson, 110 F.34 at 1443, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 830; see also Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538.
67 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1443, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 830.
6H See id, at 1441, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 829; see also Remo; 116 S. Ct, at 1620;
Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467.
66 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1441, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 829; see also Rosner, 116 S.
Ct. at 1620; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467.
70 See 110 F.3d at 1441, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 829.
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1446-48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
833-34. The district court found that neither Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 nor Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 preempted Proposition 209 under the Supremacy Clause.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-d; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1446, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 833. Plaintiffs did not contend otherwise on appeal and therefore the Ninth Circuit
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law may preempt state law to the extent that state law stands as an
impediment to the goals and objectives of Congress, the court pointed
to sections 708 and 1104 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as controlling
in this situation." Both of those provisions, the court noted, specify
that state action is preempted only if the law at issue actually conflicts
with federal law." Finding that Proposition 209 was in no way incon-
sistent with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the court held that Title VII did
not preempt Proposition 209. 74
Subsequent to the three-judge panel outcome in Wilson, the Coa-
lition appealed to the full United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which refused to overturn the panel's decision." The Coalition
then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of Wilson, which was
recently rejected." The Court's decision to deny certiorari effectively
validates the enforceability of Proposition 209, while at the same time
leaving many unanswered questions as to affirmative action programs."
In cases subsequent to Wilson, interested parties attempted to
address some of those unresolved issues." The decision in Monterey
Mechanical Co. v. Wilson began to implement the goals of Proposition
209 while the measure's future was still uncertain." Monterey Mechani-
only addressed the issue of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Wilson, 110 F.52:1 at 1446,
73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 833.
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7; 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1447, 73 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 833-34. Section 708 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. Section 1104 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent
On the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the
exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this
Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 200012-4.
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7; 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1447, 73 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 833.
74 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1447-48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
833-34.
75 See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 718, 719, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec.
1 44,935 (9th Cir,), cerl denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997) [hereinafter Wilson II). •
"See 118 S. Ct. at 397.
77 See Id.; see also Richard Carelli, Prop. 209 Survives Justices' Scrutiny, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
4, 1997, at Al.
78 See Monterey Mechanical v, Wilson, No. 96-16729, 1997 WL 538757, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept.
3, 1997).
72 See id. at *1, *14; see also Lesher, supra note 7, at Al.
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cal stemmed from the issue of a contractor whose low bid on a state
university construction project was rejected because he had not actively
sought to share the job with minority and female subcontractors, as
encouraged by the California Public Contract Code. 8° The same three-
judge panel that decided Wilson found the contracting law unconsti-
tutional, reasoning that it violated the Equal Protection Clauses' Al-
though this ruling impacts only state government contracts, it is
conceivable that this action will spur other challenges to similar provi-
sions in local government laws across California and within other states
under the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction. 82
California was the first state to abolish affirmative action by law,
but the concept is not likely to remain isolated on the west coast." Two
recent cases, Hopwood v. Texas and Taxman v. Piscataway Township
Board of Education, signify a nearing end to public affirmative action
programs within the Fifth and Third Circuits.'" On the legislative front,
more than two dozen states are moving to follow California's example
8° See CAL. Pun. CONT. CODE §§ 10115(c), 10115.2 (1988); Monterey Mechanical, 1997 WL
538757, at *1-2. The statute in question of the California Public Contract Code requires that
bidders on public works projects put forth effort to share 15% of their contract dollar value with
minority-owned businesses, 5% with female-owned companies and 3% with disabled veteran
subcontractors. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10115(c).
81 See. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Monterey Mechanica4 1997 WL 538757, at *1, *14; Wilson,
110 F.Sd at 1434, 73 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 823.
52 See Monterey Mechanical, 1997 WL 538757, at *14; see also Lesher, supra note 7.
83 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 834; Taxman v. Piscataway
Township Bd. of Ed., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550, 1567, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 848, 850, 864 (3d
Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934, 962 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
84 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550, 1567, 71 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 850, 864; Hopwood,
78 F.3d at 934, 962, In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit declared a University of Texas School of Law
program designed to produce a diverse student body unconstitutional on the grounds that it
deprived whites of equal protection. See 78 F.3(1 at 934-35, 957, 962. Holding the law school to
strict scrutiny, the court found that the school had not presented a compelling justification for
their admissions practices. See id, at 934, 940. The court further stated that recent Supreme Court
decisions indicated that diversity interests will not satisfy strict scrutiny. See id. at 944. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari of the Hopwood case, solidifying it as law in the three states under the
Fifth Circuit, See Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2581, 2581. (1996) [hereinafter Hopwood II]. In
Taxman, the Third Circuit found in favor of a white school teacher fired due to reductions in
teaching positions, See 91 F.Sd at 1550-52, 1567, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850-51, 864.
The school retained a minority teacher with identical seniority and evaluations instead of the
white teacher, pursuant to a school board policy of promoting diversity in its teaching staff. See
id. at 1551-52, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 851-52. Taxman was scheduled to be heard by
the Supreme Court this session, but recently settled out of court. See Piscataway Township Bd. of
Educ. v. Taxman, 118 S. CL 595, 595 (1997) [hereinafter Taxman In. The settlement of $433,500
was funded in large part by the Black Leadership Forum, which feared an adverse ruling to
affirmative action was likely if the case reached the Supreme Court. See Jan Crawford Greenhurg,
Civil Rights Groups Pay Teacher to Avoid Court; Coalition Feared Adverse Ruling By High Court
Would Damage Affirmative Action, Cm. Trun., Nov. 22, 1997, at
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of Proposition 209, and a federal bill is in the works as well." The
pending legislation and recent court decisions affect only state and
federal government action but suggest that affirmative action pro-
grams are on shaky ground in the private sector as well."
In California, implementing Proposition 209 has not been easy."
Certain cities and counties throughout the state refused to comply with
the measure's requirements until an appeal was heard." In response,
California Governor Pete Wilson called upon the state legislature to
repeal or amend some thirty state statutes identified as violating Propo-
sition 209 by granting race or gender preferences. 89 If state and local
legislatures fail to comply, each statute potentially in violation of Propo-
sition 209 must be declared unconstitutional by a court to be invali-
dated." Wilson has already challenged five such statutes in cases which
are presently pending in Sacramento Superior Court. 9 '
The continuing debate over the enforceability of Proposition 209
exemplifies the conflicting objectives that will be played out as meas-
ures like Proposition 209 surface across the nation. 92 Proponents of
Proposition 209 are apt to use the momentum from the Wilson, Hop-
wood and Taxman decisions to expand anti-affirmative action measures
throughout the United States." Wilson and related cases are significant
in that they are signaling an emerging change in attitudes towards
preferential treatment programs." The final outcome of Taxman sug-
gests that parties on both sides of the affirmative action battle recog-
35 See H.R. 1909, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 950, 105th Cong. (1997); James J. Kilpatrick, Another
Blow to Racial Preferences, SAN DIEGO Urnorg-TRia., Sept. 4, 1997, at BM. House Bill No. 1909
and its Senate counterpart, Senate Bill No. 950, would prohibit preferences based on race or
gender in federal government hiring and contracting. See H.R. 1909, 105th Cong.; S. 950, 105th
Cong.
86 See H.R. 1909, 105th Cong.; S. 950, 105th Cong.; see also Kilpatrick, supra note 85. Kilpatrick
noted that the "whole wobbly structure of preferential treatment now approaches collapse." Id.
82 See Ed Mendel, Prop. 209 . Becomes State Law; Agencies That Don't Comply with Ban on
Preferences Targeted, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB, Aug. 29, 1997, at Al. Mendel, referring to comments
by Ward Connerly, noted that "some local governments arc bent on 'sabotage' and do not intend
to comply with the new law." Id. Ward Connerly led the campaign for Proposition 209. See id.
33 See id.
33 See Dave Lesher, Wilson Urges Legislature to Act on Prop. 209, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept.
10, 1997, at Al.
3° See Mendel, supra note 87.
31 See Lesher, supra note 89.
92 See Wilson, 110 F.Sd at 1434, 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 823, 834; see also
Kilpatrick, supra note 85.
93 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 834; Taxman, 91 F.3d at
1550, 1567, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 850, 864; Hopwood, 78 F.Sd at 934, 962.
34 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-39, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1843-44; Crawford, 458
U.S. at 542-45; Wilson, 110 F.Sd at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 834; see also Mendel,
supra note 87.
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nize that such programs are losing footing in the public sector." The
effect is also certain to be felt in the private sector as well, stimulating
lawsuits aimed at non-governmental affirmative action programs."
Whatever an employer's outlook on affirmative action in the work-
place, he or she should be aware that preferential treatment could
likely be challenged as unconstitutional in• the near future."
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit in Wilson upheld the validity of
a state constitutional amendment eliminating racial and gender pref-
erences in public employment, education and contracting." The court
reasoned that Proposition 209 was not unconstitutional on its face nor
did it create discriminatory barriers to the political process." The court
also found that Proposition 209 was not in violation of Title VII, as
Title VII did not preempt the initiative. 100 Wilson was denied certiorari
by the Supreme Court, thereby solidifying Proposition 209 as law in
California.m Practitioners should be on notice that a significant
change in the legality of affirmative action programs is in progress. 102
Employers may soon be unable to use race and gender as criteria for
hiring and other workplace decisions.'" Although Wilson did not set
national precedent, the Supreme Court is certain to rule on the issue
of affirmative action before long. 164 The settlement in Taxman, cases
like Wilson and Hopwood and the conservative nature of the Court
towards preferential treatment programs suggest that such a case could
likely result in a fatal blow to affirmative action, stifling preferential
treatment programs across the nation."
93 See Greenburg, supra note 84.
98 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 834; Taxman, 91 F.3d at
1550, 71 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850; Hopwood, 78 E3d at 934, 962; see also Employment
Discrimination--Race: Supreme Court Ruling Could Render Moot Debate Over Affirmative Action,
ABA Told, supra note 6.
97 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 834; Taxman, 91 F.3d at
1550, 1567, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 850, 864; Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934, 962.
98 See CAL. CONST. art, I, § 31(a); Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA)
at 834.
99 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1440, 1446, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(DNA) at 827-28, 832-33.
LOU See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; CAL, CONST. art. I, § 31(a); Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empi.
Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 834.
1 ° 1 See 118 S. Ct. at 397.
192 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empi, Prac, Cas. (BNA) at 834; Taxman, 91 F.3d at
1550, 1567, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 850, 864; Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934, 962.
105 See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1448, 73 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 834; Taxman, 91 F.3d at
1550, 1567, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 850, 864; Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934, 962.
104 See David G. Savage, New Legal Test of Affirmative Action Arrives, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov.
26, 1997, at A:1.
193 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-39, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1843-44; Wilson, 110
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VI. MASSACHUSETTS DEVELOPMENTS
A.*Public Policy Exception to At-Will Employment Rule Extended to
Internal Complaints About Criminal Violations Smith v. Mitre Corp.
and Shea v. Emmanuel CoHegel
In Massachusetts, employment contracts are deemed to be at-will
unless there is a contractual provision stating otherwise.' An employee
at-will may be terminated at any time and for any reason or for no
reason at all.' Massachusetts courts recognize an exception to this
general rule when an employee is terminated contrary to a well-
defined public policy.' Recent decisions have expanded the tradition-
ally narrow public policy exception to protect employees terminated
for complaining internally about criminal matters.'
In 1989, in Smith-Pfeffer v. Fernald State School, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts held that the public policy exception to
the at-will employment rule does not include employees terminated
without just cause simply because they perform appropriate, socially
desirable duties.' In Smith
-Pfeffer, an at-will employee of a state school
for the mentally retarded brought an action against the school's super-
intendent after he allegedly fired her for criticizing his administrative
abilities and reorganization plan.? The plaintiff claimed that the dis-
charge violated public policy because her job was socially important.'
The court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning
that to extend the public policy exception in the plaintiff's case would
convert the general rule that an at-will employee can be terminated at
any time for any reason or for no reason at all into a rule that requires
F.3d at 1148, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 850; Hopwood, 78 FM at 934, 962; see also
Greenburg, supra note 84.
* By Marybeth Walsh, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I Smith, 949 F. Supp. 943, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)1 44,506, 87,838 (D. Mass. 1997); Shea,
682 N.E.2d 1348, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 308 (Mass, 1997).
2
 See Richard L. Alfred & Ben T. Clements, The. Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Employ-
ment Rule, 78 MASS. L. REV. 88, 88 (1993).
See, eg„ Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 948, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec, (CCH) 1 87,838.
4 See id. Another exception to the at-will rule is discharge resulting from an employer's
overreaching for its own financial advantage. SeeJohn Allen Doran & David L. Abney, An Overview
of Massachusetts Law on Wrongful Termination of Al-Will Employment, 77 MASS. L. Rev. 83, 85
(1992). This occurs when the employer discharges an employee and retains benefits, commissions
or other income that the employee has already earned. See id,
5 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 951-52, 66 awl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,841; Shea, 682 N.E.2d
at 1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 309.
6
 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1371, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) 289, 291 (Mass. 1989).
7
 See id at 1570, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 291.
8 See id. at 1371, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 291.
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just cause to terminate.9 The court noted that the public policy excep-
tion is available when an at-will employee is terminated for asserting a
legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing a workers' compensation claim),
for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury) or for refusing
to do what the law forbids (e.g., committing perjury).° The court
noted, however, that employers have an interest in running their busi-
nesses as they see fit and that the public has an interest in discouraging
dissatisfied employees from filing frivolous lawsuits." Therefore, the
court reasoned that the administration and organization of the school
was a matter of opinion and internal policy and could not be the basis
of a public policy exception to the at-will rule." The court further
reasoned that even employees in socially important occupations may
not seek legal redress for termination stemming from disagreement
with their employer's policy decisions!' Thus, the court held that the
public policy exception should not extend to employees terminated
without just cause simply because they perform socially desirable acts."
In 1991, in Flesner a Technical Communications Corp., the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that an employee who cooperates
with a government investigation, even if not legally required to do so,
is protected by the public policy exception to the general at-will rule.''
In Flesner, an employee claimed that he was constructively discharged
in retaliation for cooperating with a United States Customs Service
investigation of his employer!G The court noted that the public policy
of the Commonwealth encourages cooperation with ongoing criminal
investigations." The court reasoned that allowing an employer to ter-
minate an employee for such cooperation would seriously impair the
government's ability to conduct investigations!" Thus, the court found
See id.
10 See id.
" See Smith-Pfeffer, 533 N.E.2d at 1371, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (BNA) at 291.
12 See id. at 1371-72, 4 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 291.
13 See id, at 1372, 4 bath!. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 291.
14 See id. The court also noted that the question of whether there is a public policy violation
is a question of law for the judge. See id., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 292.
15 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1111, 6 Indiv. Einpl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1530, 1533 (Mass. 1991).
16 See id. at 1109, 6 Indiv. Dupl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1531. Customs officials detained the
employee after he attempted to take his employer's merchandise out of the country without the
requisite export license. See id. The employer had assured the employee that no license was
necessary. See id. at 1108, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1531. The customs officials told
the employee that they would handcuff and arrest him if he did not cooperate. See id. at 1109,
6 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1531.
17 See id. at 1110, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1533. The court cited state statutes that
grant immunity to witnesses and reimburse them for their travel costs. See id.
18 See id. at 1111, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1533.
492	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:365
that the three bases for the public policy exception outlined in Smith-
Pfeffershould be expanded in certain circumstances to include employ-
ees terminated for performing important public deeds, even though
the deeds may not be legally required. 19 Accordingly, the court held
that the employee's cooperation with the governmental investigation
was an important public deed which justified an exception to the
general at-will rule."
In 1994, in King v. Driscoll, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held that firing an employee in retaliation for exercising his
statutory right to file a shareholder's derivative suit did not justify an
exception to the general at-will rule." In King, the employer, a closely
held corporation, fired the employee, a vice president and shareholder
of the corporation, after his concern over the buy back of a retiring
executive's stock motivated him to participate in a shareholder's de-
rivative suit. 22 The court reasoned that the mere existence of a statute
relating to derivative suits did not by itself pronounce a public policy
that would give rise to an exception to the at-will rule." The court
noted that the administration of the stock buy back program was an
internal company matter." Therefore, the court reasoned that the
effect on the public due to the administration of the program was too
remote to justify an exception to the at-will rule. 25 Thus, the court held
that the public policy exception did not prevent the employer from
firing the employee for participating in the derivative suit. 26
In 1994, in Hutson v. Analytic Sciences Corp., the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that a Massachu-
setts court would recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge
based on public policy for an employee terminated for complaining
internally about fraudulent claims and practices that violated federal
law." In Hutson, a defense contractor allegedly terminated an em-
19 See id.; supra note 10 and accompanying text. The court noted that whistleblowing may
fall into this category. See Flesner, 575 N.E.2d at 1111 n.3, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at
153311.3.
20 see Fiesner
,  575 N.E.2d at 1111, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 1533.
21 638 N.E.2d 488, 492-93, 150 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1  57,895, 86,360 (Mass. 1994).
22 See id. at 490-91, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11 86,358-59.
23 See id. at 493-94, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 86,361.
24 See id. at 492, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 86,360.
23 See id. at 493, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 86,361.
26 See King, 638 N.E.2d at 492-93, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 86,360.
27 860 F. Supp. 6, 12-13, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 57,770, 85,793 (D. Mass. 1994), The court's
decision in Hutson to extend protection to employees who complain internally is consistent with
other jurisdictions. For example, in 1982, in Petrik u. Monarch Printing Corp., the Appellate Court
of Illinois held that an employee stated a complaint for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy even though he never complained outside the organization. 444 N.E.2d 588, 592-93, 115
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ployee who complained internally about the company's failure to com-
ply with the terms of one of its contracts to develop technology. 28 The
court first concluded that a Massachusetts court would consider federal
law a source of well-defined public policy sufficient to support an
exception to the at-will rule. 29 The court then reasoned that nearly
identical federal and state statutes exist prohibiting fraud against the
government." The court considered both statutes and concluded that,
by criminalizing fraud against the government, the statutes expressed
a similar public policy against such conduct. 3 ' Thus, citing the Supreme
Judicial Court's reasoning in Flesner, the district court held that a
Massachusetts court would recognize internal whistleblowing on fraud
against the federal government as an important public deed justifying
an exception to the general at-will rule."
During the Survey year, in Smith v. Mitre Corp., the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts affirmed its analysis in
Hutson, and held that whistleblowing on fraud and false claims by a
government contractor is sufficiently important to state a claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy." The employee in
Smith claimed that she was discharged for informing her employer of
fraud and the misuse of funds derived from government contracts. 34
The court concluded that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
would apply the public policy exception to protect an employee termi-
nated for complaining internally about fraud and false claims by a
government contractor. 35
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4520, 4523-24 (III. App. Ct. 1982). The court reasoned that the employee's
complaint was not merely an internal dispute between an employee and his employer and that
a public policy favoring enforcement of the criminal code supported the employee's conduct. See
id.
23 See Hutson, 860 F. Supp. at 10, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 85,791.
29 See id. In support of its conclusion, the court cited case law from other jurisdictions and
noted the lack of contrary authority. See id.
3° See id. at 10-11, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 85,792.
31 See id. at 11, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 85,792.
32 See id. at 10, 11, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 111 85,791, 85,792. This decision is consistent with
Tighe it Career Systems Development Corp., 915 F. Supp. 476, 485, 131 Lab. Cas. ¶ 58,099, 87,265
(D. Mass. 1996). In Tighe, the court concluded that federal statutes encouraging persons to report
fraud formed the basis of a public policy exception to the general at-will rule. See id. The court
in Hutson also held that a Massachusetts court would recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy for the plaintiffs claims that he was terminated for
revealing alleged violations of government procurement laws and laws protecting information
related to national defense. See Hutson, 860 F. Supp. at 11-13, 129 Lab. Cas. (CC1-1)11 85,792-93.
53 949 F. Supp. 943, 951-52, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 44,506, 87,841 (D. Mass. 1997).
34 See id. at 948, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,838.
55 See id. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,839.
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In Smith, the plaintiff, Patricia G. Smith ("Smith"), was an em-
ployee of the defendant, Mitre Corporation ("Mitre"), a nonprofit
corporation and government contractor funded _mainly through gov-
ernment grants. 36 Smith conducted internal audits. 37 She also served
as company ombudsperson for complaints about the misuse of govern-
ment funds and as compliance officer for their proper use. 38 Smith in-
vestigated and complained to Mitre executives about several instances
of fraud and false statements by Mitre employees and management in
connection with Mitre's spending of money derived from government
contracts." She insisted that Mitre comply with the federal law prohib-
iting such activities. 40
Smith alleged that Mitre responded to her complaints by taking
adverse employment actions against her." She contended that Mitre
demoted her, and that her superiors denied her sufficient work and
falsely characterized her work performance. 42 Although Mitre claimed
that Smith was to be terminated as part of a "lay-off action," she alleged
that Mitre terminated her in retaliation for making internal com-
plaints, or for being a potential "whistleblower. 93
The court concluded that the Supreme judicial Court would con-
sider whistleblowing an activity worth protecting by the public policy
exception to the at-will rule." The court reasoned that the Supreme
judicial Court would rely on its conclusion in Flesner that, in certain
circumstances, the public policy exception should extend to important
public deeds, even though the deeds are not legally required. 45 The
56 See id. at 998, 951 n.3, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 87,838, 87,840 n.3.
57 See id. at 952, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,841.
58 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 952, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,841.
56 See id. at 948, 952, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 87,838, 87,891.
" See id. at 949-50, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,839.
41 See id. at 952, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,842.
42
 See id.
45
 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 945, 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 87,835, 87,839. Smith's
claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was one of three new claims she
sought to add to her original complaint. See id. at 945, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,835. The
other proposed amendments were a claim for termination in retaliation for her filing a discrimi-
nation claim under Massachusetts law and a claim for termination in retaliation for her filing a
claim under federal law. See id. In her original complaint, Smith claimed Mitre demoted her and
otherwise discriminated against her because of her age and gender. See id. The court allowed all
three amendments. See id. at 953, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,842. The court concluded
that prejudice from delay in trial and reopening of discovery was insufficient to deny the motion.
See id. With respect to the retaliation claims, the court noted that, under Massachusetts law, Smith
would not be required to exhaust the administrative remedies before bringing a claim arising out
of an earlier filed charge. See id. at 998, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,838.
44 See id. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,839.
45 See a
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court observed that, in Flesner, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that
whistleblowing may fall into the category of important public deeds
worthy of such protection."
The court also concluded that, in a case like Smith, an employee
would not be required to complain outside the organization to be
protected under the public policy exception for whistleblowers. 47 Cit-
ing the Flesner court, the court held that an employee need not com-
plain outside the company, provided that the employee can establish
that he or she was terminated for making internal complaints about
the alleged fraud and false claims." The court also cited Hutson, where
it also appeared that the employee did not complain outside the
organization and still was protected by the public policy exception. 49
Thus, the court held that some whistleblowers, even those who only
complain internally, can qualify for the public policy exception. 5°
The court found that the whistleblower in Sinith fell within the
exception.5 ' The court noted the Supreme Judicial Court's concern in
King, that the public policy exception be limited to cases of sufficient
social import to prevent the general rule from being converted into a
rule requiring just cause to terminate an employee at-will. 52 The court
observed, however, that Mitre is a corporation funded mainly through
taxpayer dollars, and thus, Smith could be distinguished from King,
where the Supreme Judicial Court found the public effect of a private
corporation's stock buy back program too remote to justify the excep-
tion." Furthermore, the court noted that Mitre's government contracts
subjected the company to claims under the federal Fraud and False
Claims Act. 54 Finally, the court reasoned that the situation was factually
very similar to Hutson, where the court found that whistleblowing on
fraud in federal government contracts deserved the protection of the
public policy exception." Thus, the court held that the public policy
46 See id.
47 See id. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840.
45 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840.
49 See id. at 951, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840.
56 See id. at 951-52, 66 Empl, Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,841.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 949, 951, 66 Et/1p1. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 87,889, 87,840.
55 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 951 n.3, 66 Einpl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 87,840 n.3.
54 See id.
66 See id. at 951, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 87,841; see also Hutson v. Analytic Sciences
Corp., 860 F. Supp. 6, 11, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 57,770, 85,792 (D. Mass. 1994). The court also
cited its holding in Tighe to support its conclusion. See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 951, 66 Empl. Prim.
Dec. (CCH) 1 87,841; see also Tighe v. Career Sys. Des% Corp., 9l5 F. Supp. 476, 485, 131 Lib.
Cas. 1 58,099, 87,265 (D. Mass. 1996) (federal statutes encouraging persons to report fraud
formêd the basis of a public policy exception to the general at-will rule).
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exception should protect an employee terminated for complaining
internally about fraud and false claims by a government contractor. 56
Subsequently, in 1997, in Shea v. Emmanuel College, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted the district court's reasoning
in Smith, and held that an employee discharged for reporting criminal
activity to her employer is protected by the public policy exception. 57
In Shea, the employer, a private college, allegedly discharged the em-
ployee for reporting to the college's administration the apparent theft
of funds from the office in which she worked. 58 The Supreme Judicial
Court stated that the district court in Smith correctly decided that the
public policy exception does not require employees to complain about
alleged criminal violations outside their employer's organization.° The
court reasoned that it would be illogical to protect employees who
report criminal conduct to public authorities but deny protection to
employees who report such conduct to their superiors. 60 Therefore, the
court extended the public policy exception to employees who com-
plain internally about criminal conduct.°
Smith and Shea are significant because they open the door for
more wrongful discharge claims based on public policy in Massachu-
setts. 62 By holding that an internal complaint may be sufficient to justify
protection under the public policy exception, the courts did not re-
quire an employee to contact public authorities to be protected. 63
Thus, the courts lowered the threshold for bringing a wrongful dis-
charge claim based on a violation of public policy.°
Extending protection to employees who complain internally about
criminal violations continues the trend in Massachusetts courts to
broaden the public policy exception.° Although the court in Smith-
Pfeffer expressed concern about converting the general at-will rule into
a rule requiring just cause to terminate, subsequent decisions ex-
panded the breadth of the public policy exception.° Beginning with
56 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,839. •
57 682 N.E.2d 1348, 1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 308, 309 (Mass. 1997).
58 See id. at 1349, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 308-09.
" See id. at 1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 309.
50 See id.
01
 See id.
62 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840; Shea, 682 N.E.2d at
1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 309.
65 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840; Shea, 682 N.E.2d at
1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 309.
65 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Empi. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 1 87,840; Shea, 682 N.E.2d
at 1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 309.
65 See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840.
"See Smith-Pfeffer, 533 N.E.2d at 1371, 4 Indiv. Empi. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 291; see also
Flesner, 575 N.E.2d at 1111, 6 Ina,. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 1533.
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Flesner, the court recognized protection for cooperating with a criminal
investigation, even though such cooperation may not be required
legally.° Then, in Smith, the district court held that internal complaints
can justify protection under the public policy exception when they
constitute whistleblowing on fraud against the federal government.°
The Supreme Judicial Court's adoption of Smith in Shea confirmed that
Massachusetts courts will protect employees who complain, either in-
ternally or externally, about criminal violations.'
Extending protection to employees who complain internally about
criminal violations supports the public policy against criminal activity
and thus serves the purpose of the public policy exception." Smith and
Shea will encourage more employees to report criminal activity because
they will no longer be forced to expose their employers to, and involve
themselves in, criminal investigations before being eligible for protec-
tion. 7 ' Furthermore, these decisions fill a logical gap in the public
policy exception." Prior to Smith and Shea, there was no explicit pro-
tection for an employee fired after making an internal complaint about
criminal activity but before reporting the activity to the authorities."
Now, as the court discussed in Shea, the public policy exception pro-
tects employees fired for bringing criminal activity to the attention of
their employers. 74
Any broadening of the public policy exception to the at-will rule,
however, necessarily limits an employer's discretion in making firing
decisions and exposes an employer to additional liability." As the court
noted in Smith-Pfeffer, employers have an interest in running their
businesses as they see fit, and the public has an interest in discouraging
dissatisfied employees from filing frivolous lawsuits." Thus, the courts
should limit protection for internal complaints to those about sus-
pected criminal conduct." Complaints about noncriminal conduct do
not have sufficient public effect to justify interfering with an em-
ployer's management of its business." Extending protection to internal
67 See 575 N.E.2d at 1111, 6 Indiv. Einpl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 1533.
68 See 949 F. Stipp. at 950, 66 Einpl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840.
69 See Shea, 682 N.E.2d at 1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas, (13NA) at 309.
" See Hutson, 860 F. Supp. at 11, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 85,792.
71
 See Smith, 949 F. Stipp. at 950, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840; Shea, 682 N.E.2d at
1350, 13 Indio. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 309.
72 See Shea, 682 N.E.2d at 1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 309.
" See Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Etnpl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840; Shea, 682 N.E.2d at
1350, 13 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 309.
74 See 682 N.E.2d at 1350, 13 Indiv, Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 309.
75 See Smith
-Pfeffer, 533 N.E.2d at 1371, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (DNA) at 291.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See King, 638 N.E.2d at 493, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 86,361.
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complaints about noncriminal matters would convert the general at-
will rule into a rule that requires just cause to terminate, a result the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disapproved of in Smith-Pfef:
fen79
Furthermore, the courts should only extend protection to employ-
ees whose internal complaints about suspected criminal conduct are
made in good faith.B° Because allegations of criminal wrongdoing can
seriously harm an employer's reputation and business operations, an
employer should not be forced to tolerate an employee who makes
baseless accusations against it." Thus, the public policy exception
should be limited to employees who make good faith complaints based
on actual knowledge."
In summary, Smith and Shea expanded logically the protection for
employees cooperating with criminal investigations to include employ-
ees who complain internally about criminal violations." By doing so,
the courts simultaneously broadened the traditionally narrow public
policy exception and diminished the discretion an employer enjoys
under the at-will rule . 84 These decisions were a needed clarification of
the public policy exception with respect to complaints about violations
of criminal law. The courts should be mindful, however, that further
expansion of the public policy exception could threaten the policy
supporting an employer's discretion that underlies the at-will rule.
B.*Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Actionable in Massachusetts Even if
Harasser Not Homosexual: Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co.'
The Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, chapter 151B of the
General Laws ("chapter 151B"), bars discrimination by an employer
because of an employee's sex and also expressly defines and prohibits
workplace sexual harassment .2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
a) See 533 N.E.2d at 1371, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 291.
8° See id.
21 See id.
82 See Id.
as
	 Smith, 949 F. Supp. at 950, 66 Empl, Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 87,840; Shea, 682 N.E.2d at
1350, 13 lndiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 309.
21
 See Smith-Pfeffer, 533 N.E.2d at 1371, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) at 291.
• By Rudy Perkins, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 676 N.E.2d 45, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 179 (Mass.
1997).
2 MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1(18), 4(1), 4(16A) (1996). Chapter 151B provides in part:
"It shall be an unlawful practice: 1. For an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the ...
sex of any individual to ... discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment . 	 ." Id. § 4(1). Chapter 15113 further provides:
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("Tide VII" or "Act") similarly prohibits unlawful discriminatory em-
ployment practices, including discrimination because of an employee's
sex, and the United States Supreme Court has made clear that a victim
of sexual harassment may state a 'claim for a violation of the Acts In
Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts held that sexual harassment prohibited under chapter 151B
may include same-sex sexual harassment, even where the harasser is
not homosexual.' The court held that any verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature that interferes unreasonably with an employee's
work performance by creating a humiliating or sexually offensive work
environment can be sexual harassment under chapter 151B. 5 The
federal circuits are split on the question of whether, and on what basis,
sexual harassment claims may be raised under Title VII when the
harasser and victim are both of the same sex.° The United States
Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the issue of whether Title VII
covers same-sex sexual harassment claims but has granted certiorari on
a leading case whose outcome depends on resolution of this question.''
The term "sexual harassment" shall mean sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (a) submission
to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of employment or as a basis for employment deci-
sions; (b) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance by creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment. Discrimination on
the basis of sex shall include, but not be limited to, sexual harassment.
Id. § 1(18). Chapter 15113 also provides: It shall be an unlawful practice ... [flor an employer,
personally or through its agents, to sexually harass any employee." Id. § 4(16A).
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994); see Meritor
Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,.477 U.S. 57, 66, 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1822, 1827 (1986);
see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 74, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1830 (Marshall, j., concurring).
Title VII provides, in part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1)
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
. ." 42 U,S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
4 676 N,E.2d 45, 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 179, 182 (Mass. 1997).
5 See id.
6 Compare Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 186, 189 (4th Cir. 1996) (same-sex sexual harassment claim may be actionable under Title
VII where harasser is homosexual), and Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378, 71 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 551, 556 (8th Cir. 1996) (implying same-sex sexual harassment claim may be
actionable under Title VII), with Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Scrvs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120, 70
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1996) (same-sex sexual harassment not action-
able under Title VII), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
7 See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1376 n,4, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 554 n.4; Oncale, 83 F.3d
at 120, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1305; see also Elizabeth Williams, Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII (42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.) of Civil Rights Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 307,
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In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank, TSB v. Vinson, the United States
Supreme Court held that sex discrimination in the form of sexual
harassment creating a hostile or abusive work environment may violate
Title VII.' The female plaintiff in Meritor claimed that her male super-
visor made repeated demands on her for sexual favors, to which she
agreed for fear of losing her job, leading to sexual intercourse between
them forty to fifty times over the course of four years. 9 The plaintiff
also alleged that her supervisor fondled her in front of other employ-
ees, exposed himself to her and forcibly raped her on several occa-
sions. 1 °
The Court rejected a narrow definition of sexual harassment as
violating Title VII only when the harassment involves economic dis-
crimination or loss." The Court first reasoned that the expansive
language of Title VII barring sex discrimination with respect to "terms,
conditions, or privileges" of employment indicated a congressional
intent to strike at all forms of disparate treatment of men and women,
not just economic discrimination.' 2 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
the administrative interpretation of Title VII by the enforcing agency,
the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
constituted a body of informed judgment to which courts could turn
for guidance.' 3 The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex prohibit sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination barred
under Title VII."
307 (1996) (federal courts sharply divided on applicability of Title VII to same-sex sexual harass-
ment).
The related, but different, issue of whether Title VII bars discrimination based on sexual
orientation does not bear directly on the Melnychenko decision, and so is not addressed here. See
676 N.E.2d at 46, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180. See generally Doe by Doe v. City of
Belleville, III., 119 F.3d 563, 592, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 625, 650 (7th Cir. 1997) (courts
widely agreed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is beyond purview of Title VII);
Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 190 (Title VII does not afford cause
of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation). Under Massachusetts law, that issue
has already been resolved by legislative action; the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute
explicitly bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, provided that orientation does
not involve minor children as the sex object See MASS, GEN. Laws ch. 151B § 4(1).
8 477 U.S. at 66, 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (I3NA) at 1827; see also id. at 74, 40 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1830 (Marshall, J., concurring).
9 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1824.
1 ° See id.
11 See id. at 64, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
12 See id. The Meritor court noted that the prohibition against sex discrimination was added
to Tide VII at the last minute and there is consequently little legislative history to guide us in
interpreting the statute's prohibition against discrimination based on sex. See id. at 63-64, 40 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1825-26.
13 See id. at 65, 90 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826.
14 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826 (quoting Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985) ("EEOC Guidelines")). The EEOC
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The Court also analogized from earlier cases involving racial,
religious or ethnic discrimination, in which courts had found violations
of Title VII where the working environment was so heavily polluted
with discrimination it destroyed the emotional and psychological sta-
bility of minority group workers. 15 The Court reasoned that Title VII
likewise should prohibit a hostile environment created by discrimina-
tory sexual harassment."' Thus, based on the broad language of the
statute, the administrative interpretation of the statute by the EEOC
and analogies to the discrimination in racially hostile environments,
the Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex, in the form of sexual harass-
ment, has created a hostile or abusive work environment. 17
In 1987, in College-Town, Division of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts, addressing the question for the first time, similarly held that
sexual harassment may constitute discrimination in violation of chap-
ter 151B of the Massachusetts General Laws. 18 The court also reasserted
its earlier holding that interpretation of chapter 151B was not bound
by federal decisions concerning Title VII.' 9 The male supervisor in
College-Town was accused of repeatedly making sexually offensive com-
ments to the female plaintiff he supervised, as well as touching and
sexually propositioning her. 2°
The court reasoned that chapter 151B, section 4(1) sought to
remove unnecessary barriers to full participation in the workplace by
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in the terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment. 2 ' The court concluded that a work
Guidelines define sexual harassment to include "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Id. The EEOC Guidelines further
provide that such sexual misconduct constitutes sexual harassment, whether or not it is linked to
an economic quid pro quo, if the conduct has the purpose or elect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working
environment." Id. at 65, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826 (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (3) (1985)).
15 See id. at 66, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas (BNA) at 1826-27.
16 See id. at 66, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827.
17 See id.
18 508 N.E.2d 587, 590, 46 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1406, 1409 (Mass. 1987). The court's
reasoning did not employ subsection 16A of chapter 15113, section 4, the subsection that explicitly
bars sexual harassment of an employee. See id. at 590-91, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1409.
The Massachusetts Legislature did not approve the subsection until six days after College-Town
was argued. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 151B, § 4 (West 1996) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
19 See College-Town, 508 N.E.2d at 591, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1410; see also
Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Manslchusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 N.E.2d 1192, 1198,
20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1804, 1807, 1808 (Mass. 1978).
20 See 508 N.E.2d at 589, 591, 46 Fair ERTL Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1407, 1409.
21 See id. at 591, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1409.
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environment pervaded by harassment or abuse, with its consequent
intimidation, humiliation and stigmatization, creates such barriers to
the full participation of an individual in the workplace. 22 The court
also concluded that the supervisor's harassing conduct was sufficiently
pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and
created a barrier "based solely on gender."23 Although the court held
that federal decisions concerning Title VII were not binding on its
interpretation of chapter 15113, it did note that its decision was in
accord with Meritor. 24 Based on the intent of the Massachusetts statute
and supported by persuasive federal precedent, the court held that
sexual harassment could constitute discrimination based on sex in
violation of chapter 151B. 25
In 1996, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that same-sex sexual
harassment claims are not actionable under Title VII. 26 The male
plaintiff, an employee on an offshore rig, claimed that two male co-
workers restrained him while his male supervisor touched the plaintiff
with his genitals and that the supervisor and one of the coworkers
threatened him with homosexual rape. 27 The plaintiff also claimed that
in Sundowner's shower facility the supervisor forcibly sodomized him
with a bar of soap while a coworker restrained him. 28
The court noted the plaintiff's arguments that Title VII's prohibi-
tion against sex discrimination and the Supreme Court's sexual har-
assment decisions, including Meritor, were formulated in gender-neu-
tral terms. 29 The court reasoned, however, that it was bound by Fifth
22 See id.
25 See id.
24 See id. at 590 n.3, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1409 n.3.
25 See College-Town, 508 N.E.2d at 590, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1409. In 1995, in
Smith v. Brimfield Precision, Inc., the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
("MCAD"), addressing same-sex sexual harassment for the first time, held that a plaintiff may
make a claim of same-gender harassment under chapter 151B. 17 MDLR 1089, 1095, 1096 (1995).
The male plaintiff in Smith alleged that hostile work environment sexual harassment by a male
coworker forced the plaintiff to quit his job. See id. at 1090, 1093.
The MCAD rejected the argument that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable, rea-
soning that such an approach would lead to an unduly restrictive application of chapter 151B.
See id. at 1095, 1096. Moreover, the MCAD noted that the Massachusetts statute defined and
prohibited workplace sexual harassment without reference to gender and that this prohibition
was in addition to the prohibitions of sex discrimination in the statute. See id. at 1096; see also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1(18), 4(1), 4(16A).
26 83 F.3d 118, 120, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
"See id. at 118, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1304.
28 See id. at 118-19, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1304.
29 See id. at 119, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 1304.
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Circuit precedent which barred same-sex harassment claims under
Title VII. 3° The court reiterated the reasoning of an earlier Fifth Circuit
decision that Title VII addresses gender discrimination and that, con-
sequently, harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate
does not state a claim under Title VII, even if the harassment has sexual
overtones. 3 ' The Oncale court thus held that Title VII does not recog-
nize same-sex sexual harassment claims. 32
51/ See id. The court referred to the Fifth Circuit precedent in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America. See id.; see also Garcia u Elf Atochem N Am., 28 F.Sd 446, 451-52, 66 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (DNA) 1700, 1704 (5th Cir. 1994). In Garcia, a male employee brought a Tide VII claim of
sexual harassment by a male supervisor for repeated incidents where the supervisor allegedly
grabbed the plaintiff's crotch. See 28 F.3d at 448, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1701. The
Oncale court noted that the Garcia decision left the Fifth Circuit with interpretive problems
because the Garcia court found an independent basis to affirm the grant of summary judgment
for each defendant. See 83 F.3d at 120, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (TINA) at 1305. Thus, sonic district
courts in the circuit treated the Garcia court's pronouncement on same-sex harassment as dictum.
See id. The Oncale court settled the issue for the Fifth Circuit, holding that Garcia's bar on
same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII was binding precedent. See id.; see also Garcia,•
28 F.Sd at 451-52, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1704,
51 See 83 F.3d at 120, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1505; see also Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52,
66 Fair Empi. Prac, Cas. (DNA) at 1704.
32 See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1305. By contrast, in Quick
v. Donaldson Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that protection
under Title VII extends to all employees and prohibits disparate treatment based on a person's
sex. 90 F.3d 1372, 1378, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 551, 556 (8th Cir. 1996). By allowing the
plaintiff's complaint to go forward, the court implied that Tide VII does not preclude a same-sex
sexual harassment claim. See id.; Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 47 11.5, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(DNA) at 181 ti.5. The male plaintiff alleged that other male employees sexually harassed him at
work in at least 100 incidents of "bagging," the practice of reaching for, hitting or squeezing
another man's testicles. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 552. The
plaintiff also alleged that his fellow employees harassed him verbally and made false accusations
that he was homosexual. See id,
The court reasoned that Tide VII protects both men and women because Congress did not
limit protection only to women or minorities in the language of the statute, See id. at 1377, 71
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 555. The court cited the Meritor decision's admonition that neither
a man nor a woman should be required to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work. See id. The court also relied on the EEOC Guidelines under
which unwelcome sexual harassment, can include verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.
See id.
The court concluded that the lower court erred in finding that "bagging" aimed at the
plaintiff's sexual organs, taunts alleging his homosexuality and other challenged conduct were
not of a sexual nature. See id. at 1378, 1379, 71 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 556. The court
noted, however, that harassment need not even be explicitly sexual in nature to violate Tide VII
because Congress intended to define discrimination in the broadest possible terms and so did
not enumerate specific discriminatory practices. See id. at 1377, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA)
at 555. The court reasoned that the proper inquiry for determining whether discrimination was
based on sex was whether members of one sex were exposed to disadvantageous working condi-
tions to which members of the other sex were not exposed. See id. at 1379, 71 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 556. The court decided that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the
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In 1996, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took a position different
from the Fifth Circuit, holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under
Title VII for same-sex hostile work environment sexual harassment if
the harasser is homosexual." The plaintiff, a heterosexual male, al-
leged that his openly homosexual male supervisor and five homosexual
male co-employees harassed him on a daily basis, making sexual propo-
sitions and engaging in sexually provocative contact with the plaintiff's
head, shoulders and buttocks." The court reasoned that Title VII does
not require that the perpetrator of sexual harassment be a different
sex than the target of the harassment. 35 The court reasoned that the
statute instead broadly prohibits employers, whether male or female,
from discriminating on the basis of sex against individual employees,
whether male or female."
The court further reasoned that a male employer who discrimi-
nates only against his male employees and not against his female
employees would be discriminating "because or the employee's sex no
less than a male employer who discriminates only against women."
Thus, the court saw no logical connection between Title VII's require-
treatment of men at Donaldson was worse than the treatment of women because the record only
revealed incidents of bagging male employees. So id.
33 99 F.3d 138, 141, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 186, 189 (4th Cir. 1996). The Fourth
Circuit had earlier taken the position, in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, that
a plaintiff has no cause of action for hostile work environment sexual harassment tinder Title VII
when both the perpetrator and the victim of the harassment are heterosexuals of the same sex.
72 F.3d 1191, 1195, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1082, 1085 (4th Cir. 1996). Acknowledging
that it faced a particularly egregious example of male on male harassment involving physical
assault, genital contact and requests for sex, the McWilliams court offered the following reasoning
for its refusal to find a claim under Title VII:
['Flo interpret Tide VII to reach that conduct when only heterosexual males arc
involved as harasser and victim would be to extend this vital statute's protections
beyond intentional discrimination "because or the offended worker's "sex" to
unmanageably broad protection of the sensibilities of workers simply "in matters of
sex." • . . There perhaps "ought to be a law against" such puerile and repulsive
workplace behavior even when it involves only heterosexual workers of the same
sex, . but we conclude that Title VII is not that law.
Id. at 1196, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1085-86.
The McWilliams court expressly reserved judgment concerning the possibility of same-sex
sexual harassment where the perpetrator was homosexual. See id. at 1195 n.4, 69 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1085 n.4; see also Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 189.
34 See. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 139, 140, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186, 187. The contact
included the supervisor rubbing his genital area against the plaintiff's buttocks and pulling out
the plaintiffs pants in order to look down into them. See id. at 140, 72 Fair Env]. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 187,
15 See id. at 142, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 189.
36 See id.
37 See id.
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ment that the discrimination be "because of the employee's sex and
a requirement that a harasser and victim be of different sexes. 38 The
court also noted that the EEOC's Compliance Manual addressed these
very circumstances." The manual concluded that a male supervisor
who makes unwelcome sexual advances toward a male employee be-
cause the employee is male, but does not make similar advances to-
wards females, may be sexually harassing the employee because the
disparate treatment is based on the male employee's sex." Thus, the
court held that a plaintiff may state a Title VII claim for same-sex
hostile work environment sexual harassment if the harasser is homo-
sexual. 4 '
During the Survey year, in Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that sexual harassment
prohibited under chapter 151B may include same-sex sexual harass-
ment, even where the harasser is not homosexual." The court held
that any verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that interferes
unreasonably with an employee's work performance by creating a
humiliating or sexually offensive work environment can be sexual
harassment under chapter 151B. 43 In this case, the male plaintiffs,
employees of 84 Lumber Company, complained of sexual harassment
by another male employee of the company.44 The harasser had grabbed
the plaintiffs by their genitals, fondled their buttocks, squeezed their
chests and touched them "everywhere." 45 He also exposed himself to
two of the plaintiffs and asked them for oral sex." Another male
employee also joined in the harassment, forcing one plaintiff's head
down towards the penis of the other harasser who had exposed him-
self. 47
The plaintiffs sued in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging sex-
ual harassment in violation of chapter 151B.48 The trial judge found
58 See id,
19 See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 190 (citing EEOC Comp].
Man. (CCH) § 615.2(6)(3) (1987)).
"See id.
4L See
42 676 N.E.2d 45, 48, 78 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas. (BNA) 179, 182 (Mass. 1997).
43 See id,
44 See id. at 46 & n.4, 73 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 181 & n.4.
45 see id.
46 See id. One harasser told the plaintiff that if the plaintiff did not perform oral sex on him,
the plaintiff could start looking for other work. See id. The harasser also told store employees that
he had been having sex with two of the plaintiffs and announced over the store's public address
system that one of the plaintiffs had given hint oral sex. See id.
47 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 46 n.4, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 181 n.4.
48 See id. at 46, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180.
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that one harasser had engaged in conduct of a sexual nature and that
this conduct was unwelcome 4 9 The judge ruled that this harasser's
"revolting and positively outrageous" behavior had the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiffs' work perform-
ance by creating an intimidating, hostile and sexually offensive work
environment and found for the plaintiffs on the sexual harassment
complaint.50 On its own motion, the Supreme Judicial Court took the
appeal directly and affirmed the Superior Court's verdict on the sexual
harassment claim.5 '
Because chapter 15113 included sexual harassment within discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex and explicitly barred such harassment, the
Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that sexual harassment was by legis-
lative definition a form of prohibited sex discrimination. 52 Thus, the
court determined that gender discrimination was not an essential ele-
ment of a sexual harassment claim in Massachusetts.53 Moreover, the
court noted that chapter 15113 defined prohibited sexual harassment
to include conduct of a sexual nature that interferes unreasonably with
an employee's work performance by creating a humiliating or sexually
offensive work environment. 54
The employer asserted that sexual harassment is only actionable
as a form of sex discrimination. 55 Therefore, the employer argued that
when same-sex harassment does not involve homosexual advances, the
harassment does not constitute gender discrimination and so does not
violate chapter 151B. 56 The court noted, however, that these arguments
relied heavily on federal case law under Title VII and observed that
the federal courts were not in accord on the issue of same-sex harass-
ment." The court stated that substantial Massachusetts precedent, in-
cluding College-Town, established that the court could make its own
49 See id. The trial court found that the harasser's actions were not romantic overtures to the
plaintiffs, nor were they inspired by sexual desire. See id. at 46 n.4, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 181 n.4. Rather, his actions were intended simply as horseplay on some occasions, and on
others, were motivated by malevolence and spite and intended to degrade and humiliate, accord-
ing to the trial court. See id.
5° See id.
51 See id. at 46 & n.3, 51, 78 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 180 & n.3, 185.
52 See Melnychrako, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
53 See id.
54 See id.; see also MAss. CEN. [Joys ch. 151B, §§ 1(18), 4(16A) (1996). 	 .
55 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 47, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 181.
56 See id.
57 See H. The court gave several examples of this split in the federal circuits: the Quirk court's
implication in the Eighth Circuit that same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable under Tide
VII without regard to the sexual orientation of the harasser; the assumption by the First Circuit
in Morgan tr. Massachusetts General Hospita4 901 F.2d 186, 192, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
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independent conclusions about the interpretation of chapter 151B.°
The court reasoned that an independent assessment was particularly
appropriate here because the language of the Massachusetts statute
differed significantly from Title VII.°
The court particularly relied on the Massachusetts statute's ex-
press definition and prohibition of sexual harassment.° Thus, the
court held that sexual harassment prohibited under chapter 151 B may
include same-sex sexual harassment, even where the harasser is not
homosexual. 6 ' The court held that any verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature that interfered unreasonably with an employee's work
performance by creating a humiliating or sexually offensive 'work en-
vironment can be sexual harassment under chapter 151B. 62
Justice O'Connor, in a dissent joined by Justice Lynch, argued that
the plaintiffs did not prove that they were sexually harassed because of
their gender.63 Thus, the plaintiffs did not establish the discriminatory
sexual harassment the dissent believed necessary for a violation of
chapter 151B.64 The dissent reasoned that the legislative history of
chapter 151B established the elimination of discrimination in the work-
place as the Legislature's single concern in enacting the statute.°
The dissent argued that the legislative history also makes clear that
chapter 151B is an anti-discrimination statute patterned after Title VII
as construed by the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex. 66 Justice O'Connor noted that these EEOC Guidelines provide:
"Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation . . . of Title V11." 67 The
1780, 1785 (1st Cir. 1990), that same-sex sexual harassment was actionable; the Oncale court's
holding in the Fifth Circuit that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable; and the Wrightson
court's holding in the Fourth Circuit that same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable where
the harasser is homosexual. See Meinychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 47-48 11.5, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 181-82 n.5.
58 See Melnychenko 676 N.E.2d at 47-48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 181-82,
59 See id. al 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182. The court observed that there is no
federal statutory language paralleling chapter 15113's explicit definition and prohibition of sexual
harassment. See id. Compare the federal and state statutory language, supra notes 2 and S.
°See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 51, 73 Fair Empl. Prat. Cas. (BNA) at 185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61 See id.
65 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 51, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 185 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
66 See id. at 51-52, 73 Fair Empl. Prac, Cas, (BNA) at 185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
67 See 676 N.E.2d at 52, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)). justice O'Connor observed that in Meritor the U.S. Supreme
Court endorsed the EEOC Guidelines as a proper interpretation of Title VII, commenting that
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dissent reasoned that the Massachusetts Legislature would have been
very explicit, which it was not, if it intended a different meaning of the
term than the EEOC's." The dissent thus objected to the court's
interpretation that the Legislature defined both nondiscriminatory
and discriminatory sexual harassment as discrimination on the basis
of sex." Rather, the dissent concluded, a valid claim for sexual harass-
ment under chapter 151B requires discriminatory sexual harassment,
that is, harassment that occurred because of the victim's sex. 7°
In Massachusetts workplaces, following the Supreme Judicial
Court's decision in Melnychenko, harassment of a sexual nature that
interferes unreasonably with an employee's work by creating a humili-
ating or sexually offensive work environment is prohibited, even where
the harassed may not be the victim of sex discrimination. 7' Thus, the
pivotal factors in such a claim appear to be the sexual nature of the
"when a supervisor harasses a subordinate beeause of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'dis-
criminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Id. (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added by J.
O'Connor)). The dissent noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that the defini-
tion of sexual harassment adopted under chapter 151B, section 1(18), is the same definition as
that in the EEOC Guidelines. See id. at 52, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The EEOC Guidelines read, in part:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-
ment or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a) (1996).
Compare the wording of these EEOC Guidelines to the very similar wording of chapter 151B,
section 1(18), supra note 2.
68 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 52-53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
" See id. at 53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182 (discrimination not an essential element of a sexual
harassment claim). Justice O'Connor suggested that the phrase "other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature" in the statutory definition of sexual harassment should be construed as a
reference to discriminatory actions taken because of the victim's sex. See id. at 53, 73 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); text of chapter 151E § 1(18), supra note 2.
The dissent argued that this interpretation would make the statute consistent both internally and
with the federal law on which it was patterned. Set Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 53, 73 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that such an interpre-
tation would necessitate a different result in this case because the plaintiffs did not prove they
were sexually harassed because of their gender. See id. at 51, 53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cam. (BNA)
at 185, 186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
7° See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 51, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 185 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
71 See id. at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182; id. at 53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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harassment and its impact on the work environment of the victim
rather than the sex or sexual orientation of the victim or harasser, or
any discrimination by the harasser." In the past, some employers may
have dismissed same-sex sexual banter, insults and innuendo and even
genital contact as mere horseplay, raising no serious sexual harassment
liability concerns for the employer." Massachusetts employers now will
have to treat such conduct as posing liability risks under chapter
1518.7' 1 Massachusetts employers will need to redraft company policies,
retrain employees and develop effective responses to all employee
harassment complaints of a sexual nature to reduce liability exposure
for sexual harassment claims in light of the Melnychenko decision."
Conduct that would have raised a red flag for Massachusetts employers
if it occurred between a male and female at the workplace now should
raise the same warning flag if it occurs between members of the same
sex. 76
Employee plaintiffs in Massachusetts now have an additional cause
of action where harassment of a sexual nature by same-sex supervisors
or fellow employees creates a humiliating or sexually offensive environ-
ment." Prior to Melnychenko, sexually offensive same-sex physical con-
tact or verbal harassment in the workplace might have only justified
tort claims like assault, battery or intentional infliction of emotional
distress against possibly penurious supervisors or fellow workers." Now,
in Massachusetts, such sexually offensive conduct may justify a sexual
harassment complaint against the employing company, deepening the
pool of possible defendants and causes of action."
72 See id. at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (13NA) at 182; id. at 53, 73 Fair Empl, Prac, Cas.
(BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
78 .See generally McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1198, 1199, 69
Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1082, 1088, 1089 (4th Cir. 1996) (Michael,J., dissenting) (discussing
cases that distinguished horseplay from sexually hostile acts or sexual assaults); Garcia v. Elf
Atochein N. Am,, 28 F.3d 446, 448, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1700, 1701 (5th Cir. 1994)
(management viewed conduct complained of as horseplay and not sexually motivated); 'Veiny-
chenko, 676 N.E.,2d at 46 11,4, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 181 11.4 (harasser's actions
sometimes intended simply as horseplay).
74 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
75 See id. See generally Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F,Sd 1372, 1377, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 551, 555 (8th Cir. 1996) (claim may be based in part on employer's failure to take proper
remedial action despite knowledge of harassment).
76 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
" See id.
78 See generally Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 191 (Murnaglian,
J., dissenting).	 •
79 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
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The Melnychenko decision is based on a straightforward reading
of the language of chapter 151B: "It shall be an unlawful practice . .
[f] or an employer, personally or through its agents, to sexually harass
any employee."80 Nowhere does the language of chapter 151B expressly
limit the prohibitions to harassment between a man and a woman. 8 '
Moreover, chapter 151B's expansive definition of sexual harassment
includes any verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when it
unreasonably interferes with an individual's work by creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment."
The statute also provides that such harassment is included within
discrimination on the basis of sex." Thus, the Melnychenko court's
application of chapter 151B to same-sex sexual harassment appears
squarely based on the terms of the statute, even where the sexual
harassment is not manifestly directed against an individual because of
his or her sex. 84
Though the Melnychenko decision is authoritative precedent only
in Massachusetts, it adds to the growing persuasive precedent in favor
of recognizing a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment nation-
wide.85 The persuasiveness of this particular precedent may be limited,
however, because the Melnychenko decision relied heavily on explicit
"Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 15113. § 4(16A) (1996).
81 See id. §§ 1(1), 1(5), 1(6), 1(18), 4(1), 4(16A); see also Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182 ("nowhere is discrimination because of a victim's sex made
an essential element of a sexual harassment claim in Massachusetts").
82 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 15113, § 1(18).
85
 See id.
84 See id. §§ 1(18), 4(16A); Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 182. The dissent in Melnychenko highlights the inconsistency between the majority's expansive
reading of actionable sexual harassment to include nondiscriminatory acts and the historical focus
of chapter 151B, and Title VII, on discriminatory acts taken because of the victim's sex. See
Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, j., dissenting).
The dissent particularly notes the disconcerting effect of prohibiting nondiscriminatory sexual
harassment by interpreting it as discrimination under the provisions of § 1(18). See ch. 15113,
§ 1(18); Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). But it would be more disconcerting to ignore the plain meaning of section 4 (16A)'s
unqualified prohibition of sexual harassment. See ch. 151B, § 4(16A). In reading the definition
of sexual harassment in section 1(18), it would likewise be disconcerting to "construe" narrowly
the phrase "conduct of a sexual nature," as the dissent does, to mean action taken because of the
victim's sex. See id. § 1(18); Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 186
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85 See, e.g., Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, III., 119 F.3d 563, 566, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141, 72 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 186, 189 (4th Or. 1996); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d
186, 192, 193, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1780, 1785, 1786 (1st Cir. 1990). For example, the
First Circuit has assumed that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable. See Morgan, 901 F.2d at
192, 193, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 1785, 1786, The Fourth Circuit has allowed a same-sex
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statutory language in the Massachusetts anti-discrimination law ex-
pressly prohibiting sexual harassment and defining it as sex discrimi-
nation per se." This language vitiated the strongest argument against
certain same-sex sexual harassment claims—that such harassment is
not actionable under anti-discrimination laws absent a showing that
the victim was being harassed because of his or her sex.87 Similar lan-
guage prohibiting sexual harassment and defining it as sex discrimina-
tion per se does not appear in the federal anti-discrimination statute,
and thus the case for wide-ranging same-sex sexual harassment claims
is more difficult to make under Title VII."
Although the dissent argued that the Melnychenko decision is a
departure from the anti-discrimination purposes of statutes based on
Title VII, the decision is in line with the underlying policy rationales
for the federal statute." With the admission that Title VII protects men
as well as women and addresses noneconomic as well as economic
barriers to equal participation in the workplace, the statute has become
a broad shield protecting all employees from certain forms of unac-
ceptable workplace conduct. 9° Courts have repeatedly stressed the re-
sexual harassment claim where the harasser was homosexual. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141, 72
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 189. The Sixth Circuit held that same-sex sexual harassment may
be actionable where the harasser acts because of homosexual attraction. See Ycary v. Goodwill
Industr.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 146, 150 (6th Cir.
1997). The Seventh Circuit held that same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable even where
the harassers were not homosexual. See Doe by Doe, 119 F.3d at 566, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 628. The Eighth Circuit implied that same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable by
allowing such a claim to proceed. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378, 71 Fair Empl.
Prae. Cas. (BNA) 551, 556 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 47 n.5, 73 Fair
Empl: Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 181 n.5. The Ninth Circuit noted that a viable claim of sexual
harassment might be possible by both a male and female employee against a male supervisor. See
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 58, 62
(9th Cir. 1994). The Eleventh Circuit held that a claim of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable
where the harassing supervisor was a homosexual who solicited sexual favors and conditioned
work benefits or detriment on receiving such favors. See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs.,
112 F.3d 1503, 1510, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1519, 1525 (11th Cir. 1997). At the federal
appellate level only the Fifth Circuit has held that, no matter what the circumstances arc, a man
harassed by another man has no claim under Title VII. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Doe by
Doe, 119 F.3d at 571, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 632 (only appellate court to so hold is
the Fifth Circuit).
m See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prue. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
67 See generally McWilliams, 72 F,Sd at 1195, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1085; Many-
clunk°, 676 N.E.2d at 51, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
" See id. at 52, 53, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 185, 186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1822, 1826, 1827 (1986).
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moval of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to the full par-
ticipation of individuals in the workplace as a policy rationale for
anti-discrimination statutes. 91 Severe or pervasive sexual harassment,
even where it does not appear to be because of the victim's sex, creates
such a barrier to workplace participation. 92 As one court observed in
the face of despicable forms of same-sex harassment, there "ought to
be a law . . . . "93
 Title VII already may be that law, waiting only to be
interpreted broadly enough to give relief to men and women driven
unnecessarily and arbitrarily from the workplace by conduct of a sexual
nature that creates an abusive, intimidating or hostile environment."
At present, the case for a claim of same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII is most readily made where it can be shown that the
victim was discriminated against because of his or her sex, that is, where
there was discriminatory same-sex sexual harassment. 95 The plain lan-
guage of the statute, the relevant Supreme Court and administrative
interpretations and the plurality of federal circuit decisions all suggest
that Title VII is offended where a person harasses employees of the
same sex because of their sex. 96
 The case for an actionable claim of
91 See, e.g., id. at 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827; College-Town, Div. of Interco,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Comin'n Against Discrimination, 508 N.E.2d 587, 590, 46 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1406, 1409 (Mass, 1987).
91 See generally Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 40 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827; College-Town,
508 N.E.2d at 591, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1409.
95 McWilliams v. Fairfax County 13d. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196, 69 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1082, 1086 (4th Cir. 1996).
94 See generally Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 1826-27; Doe
by Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 593, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 625, 650-51
(7th Cir. 1997); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1088 (Michael,
J., dissenting).
95 See Yeary v. Goodwill Industr.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1997). Title VII does not confine itself to discrimination occurring
between the sexes but instead makes it unlawful for any employer to discriminate against "any
individual . . . because of such individual's . . . sex." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994); see Fredette v. DV? Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505, 73 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) 1519, 1520 (11th Cir. 1997) ("There is simply no suggestion in these
statutory terms that the cause of action is limited to opposite gender contexts."). In interpreting
Title VII in Meritar, the Supreme Court also did not limit harassment claims to those between
sexes but instead indicated that when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate "because of
the subordinate's sex," that supervisor has discriminated on the basis of sex. See 477 U.S. at 64,
40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1826. Significantly, the administrative agency charged with
enforcing the statute, the EEOC, has interpreted Title VII to prohibit same-sex harassment if that
harassment is based on the victim's sex. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987),
cited in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
186, 190 (4th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, many of the federal circuits that have addressed the issue
have likewise held that Title VII protects against discriminatory same-sex sexual harassment. See
supra note 85.
96 See supra note 95.
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same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII may be weakest, however,
when there is no showing that an employee was victimized because of
his or her sex, that is, where the same-sex sexual harassment appears
to be nondiscriminatory.° For example, courts may have more difficulty
applying Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment where both parties
are heterosexual or where the harasser victimizes both men and
women equally." Ultimately, however, situations such as those where
men and women are equally harassed by a single harasser may provide
further impetus for Title VII jurisprudence to consolidate around the
approach of the Melnychenko court, allowing a claim for same-sex
sexual harassment even absent a showing of sex discrimination by the
harasser." It would undermine Title VII's intent to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in the workplace
to deny a claim for same-sex harassment because the victim is a man
if the same harassing conduct would be actionable if the victim were
a woman.'"
97 See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1085-86; see also
Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 51, 52, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 185 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
" See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc,, 83 F.3d 118, 120, 70 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1303, 1305 (5th Cir, 1996); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA)
at 1085; cf. Quick v Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379, 71 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 551, 556
(8th Cir. 1996) (male-on-male sexual harassment claim allowed to go forward where fact-finder
reasonably could conclude treatment of men was worse than treatment of women).
" See generally Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 566, 568, 74 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 625, 628, 630 (7th Cir. 1997); Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 182. Such a claim presumably still would require that the sexual harassment meet the
thresholds of pervasiveness or severity set out in Meritor. See 477 U.S. at 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1827.
Itl° See generally Doe fry Doe, 119 F.3d at 568, 74 Fair Empl. Pr ac. Cas. (BNA) at 630 (if plaintiff
were a woman, no court would have difficulty construing such abuse as sexual harassment).
Paradoxically, a seminal federal case opposing the acceptance of same-sex harassment claims,
Goluszek u H,P. Smith, also recognized the inherent sex discrimination in employers reacting
differently to female complaints of harassment than to similar male complaints. 697 F. Supp.
1452, 1456, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 317, 320 (N.D. 111. 1988); see also Williams, supra note 7, at
322 (providing that Goluszek is the seminal case ruling same-sex harassment not actionable under
Title VII). When an employer reacts promptly to stop harassment when a female complains, while
doing nothing to stop similar harassment when a male complains, the harassment of the man
may continue because of his sex. See Goluszek, 697 F. Stapp. at 1456, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 320. Goluszek side-stepped this problem by arguing Title VII was meant to protect discrete and
vulnerable groups at the workplace, and thus does not offer protection, for example, to a man
in a male-dominated workplace. See id, Other tribunals have criticized this interpretation as
unsupported by the plain language of Title VII, the legislative history of Title VII or the relevant
court decisions, or as simply illogical. See Freddie, 112 F.3d at 1509, 73 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1524; Smith v. Brimfield Precision, Inc., 17 MDLR 1089, 1095 (1995); see also Williams, supra
note 7, at 325.
514	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:365
Moreover, to require a plaintiff making a same-sex harassment
claim to show the harasser is homosexual, as the Wrightson court
suggests, may raise difficult problems of proof. 1 °' Notably, the courts
have not made the sexual orientation of the harasser an issue when
harassment occurred between a man and a woman, focusing instead
on the sexual nature of the conduct, its unwelcome aspect, its severity
or pervasiveness and its impact on the work environment of the plain-
tiff.'°' The presumption that sexual harassment between the sexes is
sexually motivated, while same-sex harassment is not, is an increasingly
dubious presumption in the modern workplace where employees have
different sexual orientations and where these orientations may be
openly expressed in some cases and repressed, denied or consciously
hidden in others. 1 °3
If courts accept the convincing logic of the Wrightson decision,
that same-sex sexual harassment by a homosexual is actionable, the
practical and legal difficulties of scrutinizing the sexual orientation of
harassers will probably necessitate further judicial evolution towards
Melnychenko's even more expansive reading of prohibited sexual har-
assmentP1 The Melnychenko approach avoids a problematic focus on
the sexual orientation of the parties and instead appropriately concen-
trates on the sexual nature of the harassing conduct and its effect on
the plaintiff's work environment.m The Melnychenko approach thus has
the advantage of giving a brighter line of guidance to courts, employers
and employees because what is impermissible does not vary based on
the sexual orientation of the harasser. ] °6 There is some statutory leeway
for such a broad interpretation of prohibited sexual harassment, be-
cause the full meaning of the phrase "because of sex" was not legisla-
tively defined under Title VII. 1" By presuming in all cases of harass-
to See Doe by Doe, 119 F.Sd at 589, 74 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 647; Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of Mn., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 186, 189 (4th Cir. 1996);
McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1088 (Michael, J., dissenting).
152 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66, 67, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827; Doe by Doe, 119
F.Sd at 588, 590, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 646, 648; Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377, 71 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 555.
105 See generally Doe by Doe, 119 F.3d at 588, 589, 74 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 646, 647;
McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1088 (Michael, J., dissenting).
101 See Doe by Doe, 119 F.3d at 589, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 647; Wrightson, 99 F.3d
at 141, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 189; McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198, 69 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1088 (Michael, J., dissenting):
155 See 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182.
106 See id.
157 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); Quick, 90 F.3d at
1378, 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 555; see also Meritor, 477 US. at 64, 40 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1825-26.
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ment, not just those between men and women, that whenever a person
sexually harasses another employee the motivation is implicitly "be-
cause of the victim's sex, Title VII could be fully utilized to prohibit
the creation of hostile work environments due to sexual harassinent.' 08
In conclusion, the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts deter-
mined in Melnychenko that sexual harassment prohibited under chap-
ter 1513 may include same-sex sexual harassment, even where the
harasser is not homosexual.'°9 The court held that any verbal or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature that interferes unreasonably with an
employee's work performance by creating a humiliating or sexually
offensive work environment can be sexual harassment under chapter
151B."° In Massachusetts, at least, whether workplace behavior is
barred as sexual harassment depends on the sexual nature of the
conduct and its effect on the work environment of the plaintiff and
not on the sex, sexual orientation or explicitly discriminatory acts of
the parties.'" This expansive conception of sexual harassment is well
grounded in the language of chapter 151B and advances the funda-
mental policy goal of eliminating unnecessary and arbitrary barriers
to the participation of individuals in the workplace." 2 Pathbreaking
decisions like Melnychenko help create a persuasive basis for widening
Title VII jurisprudence to include claims for discriminatory same-sex
sexual harassment and eventually may set the stage for a federal pro-
hibition on all forms of hostile work environment sexual harassment." 3
108 See generally Doe by Doe, 119 F.3d at 593, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 650-51;
McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1088 (Michael, J., dissenting).
109 See 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 182.
110
 See id.
ill See IS
" 2 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 40 Fair Eiupl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1827; Melnychenko, 676
N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 182; College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Conun'n Against Discrimination, 508 N.E.2d 587, 591, 46 Fair Empl, Prac. Gas.
(BNA) 1406, 1409 (Mass. 1987).
119 See Melnychenko, 676 N.E.2d at 48, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 182.
